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Foreword
Innovation in public services is going to prove crucial to the UK’s ability to meet the social 
challenges of the 21st century. However, at the moment, the UK does a poor job of developing 
innovations in the public sector. We are particularly weak in using innovations in one service to 
improve public services in others in the same locality or nearby.
Historically, nearly all innovation policy has been tailored to the needs of for-profit manufacturing 
sectors. However, there is an increasing thirst for understanding how finance, policy and 
institutions can support social innovation. Over the past year, NESTA and the Young Foundation 
have collaborated on two research projects that try to advance understanding of the UK’s ‘social 
innovation system’.
In this second project, we have conducted four in-depth case studies of UK local social innovations 
as well as five smaller case studies of innovative localities internationally. The findings challenge 
many widely-held assumptions about the most favourable conditions for social innovation and lay 
out an easy-to-use model and toolkit to help local authorities understand how to make more of the 
innovation that currently goes on and how to stimulate more.
NESTA does not like to do research in a vacuum. As such, we intend to take what we have learned 
here and put it to work in our practical programmes. Taken together and over time, we hope that 
we will develop a compelling vision of how to make the UK more socially innovative – to improve 
our economic competitiveness and social wellbeing.
As always, we welcome your input and your comments.
Jonathan Kestenbaum 
CEO, NESTA
January, 2008
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NESTA is the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts.
Our aim is to transform the UK’s capacity for innovation. We invest in early 
stage companies, inform innovation policy and encourage a culture that 
helps innovation to flourish.
Executive summary
The ability of local areas to innovate is 
unevenly spread
This report investigates why some places 
innovate more effectively to meet social needs 
than others. It is based on a series of case 
studies – in the UK and internationally – which 
explore how cities and localities have thrived, 
or reversed their decline, by finding new ways 
of tackling problems. 
For our case studies, we looked in detail at very 
diverse places. We found conclusive evidence 
that innovative capacity can be nurtured, 
even in unpromising circumstances. And we 
drew from them some common lessons about 
the importance of facing up to problems and 
underperformance; the role of leadership and 
organisational cultures; and, crucially, the 
structure of networks within the public sector 
and across organisational boundaries. 
Innovation is sometimes treated as a 
desirable luxury: in fact it’s essential
Many towns and cities in the industrialised 
world have experienced severe downturns 
over the last 30 or 40 years. These arose partly 
because of external forces. But they also 
reflected a failure to respond to these shocks, 
and to innovate quickly enough to anticipate or 
mitigate them.
Innovation is also essential for local 
government as a whole. One explanation for 
the decline of local government’s powers in 
the UK over the last 30 years is its failure to 
innovate sufficiently, or in the right ways, and 
its consequent inability to resist incursions from 
national government and quangos. 
Some common assumptions about local 
innovation are flawed
Our research challenges many previously 
widely-held assumptions about social 
innovation.
It shows that money matters – but in quite 
complex ways (and too much money can 
sometimes inhibit innovation). In none of 
our case studies are deep cultures of social 
innovation or the impact of particular 
institutions identified as critical drivers for 
innovation. Previous innovation studies 
emphasised the importance of local institutions 
having freedom to experiment. This freedom 
is undoubtedly vital, but our research also 
shows that constraints and restrictions can be 
important triggers and drivers for innovation. 
We found little evidence that citizens and 
public service users influenced innovation – a 
symptom of their relatively weak voice and 
choice in the UK. And we found little evidence 
that the management of innovation consciously 
drew on proven methods – a symptom of the 
relative underdevelopment of this field. 
The critical factors: the will to change, 
strong internal capacity, external 
resources and feedback
In the case studies, three groups of critical 
factors explained much of the dynamic of 
innovation:
The will to change that comes from •	
awareness of threat or failure (and, 
occasionally, from a sense of a new 
opportunity).
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The presence of internal capacities to •	
change, including leadership and culture.
Access to the external resources that help •	
change happen, including people, money, 
skills and networks, as well as the positive 
feedback that comes from providing the 
public with better services.
From this analysis, we developed a model to 
describe different aspects of the local social 
innovation process and to explore how local 
social innovation can spread and grow (and 
we showed how this model can apply to 
community organisations, frontline services and 
entire services). 
A model of local social innovation
Our model demonstrates the phases through 
which innovations evolve, from a latent phase, 
through development and mainstreaming to 
embedding. The model shows the changing 
relationship between authority, organisational 
capacities and demonstrable value for the 
public. It also sets out the priorities for leaders 
at each stage – and why innovations can fail at 
any point.
A main finding from the case studies is that 
local areas can improve their innovative 
capacity by building up their networks 
for collaboration, linking people across 
organisational boundaries to share information 
and ideas. As we show, the emerging methods 
of social network analysis (SNA) provide 
powerful tools for diagnosing innovative 
capacity and enhancing it. 
The right amount of innovation at the 
right time
In most services, at most times, the primary 
focus must be on effective implementation 
and incremental improvement. However, an 
organisation should always have some people 
focused on future possibilities – including what 
can be learned from elsewhere and from new 
ideas emerging locally. In times of rapid change 
– or underperformance – innovation often 
needs to move centre stage. The ideal stance 
for a locality is a subtle combination of creative 
energy, the willingness to try out new ideas, 
an eagerness to learn from others, and pride in 
presenting whatever results as utterly rooted in 
the area’s own history and culture. 
Local government has paid relatively little 
attention to innovation in recent decades. 
Far more effort has gone on performance 
management and compliance with targets. 
As a result, although there are many highly 
innovative local services and agencies, the 
system of innovation is deficient. Innovators 
and managers have had little help in navigating 
the several dozen contending methods which 
they could use. There are few mature systems 
for spreading successful local models. And 
the intermediary or broker roles which are so 
essential in other innovation systems are largely 
absent. Too little attention has also been paid 
to the bigger role that could be played by other 
local institutions, such as universities.
How to improve innovative capacity
We make a series of recommendations for 
supporting local innovation. The new National 
Improvement and Efficiency Strategy for 
local government1 could provide new ways to 
support local innovation, particularly if the 
emerging framework for Local Area Agreements 
(LAAs) allows localities greater freedom to 
experiment, and if central government commits 
to sharing the costs, and risks, of innovative 
new approaches in priority fields such as youth 
offending, carbon reduction or eldercare.
Although external pressures (including 
inspections) are likely to continue playing 
an important role in triggering change, 
performance frameworks need to evolve 
to assess and reward innovation – and the 
demand for innovation from elsewhere – 
rather than focusing exclusively on current 
performance.
Organisational capacity needs to be 
strengthened by nurturing leadership and 
internal cultures that support innovation. Those 
should include more deliberate cultivation of 
local networks, helped by methods such as 
SNA. Local government, public agencies and 
voluntary organisations need better access to 
the necessary skills for successful innovation – 
current support is patchy (ranging from courses 
on creativity and seminars on improvement 
to peer learning networks) and only weakly 
grounded in evidence about what works.
Access to external networks of money, people 
and skills must be improved. The UK needs 
a richer set of funding sources, to cover the 
diversity of types of need and risk involved 
in innovation (including grants, loans, equity 
LGA/CLG (2007) ‘National 1. 
Improvement and Efficiency 
Strategy.’ London: LGA.
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and guarantees). We also need a stronger 
range of intermediaries to broker links between 
different agencies and to connect creative 
ideas to practitioners on the ground. We found 
no localities which systematically nurture their 
own social, civic and public entrepreneurs (and 
many that see them as threats). Yet they are 
a vital force for renewal and are as important 
to the long-term vitality of localities as many 
more familiar assets.
All of the current methods in use – such as 
formal pilots, pathfinders and collaboratives, 
as well as the many methods drawn from 
design, technology, communities of practice, 
social entrepreneurship and venturing – need 
to be developed further and fitted better 
to the needs of local authorities and other 
organisations. In short, a field which remains 
ad hoc and short on evidence needs to mature 
quickly to help localities innovate effectively in 
response to challenges such as ageing, climate 
change, poverty and competitiveness. 
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1. Introduction
This report investigates why some places 
innovate more effectively to meet social 
needs than others. We know that most social 
innovations start off local – in the creativity 
and enterprise of people trying to solve 
everyday problems. But many areas fail to 
make the most either of their own ideas or of 
innovations that come from elsewhere, and 
many fail to adapt quickly enough to change.
This report draws on extensive research, 
including literature reviews and case studies 
from around the world, and from interviews. 
It looks at successes as well as failures. It 
aims to clarify which conditions best support 
and sustain local social innovation. And it 
provides guidance to future practitioners and 
policymakers. 
Over the last two decades in the UK, there has 
been a strong drive to tighten the performance 
management of local government. This has 
meant greater measurement and inspection of 
service delivery, as well as additional support to 
achieve improved outcomes. But performance 
management is concerned with the present. 
And all competent organisations must also 
address the future if they are to ensure a flow 
of new methods which can improve long-term 
outcomes. 
Despite its ubiquity, local innovation has 
been neglected – it has not been managed, 
measured, audited, taught or financed. And 
the few initiatives which have ostensibly been 
established to support local innovation have 
often been based on flawed assumptions. A 
good sign of the field’s neglect is that many 
widely-held beliefs turn out to be at odds with 
the evidence. 
It is widely believed, for example, that local 
innovation depends on: 
significant amounts of free money;•	
the absence of external inspection or •	
performance management;
deep cultures and histories of innovation;•	
the presence of a single entrepreneurial •	
individual;
demand from service users; and•	
key institutions, like universities.•	
Yet, as we shall show, these assumptions are 
at best unproven, at worst wrong. Moreover, 
although there are many different methods 
available for strengthening innovation and 
innovative capacity (with their origins in 
fields as diverse as design and technology, 
professional development, venture capital and 
social movements), remarkably little attention 
has been paid to evidence about what works, 
or to the most appropriate tools for particular 
tasks.
This report aims to provide a more coherent 
framework for thinking about innovation. It 
describes some of the key stages of innovation 
and how they can be managed well. Our model 
explains the links between the authority to 
act (which often comes from politics), the 
capacity to act, and the value that is created 
for the public at each stage of the process 
as innovations prove their worth. There is no 
universal formula for becoming more innovative 
– but there are strong messages about how 
localities can radically change their prospects.
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The research
This report is based on four detailed UK case 
studies, three international case studies and 
several other mini case studies, as well as 
accumulated experience and learning within 
the Young Foundation and its partners.
The UK case studies were chosen to focus on 
four contrasting areas at different stages of the 
innovation cycle. The lack of comprehensive 
data about the effectiveness of innovation 
meant that the perceptions of key stakeholders 
became a key criterion for choosing each case 
study. Each case study focused on a particular 
field of activity, recognising that no locality 
would be innovative in every field at any one 
time. The case studies chosen were: 
children’s services in the Highlands;•	
Knowsley’s secondary education;•	
social exclusion in South Tyneside; and•	
youth services in Tower Hamlets. •	
The UK examples are primarily focused on 
the public sector – partly a reflection of the 
importance of the public sector in the UK 
context, and partly to complement parallel 
work we have undertaken recently on 
innovations that grew more through the third 
sector.2
The international case studies looked more 
broadly at the roles of different sectors. The 
international case studies covered: 
Gouda in the Netherlands, exploring efforts •	
to deal with the marginalised Moroccan 
community;
Lille in France, with a focus on cultural •	
regeneration; and 
Pittsburgh in the United States (US), looking •	
particularly at workforce development. 
Smaller case studies of Cambridge, England 
and Portland in the US also fed into our 
findings and analysis. The research also draws 
on a very wide range of other examples of 
successful and less successful innovation 
around the world.
2. Background: why innovation matters
Innovation is sometimes presented as 
a desirable extra, something that local 
government or voluntary organisations might 
do when they have some spare cash. This study 
starts from the premise that innovation is much 
more basic than this: it is the condition for 
survival in a changing environment. This is true 
in many fields, from biology to business. But, it 
is also very clearly the case for localities. Many 
towns and cities in industrialised countries 
have experienced severe decline over the last 
30 or 40 years, with higher unemployment, 
dereliction and weakened institutions. This 
decline has often been the result of changing 
patterns of industry, technology and demand; 
the places most affected are those dependent 
on shipbuilding, steel or domestic tourism. 
Decline partly reflects the impact of external 
forces. But it also reflects a relative failure 
to respond to these shocks, and a failure 
to innovate quickly enough to anticipate or 
mitigate them. Some places have managed to 
turn themselves around, and to adapt against 
the odds. Others have not, and have paid a 
high price in declining prosperity, population 
and confidence. However, unlike other fields, 
decline in localities is not necessarily terminal. 
Businesses that fail to anticipate market shifts 
go under. In the past, declining nations were 
conquered by rising ones. But, in today’s 
environment, localities can drift downwards 
and adapt to a lower level of achievement. 
Innovation also matters for local government 
as a whole. There are many explanations for 
the decline of local government’s powers in 
the UK over the last 30 years. But one reason 
is its failure to innovate sufficiently – or in the 
right ways – to resist incursions from national 
government and quangos. There have, it is 
true, been innovative councils and places, but 
there have not been enough. And British local 
government as a whole has not innovated 
sufficiently visibly on the most compelling 
issues by comparison with some international 
counterparts. This is another reason why local 
government should take innovation much 
more seriously than it has in the past. In a 
world of intense competition between places 
and between different tiers of governance, its 
future depends on a sharper ability to adapt 
and learn new tricks.
The recent National Improvement and 
Efficiency Strategy3 signalled that the world of 
local government now recognises innovation 
as essential to long-term improvement. There 
Mulgan, G., Ali, R., Halkett, R. 2. 
and Sanders, B. (2007) ‘In and 
Out of Sync: The challenge of 
growing social innovations.’ 
NESTA Research Report. 
London: NESTA.
LGA/CLG (2007) ‘National 3. 
Improvement and Efficiency 
Strategy.’ London: LGA.
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The Improvement and 4. 
Development Agency for 
Local Government.
See www.lga.gov.uk5. 
See www.localleadership.6. 
gov.uk
See www.nic.nhs.uk7. 
See http://capacitybuilders.8. 
org.uk
See Mulgan, G. (2007) ‘Ready 9. 
or Not? Taking Innovation in 
the Public Sector Seriously.’ 
NESTA Provocation 03. 
London: NESTA. See also 
the string of material 
which will be available 
on the Social Innovation 
Exchange website during 
2008-9. Available at www.
socialinnovationexchange.org
Mulgan, G. (2006) ‘Social 10. 
Innovation: what it is, 
why it matters, how it can 
be accelerated.’ London: 
Basingstoke Press.
Ibid.11. 
Diaz, R. and Schneck, D. 12. 
(2000) ‘Innovative Service 
Design Among Bus Rapid 
Transit Systems in the 
Americas’ [online]. Available 
at: http://www.apta.com/
research/info/briefings/
documents/diaz_schneck.
pdf
A process of community 13. 
consultation that begins 
with contacting local 
community organisations 
and residents and concludes 
with the formation of an 
Action Plan for taking 
forward the decisions made 
during the process.
Landry, C. (2006) ‘The Art 14. 
of Making Cities.’ London: 
Earthscan. See also www.
waterfire.org. 
See http://english.seoul.15. 
go.kr/cheonggye/
See www.waag.org and 16. 
www.fixmystreet.com
See www.patientopinion.17. 
org.uk, www.schoolsnet.com 
and http://www.kafka.be/
are now several organisations dedicated to 
improving local capacity. Some are focused 
on local government (like the IDeA,4 the 
Local Government Association5 and Local 
Government Leadership Centre6); some on 
other parts of the public sector (like the NHS 
Innovation Centres7); and others are focused 
on the third sector (like Changeup).8 Whether 
these initiatives are adequate to the scale of 
change that local areas may face in the next 
two decades is unclear given the enormity of 
the challenges faced: these include adapting to 
a low carbon economy, to the new care needs 
of an ageing population and the integration 
issues presented by growing migration. 
Elsewhere in the world, the public sector and 
local government are taking innovation much 
more seriously. We have previously documented 
some of the new methods developing in 
countries as diverse as Denmark and Finland, 
Singapore and Taiwan, New Zealand and Spain. 
In most of these cases innovative localities are 
finding a new relationship with central agencies 
and departments – recognising that all benefit 
from better and faster innovation, and from 
some sharing of risk.9 Their experiences will 
provide a useful source of inspiration and 
challenge for the UK, hopefully raising the bar 
against which good examples will be judged.
2.1 What is social innovation?
We use the term ‘social innovation’ to refer 
to new ideas (products, services and models) 
developed to fulfil unmet social needs. 
Many are supported by the public sector, 
others by community groups and voluntary 
organisations.10 Social innovation is not 
restricted to any one sector or field. It can 
take the form of a new service, initiative 
or organisation, or a new approach to the 
organisation and delivery of services. Social 
innovation can either spread throughout 
a profession or sector – like education or 
healthcare – or geographically from one place 
to another.11 An extensive literature review of 
social innovation can be found in Appendix D.
Local innovations and creative places
Most social innovations start locally. In 
this respect, they differ from technological 
innovations which often emanate from 
multinational companies or research 
collaborations far away from the site of 
their eventual application. There are striking 
international examples of how a local 
innovation has led to systemic change. For 
example, the integrated transport system in 
Curitiba, Brazil has become a role model for 
fast growing cities around the world. This 
integrated system demonstrates how efficient 
public transport can provide a socially and 
environmentally superior alternative to the car, 
and has been influential in new Chinese eco-
cities such as Dongtan.12 
The US city of Portland, Oregon has long 
pioneered new ways of involving the public in 
decisions. Other places have also experimented 
with citizens’ juries and participatory 
budgeting, Planning for Real13 and large 
scale consultations. Singapore pioneered new 
methods of road charging, to be followed more 
recently by London. Paris has become a role 
model for extensive bicycle hiring. Freiburg 
showed in the eighties and nineties how to cut 
car traffic during a period of rising prosperity. 
And Barcelona demonstrated how a city’s 
public spaces could be transformed. 
Sometimes innovation has been very visible. 
Tirana’s Mayor Edi Rama ordered that several 
hundred old buildings should be painted in 
vivid colours to help kick-start a process of 
renewal. Gateshead’s Angel of the North 
was another powerful symbol of renewal and 
openness to creativity. The Waterfire display 
in Providence, Rhode Island, a display of one 
hundred sparkling bonfires beside three rivers, 
is intended to symbolise the city’s rebirth.14 Lee 
Myung Bak’s Cheonggyecheon development 
in Seoul, South Korea is an even more striking 
example of a physical redevelopment (a 6km 
reclaimed river through the middle of the city 
that went from design to delivery in little more 
than two years) that symbolised an ability to 
innovate and change rapidly.15 
Some of the most striking recent examples of 
local innovation are technological: the spread 
of single non-emergency phone numbers for 
example, or virtual cities like Amsterdam’s De 
Waag or the Fixmystreet website16 (developed 
by MySociety and the Young Foundation). 
There are also innovations in citizen feedback 
like Patient Opinion, Schoolsnet and Belgium’s 
kafka.be, which encourage citizens to comment 
on areas where public services could be 
improved.17 
There are also many examples of more formal 
testing and evaluation of innovations in 
local areas, such as the ‘Five Cities’ project 
conducted at Stanford in the early nineties, 
and the World Health Organisation’s Healthy 
Cities’ programmes, which showed how to 
improve health outcomes by intervening in a 
whole community rather than responding to 
individuals’ disease status. 
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The UK as a nation of local innovation
The UK has a long history of local social 
innovation. Some point to a golden era in 
the second half of the 19th century when 
local government developed new approaches 
to public health, utilities and welfare, whilst 
sustaining a vibrant civil society. But, in 
recent years, local government has often led 
central government on innovation, despite its 
constrained powers and budgets.
Woking Borough Council, in Surrey, pioneered 
radical action around climate change, with 
its approach to energy in public buildings. 
Its Climate Development Good Practice18 is 
thought to be the first of its kind, promoting 
voluntary cooperation between parties involved 
in the local development process with a view 
to achieve an 80 per cent reduction in carbon 
dioxide and equivalent emissions, whilst also 
mitigating against climate change. Other 
recent examples of local social innovation 
in the UK include choice-based lettings in 
Market Harborough, Leicestershire; integrated 
children’s services in Hertfordshire; joined-up 
bereavement services in Wolverhampton; the 
development of clusters of social enterprises 
to provide cleaning, shopping, gardening and 
care for the elderly in Leeds; ‘village agents’ in 
Gloucestershire to provide advice and guidance; 
and new models of affordable housing in 
Basingstoke and Deane, Hampshire.19 
What counts as innovation?
The word ‘innovation’ means bringing in 
something new. As such, it is not inherently 
virtuous. Innovations can fail, and they can 
damage services. But innovation also enables 
many fields of human activity to advance 
through the systematic experiment and testing 
that demonstrates what does and doesn’t work. 
Markets advance through multiple failures, 
as do science and product design. In the 
public sector, this sort of experimentation is 
inherently more difficult because failures are 
harder to explain and manage in the glare of 
public accountability. As we will show, this is 
one reason why innovation tends to happen 
only when other approaches have visibly failed.
However, our focus on innovation is not just 
about novelty. What is innovative in one 
area may have been tried elsewhere before. 
Innovations can also arise simultaneously in 
different places in response to similar needs 
and pressures. Indeed, it is often difficult 
to trace the origin of a successful idea, 
particularly when it is going with the grain of 
national policy. In any case, the public cares 
less about an idea’s origins or novelty than its 
effectiveness. 
2.2 What stands in the way?
It has often been assumed that local 
government cannot innovate because it is too 
bureaucratic and risk-averse. Town Halls are 
frequently seen as inherently conservative – 
more at ease with rules and regulations than 
creativity. National policies can further inhibit 
innovation. Specific targets can squeeze 
out the room for creativity; and risk may 
be discouraged in a culture where few are 
promoted for successful risk taking, but failures 
are quickly punished. For elected members, 
the imperatives of the electoral cycle can 
undermine attempts to push forward more long 
term plans for innovation. 
The voluntary and community sectors have 
often been thought of as the source of much 
local social innovation in the UK, especially 
in the delivery of specialist services for 
marginalised or vulnerable groups,20 while 
business has been seen as the source of 
innovations in service design and technology.
This perception has been reinforced in recent 
years as central controls have made it harder 
for local government to innovate. Tighter 
prescription of how services should be run 
and what they should seek to achieve have 
tended to reduce the scope for local enterprise. 
Similarly, complaints about ‘postcode lotteries’ 
have led central government to bear down on 
local pluralism.
There are certainly many barriers in the way 
of local innovation – and few councils manage 
innovation systematically. But the conventional 
accounts are misleading. They underestimate 
just how much local innovation takes place 
in every sector – even if it is inadequately 
recognised or supported. And they exaggerate 
the importance of factors such as the 
availability of free money.
It is true that some cities (like Pittsburgh) 
have benefited from the presence of 
foundations reflecting historic wealth, and 
some flexible funding often provides the space 
for experiment. But our research shows that 
much innovation happens without large-
scale additional resources. Indeed, pressure 
on resources often acts as more of a spur to 
innovation than plenty. The critical issue is to 
have the right kind of money that can fund 
ideas, and force their practical development, 
rather than propping up old and unsuccessful 
models. Similarly, central government 
See http://www.18. 
woking.gov.uk/council/
planning/publications/
climateneutral2/summary.
pdf
Audit Commission (2007) 19. 
‘Seeing the Light, Innovation 
in Local Public Services.’ 
London: Audit Commission.
Mulgan, G. (2006)  ‘Social 20. 
Innovation: what it is, 
why it matters, how it can 
be accelerated.’ London: 
Basingstoke Press.
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Audit Commission (2007) 21. 
‘Seeing the Light, Innovation 
in Local Public Services.’ 
London: Audit Commission.
Caryl, C. (2007) Why Apple 22. 
isn’t Japanese. ‘Newsweek.’ 
10  December 2007.
Borins, S. (2001) Public 23. 
Management Innovation 
in Economically Advanced 
and Developing Countries. 
‘International Review of 
Administrative Sciences.’ 67, 
pp. 715-731.
Porter, M. (1998) Clusters 24. 
and the New Economics 
of Competition. ‘Harvard 
Business Review.’ Nov/Dec 
1998, pp. 77-90.
Moulaert, F. and Sekia, F. 25. 
(2003) Territorial Innovation 
Models: A Critical Survey.  
‘Regional Studies.’ 37(3), 
pp. 289-302.
Palmer/Rae Associates 26. 
(2004) ‘European Cities of 
Culture 1985-1994.’ Study 
prepared for the European 
Commission. Brussels: 
Palmer/Rae Associates.
See University Continuing 27. 
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regulation and intervention is often blamed for 
hampering innovation. But, as we will show, 
although targets can be constraining, the right 
kind of external pressure has aided innovation 
more than it has hindered it. 
Local government at its best has shown that 
it can lead imaginatively, and to an extent 
that is hard in national government. Research 
published by the Audit Commission in 2007 
indicates that 95 per cent of English local 
authorities reportedly engaged in some degree 
of innovation in some or all areas of activity.21 
Quite what they mean by this is unclear, since 
many in the public sector confuse improvement 
and innovation, a confusion exemplified in 
industry by the difference between the type of 
continuous improvement of Japanese corporate 
culture, like Toyota’s production philosophy of 
kaizen, and the flexible ways of working that 
generated a company like Google or products 
like the Apple iPod.22 
But, in some ways, the remarkably high figure 
cited by the Audit Commission is plausible. 
Look in detail in any locality and it is not 
hard to find innovation. Much takes place 
organically at the frontline of service delivery 
in health centres, classrooms, youth clubs or 
community centres, and sometimes (although 
evidence suggests not frequently) as a direct 
response to demands from individual residents. 
It is rarely formally evaluated or analysed.23 
Because no institutions are charged with 
mapping, interpreting and spreading these 
innovations, they generally remain local. So the 
key problem may not be a lack of innovation 
but a lack of the means of making the most of 
it.
This matters because localness is not always 
a virtue. Wheels can be reinvented; ‘not 
invented here’ attitudes can inhibit change; 
and neighbouring areas are often unaware 
of each other’s innovations. Some impressive 
innovations from local areas in the UK (in fields 
as varied as arts policy, crime reduction and 
healthcare) only received national attention 
when they were taken up in the USA and 
marketed back to Britain. In short, we lack a 
mature system of innovation that is good at 
developing new ideas, appraising them and 
then spreading them. 
2.3 Existing thinking on local innovation
An extensive literature exists on why some 
areas are creative and innovative (some of 
which is discussed in the literature review in 
Appendix D). In economics, this work dates 
back to Alfred Marshall’s 19th century study 
of industrial districts, through the work 
of Michael Piore and Charles Sabel in the 
eighties, to Michael Porter in the nineties. On 
a broader canvas, Peter Hall’s work on creative 
cities and milieux has shown how particular 
cities have provided the ideas, images and 
arguments that shaped the world at different 
periods, and the importance of such factors as 
migration, bridging institutions and the ‘ethos’ 
of a place.24 Hall’s work emphasised how the 
greatest creativity has often come at one 
remove from the centres of power, in smaller 
cities, or in marginal parts of bigger cities. 
Charles Landry’s work over many years has 
also examined what makes cities creative, and 
in this decade Richard Florida has helped to 
spread these and other ideas to a wider public. 
All this work has identified a host of interesting 
features of dynamic and creative societies and 
economies – including the roles of intermediary 
bodies, incubators, universities, finance, 
creative industries and migrant workers, in 
encouraging and supporting the emergence of 
geographical innovation. 
The largest literature has been in the field of 
regional and territorial innovation theory. This 
has tried to explain the success of places such 
as Silicon Valley in California, or Bangalore in 
India, both acknowledged worldwide for their 
success in innovation within specific economic 
sectors. This literature has also tried to explain 
why so many emulators have failed – and why 
it is so hard to engineer a new cluster. The 
experience of Cambridge in the UK shows how 
clusters can sometimes stagnate.25 
A parallel literature has looked at why some 
places are culturally dynamic – from Memphis 
and Hollywood to Mumbai and contemporary 
London. Some places with illustrious pasts 
have reinvented themselves: Antwerp, once a 
great trading city, went into serious decline in 
the seventies and eighties and then reinvented 
itself with a very large multicultural population, 
with Moroccan, Turkish and Jewish-orthodox 
communities,26 and the work of organisations 
like Antwerpen Open (which was set up to 
organise big international events). Antwerp’s 
creativity has been widely recognised, from 
being the 1993 European Capital of Culture to 
Newsweek Magazine naming Antwerp as one 
of the world’s top eight creative cities in 2002. 
In the US, New Orleans, the birthplace of jazz 
and once the cultural capital of the South, 
is currently undergoing its own creative 
renaissance.27 After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
sustaining the arts has been at the forefront 
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of policy agendas, aiding in the regeneration 
of the city. Historic neighbourhoods are being 
revitalised with attention being given to 
their world-class museums. Organisations to 
preserve New Orleans’ music tradition such as 
the Tipitina’s Music Foundation and Save New 
Orleans Music have been highly involved in 
supporting local talent by providing shelter, 
food, medical support and new instruments 
to musicians devastated by Hurricane Katrina. 
Such initiatives have maintained New Orleans’ 
reputation as a world-class music hub. So, 
music continues to permeate the daily life of 
the city. 
In the UK, Bristol has also been acknowledged 
for the strength of its music scene and its 
talented young artists. From the late eighties 
to the mid-nineties Bristol was at the fore of 
new musical genres and talent as bands such 
as Portishead and Massive Attack achieved 
international recognition.
These examples are all suggestive for the social 
and public field. They confirm the importance 
of energy and commitment, the sometimes 
critical role played by institutions and the 
underlying role of culture. They also show that, 
in some circumstances, places can radically 
change their reputation and performance.
2.4 Social innovation clusters
Comparable clusters of social innovation 
exist in the social and public fields. Over the 
last decade, for example, Manchester has 
adopted many new approaches, from changing 
behaviour on its most deprived estates to 
reducing car use. Tower Hamlets, in East 
London, has a long history of innovation. It 
was the scene of radical welfare initiatives in 
the twenties, neighbourhood devolution in the 
eighties and a new approach to youth services 
in the early 21st century. In the last few years, 
South Tyneside has energetically innovated to 
transform service delivery for residents and its 
external reputation. Liverpool innovated in new 
ways of delivering services through call centres 
and the web. And, Knowsley is innovating in 
secondary education, replacing all its secondary 
schools with new learning centres by 2010.
Internationally, Pittsburgh has one of the 
highest numbers of social enterprises and 
charities in the US.28 During the last 20 years, 
Lille in France has adopted a number of 
innovative approaches to regenerate the city, 
tackling deprivation and other social issues.29 
Portland in Oregon has been described as the 
‘poster child for regional planning, growth 
management and a number of innovative 
urban planning policies’, through sustained 
innovation over several decades.30 
2.5 Why are some areas more socially 
innovative than others?
So why can some places innovate socially while 
others can not? There is a modest literature on 
social innovation in cities and regions. Works 
like Walker and Gray’s studies of diffusion 
of innovations in US states in the sixties and 
seventies focus on a few key characteristics 
of innovating places. One is the presence of 
strong leaders, and the effect of leadership on 
social innovation. These may be Mayors – like 
London’s Ken Livingstone, Jaime Lerner in 
Curitiba or Pierre Mauroy in Lille. Or, they may 
be social entrepreneurs, like Fazle Abed the 
founder of BRAC, a Bangladeshi organisation 
which works with people whose lives are 
dominated by extreme poverty, illiteracy, 
disease and other handicaps.31 In many of our 
case studies, the passion and commitment of 
particular individuals was critical to getting 
innovations started.
Another body of work has focused on 
organisational cultures. These suggest that 
local innovation is greater where there are 
large numbers of organisations which avoid 
excessively bureaucratic, hierarchical methods 
that hinder innovation.32 They adopt more 
decentralised, organic, and horizontal models33 
and ‘open’ working cultures where staff 
are supported and allowed to experiment. 
In principle, places where the main public 
agencies have an open organisational culture 
are more likely to innovate than ones that 
don’t. 
Our previous work on social innovation 
suggested some attributes that may be 
important in developing a socially innovative 
cluster. Innovation often depends on the 
right kinds of difference (what we called the 
‘connected difference’ theory of innovation).34 
Clusters need to link people and institutions 
with sufficiently divergent cognitive frames and 
cultures to spark off new ideas and insights, 
while also providing sufficient common and 
mutual understanding, and the right brokering 
and intermediary bodies.35 This combination 
is particularly visible in some of the most 
dynamic industrial clusters; it is also seen in 
some places generating more dynamic social 
ideas, which constantly bring together unusual 
partners, often using the skills and experience 
of people new to an area. For the public sector, 
such hybrid working is harder – and public 
sectors have tendencies towards homogeneity 
that can crush innovation. These theories are 
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borne out in most of our case studies, where 
a degree of ‘connected difference’ has been 
either deliberately or fortuitously created, with 
wide-ranging, dense networks linking diverse 
organisations and individuals in common 
projects.
What methods are currently used to support 
local innovation? 
Many methods have been used by local areas 
around the UK to support innovation. National 
government has used a variety of tools to 
support and reward innovators with various 
degrees of success. In the late nineties, the 
Beacon Councils approach provided additional 
support for strongly performing organisations 
(based on the assumption that these would be 
the most innovative or best able to implement 
innovations). More recently, the Innovation 
Forum was established by government as 
part of the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment,36 again to bring together a group 
of high performing councils in a loose network. 
Since the eighties, national Governments have 
also encouraged local ‘zones’ in enterprise, 
employment, education and health, which 
assumed a latent capacity for innovation, 
either within the public sector or more often 
outside, that can be untapped with freedoms. 
There have also been special budgets with 
competitive bidding for innovative projects 
(like the Treasury’s Invest to Save Budget or the 
much smaller budgets used in individual public 
services to reward ideas coming from the front 
line).
Local government itself has favoured mutual 
support for its own officials (like IDeA’s 
communities of practice), while the NHS 
has favoured collaboratives (like the Primary 
Care Collaborative), and the education 
system has used the Innovation Unit’s Next 
Practice approach for teachers and education 
managers.37 
Elsewhere in the public sector, different models 
have been used to generate and implement 
new ideas: ‘skunk works’, setting up small 
units within or at arm’s length from bigger 
agencies to develop innovative ideas; in-
house innovation teams such as Denmark’s 
MindLab or Kent’s community of practice. In 
this decade, there has been growing interest 
both in design-led methods – used by firms 
like Livework, often in collaboration with local 
councils – and open source methods which 
enable commentary on ideas, such as New 
Zealand’s recent use of a wiki for rewriting 
Police legislation. 
The Young Foundation, and its predecessor 
the Institute of Community Studies, has used a 
range of methods to support local innovations. 
One is a social entrepreneurship model in 
which new approaches are designed based 
on user experiences and research, and then 
demonstrated on a small scale in particular 
localities. This approach has been used with 
extended schools, patient-led healthcare, 
Healthline – the precursor to NHS Direct – and 
language translation services. Another model 
has involved bringing together groups of local 
authorities, national government departments, 
academics and other innovators to design, 
implement and evaluate new models. Examples 
include the Local Wellbeing Project, and 
Neighbourhood Action Network, which have 
involved over 20 local authorities.38 In addition, 
many other methods have arisen out of the 
arts, and from efforts to spur creativity such as 
open space meetings.39
All these methods have advocates. But, 
although each is promising, and some have 
achieved impressive results, there remains 
surprisingly little hard evidence on which 
methods work best – and where. In principle, 
given what is generally assumed about 
innovation theory, their effectiveness should 
depend on four factors: the urgency of change; 
the capital intensity of the service in question; 
the power of the professions; and the level 
of knowledge and evidence about specific 
interventions. But, as we shall see in the next 
section, one of the findings of our case studies 
was how little common understanding there is 
of which methods are available and which are 
most useful in different circumstances. This 
remains a rather less mature field than spatial 
planning or performance management.
3. Case study summaries
We drew on some of the ideas and research 
described in Section 2 to study a variety of 
case studies about places and agency initiatives 
in the UK, Europe and the US. We also tested 
the factors identified as encouraging and 
driving local social innovation. The case studies 
were chosen to reflect different types of social 
innovation (for example, process or service 
innovation) in different fields and at different 
stages. These are briefly summarised below. For 
a detailed analysis see Appendix C.
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The Highlands (UK): Children’s Services
The Highlands covers a third of mainland 
Scotland. It is the largest local authority in 
the UK. Since 1999, the Highland Council in 
Scotland has radically reorganised the delivery 
of children’s services, creating effective joint 
working between key agencies.40 This approach 
was both ahead of mainstream national 
practice and in tune with the overall direction 
of national policy priorities. The integrated 
service has been praised by Audit Scotland and 
has enabled the Council to make significant 
service improvements in a short period of 
time.41 In 2006, its success was recognised 
by the Scottish Executive, which selected the 
Highlands as a pathfinder for the rest of the 
country. The case study shows innovation 
coming out of a need to improve outcomes and 
arrest population decline, piloted by a small 
group of outsiders coming into the authority, 
but mainstreamed through new working 
practices that fundamentally changed frontline 
services
South Tyneside (UK): Social exclusion
South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council 
is the only unitary council ever to move directly 
from ‘fair’ to ‘excellent’ in the Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA).42 Since 2001, 
the local authority has developed a number of 
innovative projects to address social exclusion, 
including their Neighbourhood Appraisal and 
Action Planning project, and the Beacon-
awarded financial inclusion scheme pioneered 
by leaders in the local voluntary sector.43 South 
Tyneside has both pioneered new approaches 
and replicated and adapted innovations from 
elsewhere. There has been a shift in the local 
authority’s organisational culture to encourage 
staff at all levels to think creatively. The case 
study investigated this progression.
South Tyneside demonstrates the potential 
impact of a charismatic individual acting with 
the sanction of local politicians to tackle 
service failure. Innovation has developed 
incrementally, but has nevertheless involved 
considerable risk. Mainstream government 
funding has been used to reshape the 
authority’s culture and service delivery, and has 
inspired confidence and imagination amongst 
staff to experiment across the board.
Knowsley (UK): Secondary education
Knowsley has traditionally had some of the 
lowest GCSE results in the country, but is now 
in the early stages of implementing radical 
innovation to improve secondary education, 
through its ‘Secondary Transformation 
Scheme’. This includes the development of 
seven new learning centres, which will replace 
all of the local authority’s secondary schools 
when they open in 2010. Knowsley is at 
the forefront of several national initiatives, 
acting as a pathfinder for a number of central 
government projects around education.44 This 
case study shows how innovation can emerge 
from a sense of crisis and poor performance. 
It also illustrates how strong collaborative 
leadership can play an important role in the 
implementation radical innovation. 
Tower Hamlets (UK): Youth Services 
In 2002, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets 
awarded a number of local and thematic 
contracts to deliver its youth services to third 
sector organisations. Tower Hamlets was one of 
the first local authorities in England to develop 
a commissioning model for youth services, one 
element of new third sector strategy for the 
Borough. Tower Hamlets’ history and culture 
of social reform was a key factor that drove 
innovation. The combination of pressures to 
improve services, and a difficult local political 
scene, came together to drive innovation in 
commissioning, an approach that was radical 
at the time but is now mainstream within the 
authority and across local government.
Lille (France): Cultural regeneration
The Lille Métropole took advantage of several 
decades of decentralisation to push through 
a major programme of regeneration. As a 
result, Lille has become an industrial hub 
and commercial centre of northwest Europe. 
Projects to revitalise the area have been 
supported by innovative alliances,45 although 
much is attributed to the leadership of Pierre 
Mauroy, Lille’s Mayor from 1983 to 2001. Lille’s 
experience shows how devolution can drive 
innovation by freeing public sector agencies 
to act experimentally, to develop partnerships, 
and to take advantage of key opportunities – 
in Lille’s case, the Channel Tunnel rail link.
Pittsburgh (US): Workforce development 
and unemployment
Following the decline of many of its industries 
in the eighties, agencies in Pittsburgh are 
now tackling the resulting deprivation. The 
city has been identified as a hub of socially 
innovative activity.46 Pittsburgh benefits from 
the presence of many innovative organisations: 
several well established Foundations (often 
supported by wealth from previous eras); a 
number of Universities, many with an interest 
in social innovation; and an active third sector 
in the city. Pittsburgh is also home to a number 
of renowned social entrepreneurs including Bill 
Strickland. His organisation, the Manchester 
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Guild, strives to turn at-risk, disaffected or 
unemployed people into productive workers. 
This model has been replicated, offering 
programmes and support both for children and 
adults. Pittsburgh’s experience shows how local 
innovation can emerge outside central or local 
government when other organisations have the 
resources to experiment and develop new ideas 
to respond to social need. It also, however, 
illustrates the weaknesses of uncoordinated 
innovation, and how this can waste scarce 
resources and cause unproductive competition 
between agencies.
Gouda (Netherlands): Community cohesion
Gouda, like other cities in the Netherlands, 
has experienced tensions between long-
established Dutch residents and Moroccans 
– particularly young men – who settled in the 
city in certain neighbourhoods from the fifties. 
Educational achievement among Moroccan 
boys is low, and unemployment high. Against 
the background of national policy debate over 
‘multi-culturalism’, the state’s national and 
local response to the needs of the Moroccan 
community has become intensely politicised. 
In Gouda, these tensions play out at the city 
and neighbourhood level. The municipality 
was freed from many central government 
constraints on its activities in 2000. One 
result has been the development of intensive 
multi-agency partnership working to support 
young Moroccan men. At the same time, 
local groups have emerged to support the 
Moroccan community. Innovation in Gouda is 
springing up in several places to meet pressing 
needs. However, there is no overall plan or 
co-ordination, or even agreement between key 
parties about what is needed. New initiatives 
consequently appear to be fragile.
Portland (US): Social innovation
Portland is often cited as one of the most 
liveable cities in the United States47 and as 
a model for ‘smart growth’.48 It has been 
described as a ‘city of engaged citizens’,49 
bucking the trend towards declining 
involvement in civic life in the US. This case 
study allowed us to investigate a location 
where social innovation has occurred in 
many different sectors and fields and where 
change appears to have come from bottom-up 
community pressure.
Cambridge (UK): Technological innovation
In Cambridge, population growth from the 
London region together with the emergence of 
new enterprises from University of Cambridge 
staff and students in the 1960s fuelled the 
growth of science-based enterprises. Since 
that time, Cambridge has been known for its 
technological innovation, establishing science 
parks and formal and informal networks to 
sustain this expertise. It remains the UK’s best 
known example of a technology cluster.
4. Findings
4.1 What drives local social innovation?
The case studies examine what happened 
in these very diverse places. As always with 
such stories, the specifics are often the most 
fascinating: the dynamic individuals or teams 
who radiate confidence because of their 
passion and vision; the new narratives that 
helped to give shape to disparate actions; the 
crises and moments when disaster appeared 
imminent, but was then averted. However, 
there are some common characteristics: in the 
UK cases, in particular, measured or inspected 
underperformance was a powerful spur to 
change.
There were also several stories which we 
expected to find but which did not materialise. 
We wanted to find evidence of bottom-
up influence on innovation from citizens 
and users.50 But, in practice, in most of the 
UK’s public services, citizens are relatively 
passive onlookers – the key players are 
policymakers, managers and professionals. 
Although residents’ participation was critical 
in implementing change in South Tyneside, 
their opportunities to influence decisions have 
been more a result of recent innovation than 
a cause of it. Across the UK as a whole, the 
public’s lack of formal powers of voice and 
choice provide one explanation for this, as do 
the absence of competition and the absence 
of powerful organisations to represent the 
interests of users.
We also expected to find more evidence of 
deliberate methods being used to manage 
innovation. In practice, many senior managers 
and politicians have improvised, drawing 
together insights and experiences – but with 
nothing like the formal support available in 
fields like public procurement or financial 
management. As we have described in Section 
2.5, there are at least 20 contending methods 
for supporting innovation in the public sector, 
each with their own advocates, but with very 
little help within local government to enable 
practitioners to decide which one to use in 
different situations.
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Politics is bound to be a big part of the story 
of local transformation, and in some cases 
political leaders did indeed play a decisive 
role, particularly in giving officers permission 
to act boldly. However, a distinctive feature 
of the UK scene is the relative weakness of 
elected leaders (with rare exceptions like 
Ken Livingstone in London, Richard Leese in 
Manchester or Sandy Bruce-Lockhart in Kent), 
and local politicians do not play a particularly 
prominent role in the UK case studies. 
Backbench councillors are even more cut off 
from power.51 By contrast, senior officials take 
on a crucial leadership role in quite a few of the 
cases. 
James, S. and Cox, E. 51. 
(2007) ‘Ward councillors 
and community leadership: 
a future perspective.’ North 
Yorkshire: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation.
Case study area           Trigger                    Drivers                              Enablers
Highland Children’s 
Services
Knowsley Secondary 
Education
South Tyneside 
Social Exclusion
Tower Hamlets Youth 
Services
Report by external 
consultancy
1999 Ofsted 
inspection
2000 Ofsted 
inspection and two 
Audit Commission 
reports
Ofsted inspection in 
the late nineties – 
threat of service being 
identified as failing
Underperformance
Charismatic 
Leadership
Capacity restraints due 
to resources having to 
cover sparse 
population over a large 
geographical area 
Crisis and 
underperformance
Leadership from a 
number of different 
agencies
Organisational culture 
that is willing to 
accept risk
Underperformance
Charismatic 
Leadership
Organisational 
culture of strong 
communication, risk 
taking and ‘no blame’ 
ethos
Underperformance
Local political pressure 
from unstable political 
environment
Leadership from local 
political figures and 
senior officers in the 
Council
Organisational culture
Collaboration and 
Partnership working
National policy 
framework to 
integrate 
Children’s Services
Political support and 
stable political 
environment
National policy 
framework and 
international policy 
debates e.g. The 
Excellence in Cities 
Programme, Every 
Child Matters, 
Building Schools for 
the Future Programme
Partnership working
Political Support
National policy 
framework 
External funding 
(NRF)
Capacity of the third 
sector
Local culture of 
innovation
Flexible funding to 
support new 
management 
teams/consultants 
Table 1: Summary of drivers and enablers from case studies 
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4.2 The critical factors
From the case studies, we have identified three 
groups of critical factors which together explain 
a great deal about how and why innovation 
happened. 
4.2.1 The sharp external push that 
galvanised the will to change
Social innovation can happen when people 
are simply persuaded of a good idea. But it is 
much more likely to happen when it becomes 
a necessity and when there is a powerful force 
to drive it. In the case studies these pressures 
included very visible service or performance 
failure, extreme need (in comparison to peers) 
and the requirements of government policy. 
Critical factors include:
Recognition of underperformance•	  by 
leaders. This can be forced on a locality 
by external agencies – such as the Audit 
Commission and other inspectorates in the 
UK. In other cases the pressure may come 
from the public, media or business. 
This then legitimises •	 urgent action by 
internal stakeholders - local politicians and 
senior officials – sometimes allowing them to 
take actions they already wanted to take. 
Government policy•	  and the actions of 
regulatory bodies can also act in a similar 
way.
4.2.2 Strong internal capacity to develop 
innovations and put them into practice
The pressure to change is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for innovation. It also 
requires the right leadership, structures and 
culture – and we found many cases where there 
was a will to change, but inadequate skills or 
capacity to see it through. 
Critical factors include: 
Strong leadership•	  from supportive political 
leaders or a group of senior management 
- often including individuals deliberately 
brought in to galvanise change 
Creation of a •	 responsive organisational 
culture with shared understanding of 
Case study area           Trigger                    Drivers                              Enablers
Pittsburgh
Unemployment and 
workforce develop-
ment
Lille
Regeneration of 
governance structures
Gouda
Building community 
cohesion
Collapse of the steel 
and coal industry 
resulting in mass 
unemployment in the 
eighties
Leadership in the form 
of a new Mayor in 
1973
Clashes between 
Moroccan youth in 
2002
Crisis
Collaborative 
leadership from 
Universities and 
Foundations
Resources from  
previous wealth
Need resulting from 
widespread deprivation
Strong collaborative 
leadership
Strong informal 
networks
Leadership and 
influence from senior 
officials in the Council 
and community 
organisations
Social problems within 
the Moroccan 
community
Strong informal 
networks 
Local culture of 
innovation
Long term leadership
Decentralisation of 
central government
Attitude to risk 
concentrating more 
on meeting needs 
than on finance
Devolving of power to 
local government
Available funding from 
central government 
funds and housing 
corporations
Source: Young Foundation (2007)
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the task and risk taking encouraged 
and supported both individually and 
institutionally. 
4.2.3 Mobilising the right external resources 
and using public feedback to reinforce 
change
Successful innovations mobilise support and 
resources from a range of sources – galvanising 
stakeholder support, partnerships and funding, 
and mobilising a set of networks to embed 
change.
Critical factors include:
Staff with the right skills •	 to innovate and 
implement new ideas, who are often the 
main resource needed to support innovation. 
Finance•	  to support innovation becomes 
more important in the later stages of the 
process as new ways of working or new 
initiatives become established.
Formal or informal networks •	 at a variety of 
levels allow support to be gathered, and they 
also ensure collaboration – often these have 
been very consciously cultivated. 
Visibly creating value•	  for the public is 
critical to maintaining momentum and 
building legitimacy.
4.3 Our case studies: the journey to 
successful innovation 
Our case studies suggest a clear relationship 
between these factors at different times in the 
process of local social innovation.
4.3.1 The external push
Underperformance	and	failure
In each case study, an underperforming 
or failing service was the primary driver of 
social innovation. An external intervention 
(either in the form of a negative performance 
assessment or the prospect of one) acted as 
a catalyst for change. But this often built on 
pre-existing conditions such as awareness of 
underperformance or local political pressure for 
improvement. 
However, the case studies show that awareness 
of underperformance is not in itself a 
sufficiently powerful factor to drive innovation. 
In each case study, underperformance in a 
particular service (or cross-cutting theme 
in the case of South Tyneside) had been 
acknowledged internally and externally for a 
number of years, but no action was taken.
What appeared to be crucial in each of our 
UK case studies was the recognition of failure 
and the decision by political leaders to act at 
a specific time. In South Tyneside, Knowsley 
and the Highlands, the direction of national 
policy priorities aligned closely with local 
needs, helping to create an environment that 
was supportive of innovation. This influenced, 
to different degrees, the local authorities’ 
approach to innovation. Tower Hamlets’ 
experience tells a different story: the Borough’s 
pioneering work at the outset was not explicitly 
encouraged by central government priorities at 
the time, however neither was it in opposition 
to mainstream policy.
When considering our international case 
studies, underperformance and a failure to 
meet social needs again emerge as drivers of 
innovation. Significant deprivation and high 
levels of unemployment in Lille and Pittsburgh 
following industrial decline drove social 
innovation. In Gouda, the particular social 
needs of one community, and the perceived 
problems this caused others, also spurred 
new ways of working. Portland’s experience 
grew out of need but innovation appears to 
have been accelerated by public pressure, 
particularly from community activists, more 
than by external push factors – a very different 
trajectory from our other case studies.
Recognition	from	central	government
Recognition and connections to central 
government appear to be important factors 
in consolidating or embedding local social 
innovation within the UK. Fieldwork from our 
UK case studies suggests that this plays a key 
role in building a local authority’s reputation for 
innovation, which impacts on the confidence 
of leadership teams and frontline staff. Gaining 
such a reputation, and pursuing policies in 
line with national priorities, makes it easier to 
access additional resources and to reduce the 
risks associated with change. A reputation for 
innovation then changes recruitment patterns 
by attracting new staff interested in working 
in an innovative and creative environment. 
However, there is no direct connection between 
the extent and impact of local social innovation 
and the level of recognition that local 
authorities receive from central government 
and the local authority community. This reflects 
the limited capacity of UK central government 
departments to systematically spot, analyse 
and promote local innovations.
4.3.2 Internal capacity
Leadership
In many of our case studies, the process of 
innovation followed a very similar pattern. Once 
political leaders recognised underperformance, 
a political commitment was made to adopt a 
particular way forward – in effect an innovation 
strategy. This was often followed swiftly by 
the creation of new senior management teams 
tasked with implementation. In each UK local 
authority, this involved bringing in senior 
managers from outside the organisation to 
establish change, or play a key role in driving it 
forward. 
Leadership can also come from other sectors. In 
South Tyneside, new ways of tackling financial 
inclusion were driven by an agency leader 
outside the public sector who used his strong 
informal networks and social capital to build 
partnerships between agencies operating in the 
area. In Pittsburgh, the city’s well established 
universities and foundations recognised that 
social needs were not being met, and worked 
together to push forward change; with local 
politicians and government playing a far less 
important role. In Gouda, however, key local 
politicians were critical in supporting changes 
in the municipality’s approach.
New leadership teams in the UK case studies 
focused on creating a culture that supported 
innovation at an early stage. Their emphasis 
was on communicating a clear vision for change 
and improvement to frontline staff and service 
managers, motivating staff to take on new 
responsibilities, creating space for people to 
think about experimentation and innovation, 
and building an environment in which staff felt 
supported to take risks. 
South Tyneside and the Highlands formalised 
this by creating specific initiatives and 
structures to gather and test new ideas from 
frontline staff. In South Tyneside, a ‘no blame’ 
culture in the authority encouraged staff to 
articulate and try new approaches and ideas. 
In Tower Hamlets, ‘continuous improvement’ 
was emphasised by political leaders and senior 
officers. This influenced a wide range of 
services, improving staff morale and creating 
a new sense of opportunity. In Lille, too, the 
public and third sectors are now more flexible, 
particularly about risk and change. 
Learning
Our fieldwork suggests that reflective learning 
is important to support innovation. In each 
case study, interviewees reported a new focus 
on continual evaluation and experimentation at 
the frontline. Although this was not formalised, 
staff were empowered to think about 
improvement and to put forward and test new 
ideas. Reflective learning requires a strong 
feedback process between agencies working 
in partnership, between frontline services and 
senior managers, and between third sector 
organisations or other external bodies and 
public services. 
Current thinking in English local government 
encourages improvement and learning through 
the adoption of ‘best practice’ from other 
authorities. However, ‘best practice’ had little 
or no impact in our UK and international 
case study areas. For Tower Hamlets, there 
was little or no evidence or experience about 
commissioning models in local government 
at the time they initiated change that could 
be adopted and applied locally. The unique 
geographical and social circumstances in the 
Highlands prevented the authority from finding 
a model elsewhere that could successfully 
be applied locally. Knowsley carried out an 
extensive review of new approaches to learning 
and education from around the world, but 
found little evidence in the UK that could be 
incorporated into its agenda for transforming 
secondary education. 
In our international case studies, there 
was also limited reference to best practice. 
Pittsburgh and Lille focused on their individual 
circumstances and set about to address these 
needs in ways appropriate to their unique 
situation. In Gouda there was no agreement 
about ‘best practice’ and what in fact 
constituted innovation. Indeed, innovation was 
found to be running contrary to some elements 
of national government policy. 
4.3.3 Mobilising resources
Collaboration	and	partnership	working
In Knowsley, South Tyneside, the Highlands, 
Pittsburgh and Lille, multi-agency collaboration 
was central to innovation and an important 
driver of change. Partnership working was used 
to embed a vision across multiple agencies, 
tackle problems holistically, and improve the 
capacity of individual agencies to respond to 
local needs. In many cases, agencies realised 
that they needed to work together across 
sectors to bring about effective change, 
recognising their inability to tackle significant 
need alone.
Access	to	funding
The case studies indicate that access to 
significant ‘free’ funding is not always critical 
for innovation. However, in some of the 
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cases it did play an important role to deliver 
innovation, although not necessarily to 
kickstart new creative thinking. Knowsley used 
Neighbourhood Renewal Funding (NRF) and 
capital resources from the Excellence in Cities 
programme to build three learning centres to 
pilot new ideas about classroom layouts and 
new teaching approaches, building on early 
work with Liverpool University. South Tyneside 
used substantial NRF funding to support the 
early stages of its new approach to social 
exclusion. In the Highlands and Knowsley, 
government ‘pathfinder’ status increased 
resources and led to national recognition. In 
Tower Hamlets, new funding through NRF 
and other sources enabled the local authority 
to expand its central Youth Services team 
and develop new initiatives. In Pittsburgh, 
agencies benefited from significant funding 
from foundations in the city, though as much 
to support and sustain existing innovations as 
for new ideas. 
However, new money can sometimes reduce 
the pressure to innovate. It can prop up 
failing services and structures (this has been 
a common critique of regeneration funding). 
It is only when new money combines with a 
reforming leadership and urgency of need that 
it has the required impact. Additional resources 
can have most impact in genuine new trials 
and pilots, and their extension, rather than 
simply going into general budgets. As we 
argue later, despite the proliferation of new 
funding schemes around UK local government 
(including PPPs, PFIs, BIDs52 and others) 
there has still been very little use of new 
financing devices to support innovation, such 
as convertible grants or loans, equity stakes 
in new social enterprises, or overt risk sharing 
between national and local government in 
priority areas.
5. Modelling social innovation
From this analysis, we have developed a series 
of models which help to describe different 
aspects of the local social innovation process.
First, we created a model to illustrate the •	
different phases in the local social innovation 
lifecycle, based on the experience of our case 
studies. 
Second, we identified the alignment •	
of factors needed to drive and enable 
local social innovation at each phase of 
development. 
Third, we looked at the networks, structures •	
and interventions required for innovation to 
be transferred from place to place or service 
to service, in order for a locality to move from 
being innovative in one field to innovating 
more widely.
5.1 The local social innovation lifecycle
Our case studies included both areas where one 
particular service or sector was innovating in 
isolation – Children’s Services in the Highlands, 
for example – and others where the culture and 
processes necessary to nurture innovation had 
become more widespread.
In Portland, there are examples of innovation 
in fields as diverse as the environment, health, 
civic participation and urban planning. In 
recent years, local authorities in the UK, such 
as Manchester and Kent, have also shown an 
ability to innovate in many fields, suggesting 
Public Private Partnerships, 52. 
Private Finance Initiatives 
and Business Improvement 
Districts.
Phases of the Local Social Innovation Life cycleEarly Late
Latent Design &
Discovery
Mobilisation Main streaming Embedding
Period of
under-performance
or gradual
improvement
before innovation
occurs
Strategy and
process for
innovation are
developed
Piloting innovative
ideas, developing
new structures and
terms, and beginnig
to implement
innovations
Innovation
becomes routine
as ideas and
working
practice are
main streamed in
one place, service,
or sector
Value of
innovation
grows. Systemic
innovation may
occur, where
the locality has
potential to
innovate in
other sector
Figure 1: Phases of the local social innovation lifecycle
Source: Young Foundation (2007)
that the potential to innovate had become 
embedded in the local authority’s way of 
working.
Our findings which led us to develop the social 
innovation lifecycle (Figure 1) match other 
research which suggests that patterns of social 
innovation are fairly similar whether the unit is 
a community organisation, a frontline service 
or an entire service. These patterns include 
the pressures to change, the development of 
fragmentary new ideas in response to needs 
and circumstances, and their subsequent 
development, testing and mainstreaming.
Phase	0:	Latent
In the latent phase, the critical issue is 
what trigger will prompt innovation. In the 
majority of our case studies, especially in 
Tower Hamlets, Knowsley, Highlands and 
South Tyneside, underperformance and its 
recognition by external bodies acted as the 
trigger for change. In other cases a mix of 
other factors may act as triggers. In Portland, 
a maturing sense of distinctive civic culture 
played a part, providing a narrative into which 
specific innovations could be placed. 
Phase	1:	Design	and	Discover
The design and discover phase of local social 
innovation is characterised by turbulence and 
a high possibility of failure. In this stage, the 
strategy for innovation is developed and a 
variety of approaches will be discussed and 
developed. Many of these innovations may be 
taken forward below the radar.
Phase	2:	Mobilisation
During the mobilisation phase, approaches to 
innovation are selected and the innovation is 
piloted by existing or new teams. Knowsley 
is now at this stage in the innovation process, 
creating structures and teams to support its 
new learning centres. In this phase, various 
innovations may fail and come to an end 
(possibly because they do not work) or they 
may not have enough support (internally or 
from other agencies), resources (staff time or 
money) or leadership. 
Phase	3:	Mainstreaming
If an innovation is seen to work, it may then 
be mainstreamed. Its implementation grows 
in scale and becomes routine. Resisters stop 
fighting against the new idea, and resources 
come in behind it. The Highlands have now 
moved into a period where innovation is being 
consolidated and embedded within local 
agencies’ work.
25
Source: Young Foundation/NESTA (2007)
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Phase	4:	Embedding
In a fourth phase, the gains made in one 
service or sector can help to encourage 
innovation in other fields or sectors, thanks 
to inspiration or infection. As this happens, 
the whole area or public sector may come to 
think of itself as innovative. Our case study 
of Tower Hamlets found some signs that this 
stage had been reached as the commissioning 
approach had been extended to other parts 
of the local authority, partly inspired by their 
success in establishing a nationally recognised 
model. In South Tyneside, the success of 
their innovations around social exclusion had 
raised confidence across the authority, which 
was reinforced by national recognition and 
an internal cultural change that promoted 
creativity and controlled risk taking.
Maintaining this level of momentum is hard. 
Complacency may set in and what was flexible 
and flourishing may stagnate. However, there 
are plenty of places that have sustained a 
strong level of innovation across different fields 
over many years. 
This chart provides a rough picture of these 
phases – and a reminder that at each point of 
transition the process may go into reverse. It 
also emphasises our contention that the key 
purpose of innovation is to create new value 
for the public (captured by the left hand axis) 
and that this is the only genuine measure of 
success. 
5.2 Aligning factors in different phases
The leaders and managers who oversee 
innovations are working in risky territory. 
As Rosabeth Moss Kanter once put it, every 
success looks like a failure in the middle.53 To 
understand how they should best manage the 
different factors that shape innovations we 
have adapted the ‘Strategic Triangle’ approach 
developed by Mark Moore as part of his model 
for public value.54 This triangle helpfully brings 
together:
Authority•	 : the external pressures that 
authorise change (and which are sometimes 
refracted through a political leadership); 
Organisational capacity•	 : the internal 
capacities to change and deliver (including 
culture, management and staff capability); 
and 
Value•	 : the feedback that comes back to 
the leadership team, both through external 
networks and through the visible value and 
benefits created for the public that provide 
legitimacy for any innovation.
Kanter, R. M. (2003) ‘On the 53. 
Frontiers of Management.’ 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press.  
Moore, M. H. (1995) 54. 
‘Creating Public Value.’ 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Authority
Leadership
External pressure
Internal pressure
Organisational
capacity
Resources
Organisational culture
Networks
Value
Outcomes
Replication
Growth
Figure 3: The strategic model for local social innovation
Source: Young Foundation (2007)
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5.3 Explaining the different phases
Each set of factors influences the other. 
Authority can be used to create organisational 
capacity (as in the Highlands and Lille); that 
capacity can then be used to create value 
for the public, which can in turn enhance 
authority.
The importance of each of these three varies 
at different stages of the innovation lifecycle, 
and in what follows we suggest how their 
roles change, using arrows to express the key 
relationships, with the size of each triangle 
denoting the importance of each cluster of 
factors, and with dotted lines indicating a  
weak link. For full detail see Appendix B.
Latent	phase
 
Before social innovation starts, both authority 
and organisational capacity are limited, and 
relatively little value is being created for the 
public. Indeed it is often this which triggers 
change. 
Design	and	discover	phase
 
At the next stage, authority (particularly 
strong entrepreneurial leadership) becomes 
particularly important, as it demands change 
from the system. In practice this often 
translates into internal pressure from local 
politicians and senior officials who try to create 
a new organisational capacity to act on the 
innovation. At this stage in the Highlands and 
Pittsburgh, authority was successfully used 
to attract resources and generate increased 
organisational capacity. Failure at this stage 
is most likely either if the organisational 
capacity doesn’t materialise or if resisters (and 
a resistant culture) prove too strong to crush 
the innovation from the start. This stage of 
innovation is turbulent and often features 
many small failures, until one initiative emerges 
as the dominant innovation.
Mobilisation
 
In the next phase, if the innovation turns out 
to work, we begin to see some value being 
created for the public. Authority remains 
important, but effective management (often 
including a new team of people better suited 
to the new mission) becomes even more 
critical as the innovation develops. Success 
is likely to strengthen the links between 
authorising leaders and the people responsible 
for implementation, as resources are diverted 
from other activities. A big risk at this stage 
(alongside the risks of mobilisation by enemies) 
is that the people involved in the earlier stage 
of innovation may be unwilling to hand over 
control to others with better management 
skills.
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In the next stage, as the innovation becomes 
part of mainstream activities, authority reduces 
in importance. Effective management remains 
important – and there will be a greater need 
for organisational capacity through resources, 
networks and skills. During this stage, the 
innovation needs to be aligned with all of the 
main drivers of behaviour in the organisation 
– including finance, HR, IT and performance 
management. This is when weaknesses in 
leadership, management and partnerships will 
most threaten success. 
Embedding
 
Sustainable innovation  
Embedding
 
Pervasive innovation
In the final stages of the lifecycle, sustainable 
innovation requires a balance between the 
three corners of the triangle, with each 
reinforcing the other in turn (the value of the 
innovation enhances authority, which in turn 
enhances organisational capacity which in turn 
further enhances the value of the innovation).
In more ambitious variants, successful 
innovations in one field may be replicated 
in other fields as innovation becomes more 
pervasive. This sort of pervasive innovation 
demands exceptional leadership and strong 
engagement and support from all parts of the 
network.
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Figure 4: The lifecycle of innovation – and the implications for strategy
Source: The Young Foundation/NESTA (2007)
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5.4 Maximising the potential for innovation
By linking these two sets of diagrams, we can 
show the lifecycle of local social innovation 
and how the balance between authority, 
organisational capacity and value changes 
at each stage. For greater detail about the 
strategic triangle during the local social 
innovation lifecycle, please refer to Appendix B.
No locality will ever be able to sustain 
innovation in every field at every time. Nor 
will this ever be necessary or desirable – as 
we pointed out earlier, the priority for most 
services at most times will be to perform well 
now. However, every service and agency will 
always need to know what it is doing about 
innovation – where it is drawing its ideas, how 
it is cultivating its own creativity, and how it is 
connecting with others.
Here we come to the third dimension of the 
story. In many of our case studies it is clear that 
dynamic innovation doesn’t take place solely 
within organisations. Instead, it depends on 
dynamic networks that link organisations both 
horizontally and vertically. These networks 
include national and regional bodies, local 
authorities and services, frontline units, NGOs, 
businesses as well as members of the public, 
residents and service users. A truly innovative 
locality is likely to have strong networks linking 
every level – recognising promising new ideas 
and experiences, and bringing together the 
right mix of resources and authority to nurture 
them.
This was a particular concern in many of the 
case studies. The Highland Council focused on 
improving links between senior management 
and frontline staff so that information and 
ideas were not lost in the ‘treacle of middle 
management’; Knowsley encouraged teachers 
to come up with new ideas for improving 
pupils’ learning experience that could be 
tried and, if successful, adopted more widely 
throughout the education service. Lessons 
from South Tyneside’s neighbourhood-based 
Participatory Appraisal Projects have been 
applied in other neighbourhoods, for example 
through the adoption of see-through plastic 
shutters in vacant properties instead of 
brown ones, to make residents feel safer and 
discourage antisocial behaviour. 
In our international case studies, the network 
structures of innovation were very different. 
In Pittsburgh, most social innovation is 
amongst small charities and grassroots groups: 
horizontal links within this level are limited 
and fragmented, though connections between 
foundations and grassroots organisations are 
stronger. In Gouda, the links between layers are 
Systemic local
social innovation
(region, city, 
authority wide)
Flow of
knowledge
learning,
networks,
creativity,
and
recognition
of what
works
Sectoral innovation
(service, agency, 
sector)
Frontline innovation
(neighbourhood and
community-based 
organisation)
Public innovation
(individuals, service users, 
neighbourhoods) 
Figure 5: Visualising a local innovation system
Source: The Young Foundation/NESTA (2007)
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weak, while in Lille and Portland they appear 
stronger and more resilient to change. 
The following diagram provides a simple 
framework for thinking about these links – 
showing how the different layers of a local 
innovation system combine horizontal and 
vertical links, which may be rich and dense or 
thin and atrophied. 
Social network analysis: insight into a 
local innovation system 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a mapping 
process that assesses the networks of influence 
and trust that flow through and between 
individuals, organisations, partnerships and 
communities, and identifies key individuals 
within these networks. It is, potentially, a 
powerful tool for understanding the intricacies 
and subtleties of networks that support 
innovation, the ways in which ideas and 
information about innovation spread, and 
how these relationships and interactions drive 
change and creativity. 
SNA offers a practical way to interpret the 
model of social innovation networks and 
relationships that emerged from this research 
(see Figure 5). An experimental case study was 
conducted in a local authority area in the UK 
that is known for innovation in education. 
The SNA model used in this experimental case 
study has been developed by an American 
anthropologist Dr Karen Stephenson, who 
has worked widely with the public and private 
sectors in the US, collaborated with the UK 
Government – the Home Office, Cabinet Office 
and Communities and Local Government 
(CLG) – and whose work has been applied in 
13 localities in five regions in the UK. It has 
not however been used to identify innovation 
in multi-agency partnerships until this 
experimental case study. The emphasis to date 
has been on understanding how partnerships 
could become more effective rather than 
more innovative. Her methodology has been 
trademarked as NetForm®. 
The purpose of this case study was twofold: 
to explore the effectiveness of NetForm® 
SNA as a diagnostic tool in illuminating (or 
contradicting) the broader findings of this 
study; and to explore how this technique could 
be used by agencies to help understand the 
circumstances fuelling or frustrating innovation 
and to support them to develop strategies to 
tackle any identified problems. 
This experimental SNA established that the 
method offers a different and important 
perspective on the relationships and networks 
that underpin innovation. It exposed 
relationships and networks that are unlikely 
to have been revealed by traditional research 
methods. The exercise confirmed what would 
be expected in the area given its stage of 
innovation, but pointed to possible weaknesses 
in future sustainability. 
Please refer to Appendix C for a detailed 
analysis of the SNA method and the key 
findings of this exercise. However, the main 
lessons include:
The locality has a high level of networking •	
around innovation compared to other 
areas
The SNA exercise revealed that in this local 
area a relatively large number of individuals 
are actively involved in the innovation 
process, using networks to seek innovative 
solutions to problems they faced. These 
individuals were apparent in different 
organisations and agencies within the locality 
and their networks included both frontline 
staff and senior management. 
In this area there are strong networks for •	
seeking new ideas, and many individuals 
act as hubs, pulsetakers and gatekeepers
The strength of the networks is high given 
the early stage in the social innovation 
lifecycle. A significant contributing factor to 
this is likely to be the large scale and level of 
risk within the service transformation.
The local authority and a number •	
of schools are central to innovation 
networks and are leading the innovation 
process
The same core group of individuals, including 
local authority officers and head teachers, 
were consistently identified across all seven 
networks. This is a strength but could also 
indicate the existence of a dominant and 
exclusive clique which could limit the extent 
to which ideas can emerge from other 
sources.
The voluntary and community sector, •	
student council and residents appear to 
be outside the core networks of influence 
in the locality
This could be either because they are weak 
or because they are being excluded. This 
may not pose a problem for implementation 
at present but could undermine future 
sustainability, if the current core group leave 
their current posts. It also suggests that there 
may be insufficient ‘connected difference’ to 
drive further innovation.
Theoretically – if links between layers are 
established and maintained – connections can 
grow to support quick and effective diffusion 
of innovation. In our four UK case studies, 
local innovation was driven primarily at the 
sectoral innovation layer – at service or agency 
level – with a strong emphasis on partnership 
working, collaboration or formal integration, to 
bring together different agencies and transfer 
thinking and new working practices. Strong 
links (formal and informal) were found between 
sectoral and frontline layers, to communicate 
ideas between service managers and frontline 
staff. 
6. Recommendations 
Should every locality aim to innovate all the 
time? The short answer is no. In most services, 
the primary focus must normally be on effective 
implementation and incremental improvement. 
However, there will be times when services will 
experience a pressing need to innovate and 
change to stay ahead of shifting demands, 
opportunities and pressures.
Ideally, a locality will subtly combine creative 
energy and the willingness to try out new 
ideas with an eagerness to learn from others, 
taking pride in presenting the results as rooted 
in the area’s own history and culture. Such a 
position can be cultivated. The research and 
case studies show conclusively that innovative 
capacity can be nurtured, even in unpromising 
circumstances. It also shows that innovative 
capacity can spread from one field to others. 
Our aim has been to show some common 
factors and patterns. But we also recognise 
that real processes of innovation in these 
places are messy, and unpredictable. They rely 
on a mixture of luck, opportunism and careful 
planning. Nevertheless, we have identified 
three clusters of factors to be critical in 
enabling places to innovate and be reborn. 
First, the will to change that comes •	
from awareness of threat or failure (and 
occasionally from a sense of a new 
opportunity), and from that will to change 
being channelled by people or organisations 
with the authority to act. 
Second, the presence of internal •	
organisational capacities to change, including 
official leadership and culture. 
Third, access to the external resources that •	
help change happen, including people, 
money, skills and networks. Feedback from 
the public is also important here, as they 
should see the value that flows from a 
successful new approach.
Our research challenges many previously 
widely-held assumptions about social 
innovation. It shows that money matters – but 
in quite complex ways (indeed, there are many 
examples where money has propped up failing 
structures in spite of urgent need for change). 
In none of our case studies have deep cultures 
of social innovation or the impact of particular 
institutions been identified as necessary factors 
in the creation of a socially innovative locality.
In contrast to previous work that has 
emphasised the importance of freedom to 
experiment, our research shows that constraints 
and restrictions are often important factors 
in triggering and driving the process of 
social innovation. Indeed, in the early stages 
of innovation performance management, 
targets and reporting (in the form of service 
assessments) appear to have had a beneficial 
effect on local innovation in our UK case 
studies, providing the catalyst to trigger 
change in each of the four locations.
6.1 Recommended directions of travel
So what positive conclusions can we draw? 
What are the implications of this analysis 
for policy, whether at the level of individual 
localities or nationally? The three clusters point 
clearly to what could be done to support more 
local innovation.
First, pressures for change and authority  
to act 
There are good reasons why the recent 
history of targets, audits and inspections has 
been resented by local government. But our 
analysis shows that they have often been 
vital catalysts for change. In the absence of 
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These are groups of 55. 
practitioners in a field of 
expertise who share ideas 
and build innovations 
together.
See www.isb.gov.uk56. 
LGA/CLG (2007) ‘National 57. 
Improvement and Efficiency 
Strategy.’ London: LGA.
market and political pressures, it is vital that 
these pressures don’t disappear. Hopefully, 
the risk-based approaches being planned by 
the Audit Commission will sustain healthy 
pressure on local authorities and local 
partnerships – showing up relative failure 
and rendering complacency less of an option. 
Indeed, in other countries, there may be a 
need for more transparent performance data 
and benchmarking – which can be assisted 
by institutions as varied as foundations, 
universities and the media.
However, it is also important that audit 
and inspection reward innovation. Existing 
processes for overseeing localities are much 
more focused on past and present performance 
than on potential. We have found no examples 
of senior managers being held to account 
for failing to provide a pipeline of promising 
options. Yet some of the best performing local 
authorities fear that they will be penalised 
for innovation. This strong bias against the 
future in earlier work by organisations like 
the National Audit Office looks increasingly 
anachronistic, and we believe that it is vital 
that the new Comprehensive Area Assessments 
cover innovation – and the demand for 
innovation from elsewhere – rather than 
focusing exclusively on current performance.
Our analysis also reinforces the importance of 
political leadership in localities. Mayors and 
leaders with the authority to act can greatly 
enhance a local area’s ability to change quickly 
– as has been shown by many outstanding 
examples from around the world, from Seoul 
and Tirana to Bogota and Barcelona.
Second, internal capacities
There is a strong message from all of our case 
studies about the importance of leadership and 
innovation-supportive internal cultures. 
Here, there is an important role to be played 
by umbrella bodies – such as IDeA and the LGA 
– in providing coaching, mutual support and 
challenge. Our findings in this area mirror many 
other studies of change processes. There are 
some obvious areas where more could be done 
– for example, in the training and development 
of local politicians. 
More could also be done to develop lessons 
about what has worked and communities of 
practice,55 preferably in ways that go beyond 
the core public sector. There is currently very 
little well-grounded training and support on 
how to manage innovation. Although there 
is patchy support and training provision for 
such things as creativity or user engagement 
these have not been brought together into a 
coherent approach to innovation, drawing on 
the many methods that can be used to drive 
it. Nor do most localities have senior figures 
charged with cultivating and supporting 
innovation in the area – wherever it may 
originate.
Third, access to external networks of 
money, people and skills 
This is the critical area where much more could 
be done to support and sustain innovation, and 
it is here that we focus our recommendations.
New	kinds	of	funding
Finance is not all-important in innovation. But, 
at some point, new models need money which 
must either come from existing budgets or be 
brought in from elsewhere. The public sector 
has experimented with a range of different 
kinds of funding for innovation. The Invest to 
Save Budget56 provided large sums of money 
for partnerships which could demonstrate 
some joined up ideas. Other funds have been 
established for small projects, to reward good 
performers, or for pathfinders and pilots. For 
innovation to spread, a range of different types 
of finance is needed, some of them themselves 
innovative:
Easily obtainable small grants•	  for frontline 
and user groups to develop new concepts.
Funding for experimental zones•	  which 
allow ideas to be tested and national rules to 
be suspended, such as Employment Zones.
Funding to test out a •	 variety of approaches 
in tandem with fast learning – for example 
a series of projects working with young 
offenders with a common target, or the kinds 
of carbon reduction being experimented with 
by the cities in the Clinton Global Initiative. 
Establishment of •	 social venture funds – 
like the Young Foundation/NESTA Health 
Innovation Accelerator for long-term 
conditions – which focus on priority areas 
and the development of new models and 
enterprises.
More •	 complex packages of investment 
finance for initiatives which bring a mix 
of different types of risk (for example, 
infrastructure or housing projects that 
also involve innovative ways of delivering 
services). 
33
The new National Improvement and Efficiency 
Strategy57 for local government could provide 
new ways to support local innovation. The 
emerging framework for Local Area Agreements 
(LAAs) will allow localities greater freedom 
to experiment. However, for its full potential 
to be realised central government will need 
to commit to sharing the costs, and risks, of 
innovative new approaches in priority fields 
such as youth offending, carbon reduction or 
eldercare.
In the long-run, greater fiscal freedoms for 
local authorities, and more free money in the 
hands of bodies like Community Foundations, 
could provide this range of finance. In the 
medium-term, central government will continue 
to have to play its part.
Developing	a	labour	market	for	innovation	
skills
In recent years, the local government world has 
created a novel labour market for specialists in 
turning around failing councils. A parallel field 
has grown up for head teachers who are good 
at turning failing schools around. There are 
now a significant number of people specialising 
in these roles, and a body of knowledge about 
how this is best done. By contrast, there is no 
parallel body of people or recognised skills in 
innovation.
This is where bodies like the National School of 
Government (NSG)58 and IDeA could develop 
courses to build up the rounded skills needed 
for innovation. They could recognise successful 
innovators, and encourage local authorities 
to recruit such people either into senior 
management positions or as part of teams 
when there is a clear need for innovation. One 
option would be deliberately to develop a cadre 
of innovators with successful track records who 
could bring with them preferential access to 
funding for individual projects.
Supporting	intermediaries
Research on innovation in other fields has 
repeatedly pointed to the importance of 
intermediaries and brokers who can spot, 
assess and adapt innovations. They see the 
potential value of innovations that have 
succeeded elsewhere or how they need to be 
changed. There is a striking absence of such 
institutions in the social field and in local 
government. Instead there is either too much 
top-down prescription or too casual a view that 
a thousand flowers should be encouraged to 
bloom. 
Intermediaries may work best when they are 
focused on particular sectors or particular 
problems. Good examples are telehealth 
networks, which use the telephone and 
video to provide health-related services and 
information, and the mySociety approach59 
to the development of civic websites. But 
intermediaries can also look at innovations 
in different fields and spot the scope for 
their application elsewhere. Brokerage and 
intermediation is a field where competition 
and pluralism are essential and where the 
natural bureaucratic instinct to task single 
organisations is particularly inapt. A range 
of different intermediaries is also important 
because they can help the public sector reach 
out to other sectors and avoid monopolistic 
instincts.
More work is also needed on developing the 
key skills for successful intermediaries. In some 
cases, these skills are closer to investigative 
journalism and venture capital than traditional 
bureaucratic skills. They include the skills 
of spotting, investigating and discovering 
what elements of a particular innovation are 
transferable. 
Creating	collaboratives
We favour more overt national and European 
funding for collaboratives, linking together 
several different places and national 
departments to test out new models, with 
fast learning, evaluation and measurement. 
This approach has been developed by some 
pathfinder models, by the Young Foundation 
(on wellbeing and neighbourhoods) and at 
an international level by the Clinton Global 
Initiative on cities and climate change. It has 
much wider application in issues as varied as 
care of the elderly and crime reduction. It also 
needs to encompass looser and more flexible 
learning processes such as action learning 
sets.60 
Examples of effective collaboration include 
the National Neighbourhood Management 
Network61 (a national practitioner network 
to improve learning and knowledge sharing 
through practical visits, events and action 
learning), IDeA’s communities of practice, 
and national networks to promote effective 
neighbourhood working through action 
research and reflexive learning, such as the 
Young Foundation’s Neighbourhood Action 
Network.
Mobilising	the	public
One striking feature of our case studies is 
the relatively minor role played by citizens 
See www.nationalschool.58. 
gov.uk
See www.mysociety.org59. 
Action Learning Sets are 60. 
small groups of individuals 
who support one another in 
learning and development in 
an area where they have an 
interest and wish to increase 
their expertise.
See http://www.renewal.61. 
net/NNMN/
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and users. The truth is that the public remain 
largely bystanders in processes of innovation, 
despite the widespread talk over the last 
ten or fifteen years about co-production. 
Voice and choice are limited, despite some 
scattered experiments. This absence is likely 
to be inhibiting localities from developing 
innovations that really meet user needs (as 
opposed to top-down targets). We favour 
much more concerted experimentation in 
empowering and engaging citizens in processes 
of innovation, building on experiences such as 
the involvement of pupils in designing schools, 
residents in regenerating housing estates and 
patients in managing their own illnesses.
The web can be a powerful tool in enabling the 
voice of users to be heard. It can create space 
for public input or to put pressure on public 
sector providers. It is true that ‘user-driven’ 
innovation can be exaggerated: in practice 
in the private sector and elsewhere what is 
happening is often more about engagement 
of the public in processes that continue to 
be fairly tightly controlled by managers and 
designers. But there is undoubtedly a great 
untapped resource waiting to be mobilised.
Training	good	commissioners	
A critical issue for the next few years will be 
the training and support of commissioners 
to back innovation. This is already a priority 
in local government as it continues to move 
more towards commissioning instead of direct 
provision, and it is fast becoming a priority in 
the health service and in the criminal justice 
system. Good commissioners not only pay 
attention to current performance but also to 
future innovation capacity, and the best use 
their powers to ensure that there is a wider 
range of options available after three to five 
years as well as in the next year. 
Commissioning for innovation requires 
attention to a set of issues that are very 
different from the concerns about efficiency 
and scale that have dominated the field of 
purchasing. Scale is particularly important – too 
large a scale for commissioning guarantees 
that promising local ideas will never have a 
chance to demonstrate their worth (an issue 
that has been a concern in welfare to work, and 
around offenders). There are also important 
issues around risk, where commissioners may 
often need to support a number of parallel 
models to see what works. Some of the most 
subtle challenges for commissioners relate 
to innovations that produce value for many 
different agencies, for example through helping 
individuals to avoid crime and unemployment. 
6.2 Where research is needed
The fields covered in this report have seen 
sporadic research. But we have identified many 
fields where much more research is needed on 
the critical dimensions of local innovation that 
we have not been able to explore here. These 
include: 
The relationship between social and public •	
sector innovation and broader patterns of 
rebirth and renewal, including economic 
turnarounds, the role of culture and the 
creative industries and political renewal. 
This is an under-researched field but could 
be helped with the use of social network 
analysis and other new tools.
The role of networks and linkages between •	
agencies and individuals, building on our 
initial analysis of networks in one area.
The role of political leadership in local •	
innovation – and its relationship to official 
leadership.
The institutional forms for innovation – •	
including the role that can be played by 
special purpose vehicles, public-private 
partnerships and other arm’s length bodies.
7. Conclusions
Viewed from a national perspective (or that of 
a whole system such as the NHS), there is a 
strong interest in encouraging experimentation 
at a local level. This is how new ideas get 
developed and tested on a small scale that can 
then help the whole society adapt quickly to 
change.
Yet, for local institutions, genuine innovation 
is likely to be risky and potentially career-
threatening for officials or politicians, making 
it more rational to watch and copy the 
innovations of others. However, if everyone 
does this, the system will produce too little 
innovation. It follows that higher-tier bodies 
should have a strong interest in sharing the 
costs and risks of local innovation, and doing 
as much as they can to share positive results. 
In practice, national governments, particularly 
in the UK, have preferred to impose their 
own policies and innovations on local areas, 
rather than mobilising them as laboratories 
for change. The results have often been 
problematic, as costly, inflexible and unproven 
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models have been imposed on widely different 
areas.
A more sensible approach would be to foster 
innovation in the ways described above, 
making the most of the evident urge that many 
localities have to try out new approaches. For 
this to work, a very different division of labour 
is needed, with national institutions providing 
the right combination of pressure, support and 
mutual learning, and local institutions building 
up their own internal capacities as well as more 
effective external networks. 
There will always be places in relative decline 
and particular services facing difficulties. But, 
with a more mature system of local innovation 
in place, more places could move more quickly 
from decline to rebirth. 
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Innovation is very often an unstructured 
and intuitive process, demanding creativity, 
invention and sound judgement about 
the balance between risk and operational 
effectiveness. In our case studies we saw the 
confidence that grows from success, from 
demonstrating that new approaches can work, 
and the pride this brings to a locality. But we 
also know that innovation for its own sake 
often fails, that many good ideas do not work 
in practice in the same way that they were 
initially envisaged. So it is wise to limit risks – 
to draw on experience and evidence, and what 
has been learnt by others.
From our case studies – and our wider 
experience of carrying out this research – we 
have put together a toolkit to support the fluid 
and creative process of local innovation. This 
sets out three steps to help:
diagnose position in the innovation cycle •	
(Step One);
understand how innovation grows (or fails) •	
(Step Two); and
ask the right questions to guide action in •	
each phase (Step Three).
Step One: Diagnosing where you are in 
the innovation lifecycle
Social innovation within localities evolves 
through a series of phases. Building an 
understanding of where you sit within this 
innovation lifecycle will help you and your 
key stakeholders – politicians, officers, local 
agencies and service users – understand their 
context and spot possible pitfalls. 
Appendix A: Putting the lessons of the research into 
practice: a toolkit to support local social innovation
Phase 0:
Latent
This phase features isolated innovation within frontline service delivery.
Innovation remains fragmented with little or no value being gained from it.
There is limited scope for growth.
Phase 1:
Design and
discover
Innovation is taking place at the frontline and the centre. But it may be failing
at the early stages of development because of a lack of resources and capacity.
Other examples may be emerging successfully at a small scale. There may be interest
in innovation, but no infrastructure to support development or embed learning.
Phase 2:
Mobilisation
Initial resources are available for innovation in one service or sector. Infrastructure
and a change in internal working practices that support innovation are put in place.
Phase 3:
Mainstreaming
The local authority has strategies and infrastructure to support innovation in one 
service or sector. Resources and capacity are available to one service but lessons are
not transferred to other parts of the local authority.
Phase 4:
Embedding
Innovation is taking place collaboratively across several services, sectors or agencies .
It is at different stages of development. The local authority has a strategy, infrastructure 
and investment to support widespread innovation. It is confident enough to recognise
and support good ideas and to ‘kill’ innovations that are not returning public
or organisational value.
Table A1: Typology for local social innovation
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Step Two: Understanding how 
innovation grows (or fails)
Agencies that have learnt to nurture innovation 
develop structures and ways of working that 
can support future innovation, where it is 
needed. For an area to become one where 
social innovation thrives, these attributes need 
to be shared by different agencies who work 
together to address needs. In the UK context 
this appears to work most effectively when 
it is galvanised and coordinated by the local 
authority. 
The diagram below illustrates the progression 
through which individual agencies and 
local partnerships typically pass. The Y axis 
represents the extent of local innovation, and 
the X axis the degree to which it is embedded.
The practical experience of the agencies 
involved in our case studies has been 
tabulated, drawing out what is needed to 
progress innovation, and the common pitfalls. 
Latent
Mobilisation
Mainstreaming
Embedding
High level of  
innovation 
High level of  
innovation 
Low level of  
innovation 
Low level of  
innovation 
Design &
Discovery
Figure A1: Progress of innovation over time
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Table A2: Learning from others’ mistakes
Progressing to the next phase
phase
Possible barriers and pitfalls:
what makes innovation fail 
Phase 1:
Design and 
discover
Phase 2:
Mobilisation
Phase 3:
Mainstreaming
Phase 4:
Embedding
To progress to Phase 2: front line 
managers responsible for innovation 
need to be recognised and rewarded 
for their creativity. 
Entrepreneurs may need to develop 
stronger conventional management 
competencies, and put a new 
emphasis on implementation and 
development.
To progress to Phase 3: systems, 
infrastructure and management styles 
that support change must be put in 
place, whilst ensuring good process 
management continues.
Resources and capacity must be made 
available to sustain the innovation.
Value must be demonstrated to build 
support for further growth. 
To progress to Phase 4: the service or 
field needs to have developed an 
identified approach or strategy for 
innovation.
Value is demonstrated to those in 
authority within other services or 
agencies, convincing them of the 
need to develop parallel approaches. 
The practice of auditing services for 
future requirements must become 
central to multi-agency working.
Infrastructure and investment need to 
be increased to support widespread 
innovation
At this stage, innovation is central to 
agencies’ work and the area’s 
potential to exploit future needs – 
opportunities for innovation 
throughout the locality are strong.
Those in authority fail to spot the
key idea.
Leaders fail to expose themselves to 
the level of risk needed to back the 
innovation.
Change is blocked because the 
organisational culture is resistant to 
new ways of working. 
Alternatively, management structures 
may be weak and may fail to support 
change.
Key stakeholders fail to appreciate 
the positive impacts and value 
generated by the innovation.
The entrepreneurial leadership 
needed in earlier stages does not 
evolve into a more structured way of 
working.
Conversely, over-rigid management, 
with too much emphasis on conven-
tional performance management 
criteria, may crush creativity.
The innovation does not create 
enough value, and fails to meet the 
targeted social need. 
Alternatively, value created is not 
recognised because systems have not 
been put in place to assess and 
evaluate it.
Weak operational management, 
organisational capacity (including 
internal culture, networks and 
partnerships) or a lack of resources 
may also lead to failure. 
There may be insufficient external 
and internal pressure to enable the 
innovation to spread – this could also 
indicate a lack of need.
A sustainable culture of innovation 
has not been created; innovation is 
dependent on organisational 
circumstance or a particular individual.
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Step Three: Asking the right questions 
in different phases
This list is intended as an aid to action, helping 
staff at different levels and local politicians to 
assess their tactics at key stages of the growth 
of innovation. 
Phase 0: Latent innovation
Is there urgency for innovation?
Is there pressure to change? Is there demand •	
for doing things differently? Are there 
opportunities to be exploited?
What proportion of your staff time is devoted •	
to innovation compared to the time you are 
spending on effectiveness (performance 
management and improvement)?
Do you need to innovate?
Would you do better to focus on •	
improvement?
Do you need to put more resources into your •	
failing area?
Phase 1: Design and Discover
Do you know about the range of available tools 
and what might work best for you?
Are you plugged into the right networks to •	
find out what you can borrow? Can you find 
people who are already one step ahead of 
you?
Have you thought about the different •	
approaches that could work for you? These 
include:
starting from service users – using design •	
models (including new models of chronic 
disease care, personalised budgets);
starting from professionals – community of •	
practice approaches (including new models 
of teaching or healthcare);
mobilising outside ideas – using social •	
enterprises (such as new models of youth 
provision),
Phase 2: Mobilisation
Do you have the capacity to drive forward 
innovation?
Can you learn quickly from others and •	
recognise where they are doing things 
differently that you could replicate or adapt?
Can you generate your own ideas, working •	
with frontline staff, services users, NGOs, 
businesses?
Are you making best use of your staff to drive 
innovation?
Have you thought about the different skills •	
you need at different points, to create ideas, 
develop concepts, act entrepreneurially, 
initiate and mainstream those processes?
Are you moving people with the right skills •	
into the right roles to support innovation at 
the different stages of the process?
Have you thought about creating a team of •	
innovation specialists that you could move 
between policy areas to support innovation?
Do you have ways of identifying and •	
rewarding frontline staff who come up with 
great ideas, and celebrating their success? 
Phase 3: Mainstreaming
Do you have the organisational capacity to 
scale up initial success?
Can you manage and implement innovation •	
effectively and learn fast from what is 
working well and what is proving more 
difficult?
Can you generate the support from •	
stakeholders that you will need to 
mainstream your ideas?
Do you have the operational resources to scale 
up?
Are the right funding and staffing in place to •	
support roll out and growth?
Can you assess the value of innovation?
Have you put a measurement method •	
in place to capture the impact of your 
innovation?
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Are you capturing feedback from the public, •	
service users and other agencies?
Phase 4: Embedding
Can you apply what you have learnt to other 
services areas, agencies or fields?
Do you understand what organisational •	
processes have emerged out of the process 
of innovation – possibilities include a 
different understanding of risk, stronger 
internal communications and reflective 
learning practices?
Are you using local networks to support •	
innovation, by spreading your lessons and 
spotting other opportunities for innovation?
Can you quantify and communicate the value 
of your innovation?
Is the evidence of effectiveness robust •	
enough to convince other service managers 
and local politicians?
Are you celebrating achievements and •	
looking for recognition from government and 
your peers?
Appendix B: The strategic triangle through the local 
social innovation lifecycle
This section describes and explains the 
strategic triangle through the possible 
trajectories through the local social innovation 
lifecycle.
Figure B1 represents a unified illustration of 
the relationship between drivers and enablers 
at different phases of the innovation lifecycle. 
The different strategic triangles during the 
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Time
Value
Phase 0
Latent
Phase 1
Design &
Discovery
Phase 2
Mobilisation
Phase 3
Mainstreaming
Phase 4
Embedding
Trigger
point for
innovation
Figure B1: Strategic triangles of Local Social Innovation in relation to the lifecycle
Source: The Young Foundation/NESTA (2007)
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Table B2: Description of strategic triangles through the local social innovation lifecycle
Strategic Triangle Description
In the latent phase before social innovation 
occurs, though both authority and 
organisational capacity are present, they are 
relatively small and working in isolation. At this 
stage, there may or may not be any value. 
P
ha
se
 0
: L
at
en
t
Success At this stage of the innovation lifecycle, 
authority (particularly strong entrepreneurial 
leadership) is very important, often through 
internal pressure from local politicians and 
senior officials. Authority creates and builds 
upon the locality’s organisational capacity
as shown by the arrow. The innovation has yet 
to directly create any value.
P
ha
se
 1
: D
es
ig
n 
an
d 
D
is
co
ve
ry
Failure If the locality fails in this initial phase of 
innovation, it is usually because a connection 
fails to form between the authority and 
organisational capacity; leadership fails to 
galvanise change, possibly because the 
dominant culture is resistant to new ways
of working.  
Success In this phase, organisational capacity begins 
to deliver value from innovation. Authority 
remains important. The urgency of initial 
change has reduced, and strong managerial 
leadership becomes critical. A stronger link 
forms between authority and the
organisational capacity, as resources are 
mobilised and networks strengthen. 
Failure Failure occurs if links are not made between 
these elements, particularly if key stakeholders 
fail to appreciate the new public and
organisational value being created.
The innovation may also fail to progress if 
entrepreneurial leadership needed in the earlier 
stages does not evolve into a more managerial 
way of working: this will typically happen if 
early-stage entrepreneurial innovators fail to 
pass control to others with stronger, more 
formalised management skills.
P
ha
se
 2
: M
ob
ili
sa
tio
n
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
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Strategic Triangle Description
In this phase, authority becomes less important 
than in the earlier stages. However, strong 
managerial leadership still plays a crucial role
in implementing innovation.  There is, however, 
an increased need for organisational capacity
– resources, networks, a more flexible
organisational culture and partnerships
– to be mobilised. Value is increased as the 
innovation becomes embedded.
P
ha
se
 3
: M
ai
ns
tr
ea
m
in
g
Failure
Success
If the value produced is not strong enough the 
innovation will not be sustained. Weaknesses in 
authority (through weak operational
management) or organisational capacity
(for example if partnership support is frail)
may also lead to failure.
Pervasive 
innovation
If system change occurs, and the potential for 
innovation becomes central to the working of 
the different local agencies, the triangle grows 
larger. This reflects its impact on the workings of 
many agencies and individuals and the greater 
value being gained from the innovation. 
Here, the value from innovation is greatest. 
Authority is needed from political and executive 
leadership to continue to drive innovation in this 
final phase. Organisational capacity from both 
entrepreneurial and effective management are 
also required to sustain effectiveness and 
creativity. and support further innovation. The 
links between these different aspects of the 
strategic triangle are extremely strong. 
Sustainable: 
Isolated 
Innovation
If the innovation is able to sustain itself without 
achieving system change, a degree of growth 
occurs due to an increase in the value created. 
However, this is not as significant as systemic 
innovation. Some authority and a substantial 
amount of organisational capacity are required, 
which in turn create value. However, the extent 
of each factor is not as great, and this has 
prevented the locality from achieving system 
change. The links between these factors are also 
not as strong.
Failure If social innovation is unsustainable in this final 
phase, it may be due to insufficient authority 
and organisational capacity. The amount of 
value created may also not be enough to ensure 
that innovation continues. The links between 
these may weaken causing the innovation to fail.
P
ha
se
 4
: E
m
be
dd
in
g
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
Authority
ValueOrganisational
Capacity
Appendix C: Case studies
47
Case study 1: Innovation in Children’s Services in the Highlands, Scotland
Since 1999, the Highland Council has radically reorganised the delivery of Children’s Services 
in the area, creating an effective joint working initiative involving a number of key agencies.
The integrated service has been praised by Audit Scotland. It has also enabled the Council 
to make significant service improvements in a short period of time. In 2006, the service’s 
success was recognised by the Scottish Government, which selected the Highlands as a 
Pathfinder for the rest of Scotland. 
These innovations were driven by four main factors: 
Underlying demographic trends; specifically, a rapidly declining youth population, •	
identified by the Council as a threat to future economic performance in the Highlands.
An external assessment revealing the poor performance of Children’s Services in the •	
region. 
Resulting pressure for change from senior figures and politicians within the Council.•	
These drivers were accelerated by the impact of a challenge to the service after the •	
murder of five year old Danielle Reid. 
Background Data
Geography:
The Highlands has a total land area of •	
26,484km2. The largest council area in the 
UK, it covers a third of mainland Scotland 
and 11.4 per cent of Great Britain. 
Population:
The population of the Highlands in 2004 •	
was 211,340. It is highly dispersed, with a 
population density of just under eight people 
per square kilometre.
The population grew by 2.6 per cent •	
between 1995-2005, while the rest of 
Scotland saw its population decline.
In mid-2006, it was estimated that 18.3 per •	
cent of the population were aged under 16; 
64.0 per cent were aged 16-64 and 17.7 per 
cent were aged 65 and over.
The age demographic of the region is •	
increasingly elderly. The proportion of over-
65s grew from 10.9 per cent in 1996 to 17.7 
per cent in 2006.62 
Labour market: 
Of those employed, 31.5 per cent work in •	
public administration, education and health, 
and 27.2 per cent work in distribution, hotels 
and catering.
The unemployment rate in the Highlands •	
was 2.1 per cent in 2006. It decreased 
significantly from 6.5 per cent in 1996. This 
is lower than the rest of Scotland (2.8 per 
cent) and the UK (2.6 per cent). 
Council: 
The Highland Council has 80 elected •	
members, most of whom are independent, 
although the number of independents has 
dropped significantly from 53 in 2003 to 34 
in 2007. Other significant parties represented 
are the Liberal Democrats (22), Scottish 
National Party (17) and Labour (7). 
1. Summary: Context and Need
In the late nineties, senior officials and elected 
members recognised that an increasingly 
Source: GRO(S) Mid Year 62. 
Estimates 1986-1996, 
GRO(S) 1994 Based 
Population Projections  
See http://www.
highland.gov.uk/NR/
rdonlyres/732CDEA4-
5772-4E9E-91B4-
38BD8D902A93/0/
highland_trends_97.pdf 
elderly population and a lack of young families 
and children could have serious implications for 
the region’s future. 
The percentage of young people in the 
Highlands was declining due to falling birth 
rates and increasing numbers of young people 
leaving to pursue further education, and failing 
to return. The Council recognised that if this 
trend were to continue the future workforce 
would be diminished, reducing productivity and 
impacting negatively on the region’s industry 
and economy. 
Some senior figures in the Council viewed the 
improvement of Children’s Services as a way to 
attract young families to the region. In 1997, 
the Council’s Looking	Ahead	in	the	Highlands 
policy paper stated: “The vital role of young 
people in our communities continues to be the 
single	most	important	determinant	of	the	future	
success	of	this	region”.63 
This report indicates the growing pressure 
on the Council to improve Children’s Services 
at that time in order to attract more young 
families to the area. However, the Council and 
its partners did not begin to make changes 
until the late nineties, when an external 
report commissioned from an independent 
consultancy by the Chief Executive described 
Children’s Services as ‘poor’ and failing the 
area’s children and young people. The report 
identified a lack of strategy and coherence 
in Children’s Services, and said that the area 
suffered from a fragmented and uncoordinated 
approach where good practice was isolated. 
The report acted as a catalyst for innovation, 
prompting the Council to assess the 
organisation and delivery of Children’s Services, 
and to review existing structures, processes and 
systems. As a result, the Council recognised the 
need to make widespread improvements. 
2. Innovation Strategy
The Council’s objective for service improvement 
was to place the child at the centre of service 
provision, while creating sustainable services 
that would strengthen families and value 
children.64 
The Council identified an integrated approach 
to Children’s Services, with a single vision and 
strategy, as the best way to improve service 
delivery. It believed that a unified approach, 
with less bureaucracy and duplicated service 
delivery, would provide greater freedom for 
agencies to meet children’s needs.
Due to the significant challenges of service 
delivery in such a vast and sparsely populated 
region, the Council was unable to identify a 
model from elsewhere in Scotland that could 
be successfully adapted to conditions in the 
Highlands. So, it began to develop and pioneer 
its own radical reorganisation. 
The Council developed a structure that would 
bring together the education and social care 
departments within the authority and with 
other agencies. This meant not just integration 
of children’s services within the Council, 
but with the NHS, the Police, the Highland 
Wellbeing Alliance65 and Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise. 
3. Innovation Process
3.1 Leadership: Creating Innovation 
Champions
The change process began with the recruitment 
of experienced individuals from outside the 
Council to senior roles within key agencies, 
with the brief to initiate change and to 
champion innovation. These appointments 
included a new Head of Integrated Children’s 
Services66 and a new Director of Social Work. 
Many of the new recruits were employed by 
dual organisations, such as the education and 
social care departments within the Council, and 
the NHS. 
With no history or culture of strong 
partnerships and collaboration between 
agencies in the Highlands, the new leadership 
team created a structure for an integrated, 
multi-agency Children’s Service. Their emphasis 
was on a joined up approach at all levels in 
the Council and other agencies, and on more 
effective engagement with the voluntary 
sector, something that had not previously 
been a priority. The new integrated structure 
aimed to ensure strong, collective leadership, 
to encourage a genuine commitment to joint 
working, and to break down barriers and 
encourage communication between the various 
agencies. The joint employment of staff by 
different departments or agencies was viewed 
as an important first step in establishing direct 
connections at a senior level between the main 
bodies in the Highlands.
The new structure incorporated two new 
bodies with strategic responsibilities: the Joint 
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‘Looking Ahead in the 
Highlands.’ Policy paper. 
Inverness: Highland Council.
Highland Council (2005) 64. 
‘For Highland’s Children 2 
Integrated Children’s Plan. 
Summary 2005-2008.’ 
Inverness: Highland Council.
A mix of public, voluntary 65. 
and private organisations 
dedicated to improving the 
wellbeing of the people of 
the Highlands.
This post, recruited in 2000, 66. 
was funded by Education, 
Social Work and Health.
Committee for Children and Young People 
(JCCYP), and Chief Officers’ Group. These were 
supported by operational structures created to 
implement the new strategy, manage service 
delivery at the frontline, and to communicate 
consistent messages throughout different 
agencies. 
In 2001 the planning document For	Highland’s	
Children was published by the Council, setting 
out priorities for service development and 
delivery between 2001 and 2004, alongside 
the national document For	Scotland’s	Children, 
which involved a national review of Scotland’s 
Children’s Services.
3.2 Integration and Joint Working
The JCCYP was established as a strategic 
body with oversight of all services for children, 
with the remit to review, develop and 
implement For	Highland’s	Children. The JCCYP 
included elected members and officials from 
the Highland Council, executive and non-
executive representatives from NHS Highland 
and representatives of community planning 
partners, the Northern Constabulary, the 
voluntary sector and the Scottish Reporters’ 
Administration.
The Chief Officers’ Group comprised directors 
of all lead services, with a remit to develop 
and coordinate strategy. The group ensured 
the implementation of policy and best 
practice models, and was supported by middle 
managers. 
New operational structures ensured joint 
working at the frontline and to take forward 
policy and practice locally. The Area Children’s 
Services Forum (ACSF) and local Liaison67 
and Youth Offender Groups were led by 
managers from each community area. They had 
responsibility for local delivery against strategic 
priorities, such as healthy eating and living 
initiatives for young people. They also brought 
together individuals from other local services, 
public bodies and the voluntary and community 
sector to improve information sharing and 
create opportunities for frontline staff to 
generate new ideas. 
To create a more integrated structure, certain 
members of staff from different agencies 
and groups were co-located at the Council 
headquarters in Inverness. This placed a 
greater emphasis on their role in the overall 
service, rather than the specific department 
or organisation for whom they worked, in the 
process helping to embed the principles of 
joint working. This movement away from a 
hierarchical structure with clear boundaries 
to a more fluid decentralised body has driven 
innovation and change throughout Children’s 
Services.
Alongside the new strategic and operational 
structures, funding for Children’s Services 
was pooled by all bodies involved in the 
partnership. The lead agencies (NHS Highland, 
and Highland Council’s Social Work and 
Education, Culture and Sport Services) spend in 
excess of £190 million each year on Children’s 
Services, equating to more than £4,000 for 
every under-18 year old.68 
In 2002, the murder of five year old Danielle 
Reid in Inverness led to an independent 
investigation of the Highland’s Children’s 
Services with a particular focus on child 
protection, and a review of joint working in 
the area. The review indicated “serious gaps 
in service provision to the vulnerable and at 
risk child”,69 though it also concluded that 
the death could not have been prevented 
by individuals employed by Highland’s child 
protection agencies.
This high profile incident accelerated the 
innovation that had already begun in the 
Highland’s Children’s Services, motivating 
frontline staff to assist and engage with the 
changes taking place. 
3.3 Embedding innovation
Interviewees reported that these structural 
changes have engaged and empowered 
frontline staff. Many respondents felt that the 
formation of bodies such as the JCCYP and 
Chief Officers’ groups have enabled the visions 
and goals of senior managers and leaders to 
be articulated to frontline staff more clearly. 
Interviews revealed that the frontline staff are 
enthused by a greater understanding of their 
role in the overall service. Area Forums and 
Liaison Groups have enabled them to operate 
more effectively on the frontline. Collaborating 
more with other frontline workers has increased 
their capacity and resources to do the job. This 
can make a great difference in the Highlands 
where frontline workers suffer from lack of 
resources and challenging geography. 
Feedback from frontline staff, middle managers 
and senior officers shows that the improved 
communication has helped create a more 
effective integrated service. One interviewee 
stated that: “[partnerships] played a big part, 
[they] helped raise awareness of what other 
practitioners deal with, what structures they 
work within …I think that’s been a trigger in 
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helping people assess their practice and change 
it.”
Communication between agencies at the senior 
level has also greatly improved with this new 
structure. One senior manager said: “we’ve got 
very good working relationships at most senior 
levels across the agencies and there’s a real 
openness to engage with change.”
The success of the communication of this 
vision from senior officials to frontline staff was 
an important achievement, given the size of 
the area that staff must cover and the isolated 
nature of many communities and workers.
In 2001, For	Scotland’s	Children proposed 
a national review of Scotland’s Children’s 
Services. This led to Getting	it	Right	for	Every	
Child	(GIRFEC) in 2004, a national approach 
to reforming Children’s Services in Scotland. 
GIRFEC goals included:
Practice change: including shared tools, •	
guidance and a shared approach.
Removing barriers: identifying and removing •	
obstacles to collaboration between agencies, 
children and families.
Legislation: making agencies responsible for •	
collaboration with each other and sharing 
information as appropriate. Ensuring that 
professionals are alert to the needs of 
children and that they take action to meet 
them.
The Highlands was identified by the Scottish 
Government as a suitable place to pilot the 
GIRFEC initiative, because of its pioneering 
work towards integrated service provision. The 
Highland Pathfinder launched in September 
2006 as a regional programme to test the 
GIRFEC principles. This pilot began with 
changes to how services were organised, 
starting with those for newborn children from 
May 2006. Later phases will cover early years 
and school transitions. GIRFEC brought in 
significant funding to the Highland’s Children’s 
Services, further accelerating innovation.
The first phase of the GIRFEC Pathfinder 
ended with a consultation on the Children’s 
Services Bill in 2007, which is currently being 
analysed. As the GIRFEC project is rolled out 
and established in other Scottish authorities, 
the Council is now moving to the next phase 
of its innovation cycle, with an emphasis on 
consolidating change, embedding new ways 
of working, and ensuring that the culture of 
innovation is sustainable in the long-term.
4. Outcomes
A number of performance targets were 
established by the partnership at the start 
of the integration and innovation process 
as benchmarks of success. These included 
reducing rates of teenage pregnancy among 13 
to 15 year olds, increasing access to Early Years 
Services, increasing respite services for young 
people with complex disabilities and reducing 
the number of persistent young offenders.70
Since 2001, the Highland Council has reported 
a steady improvement in performance against 
these targets. Improvements have been 
reported in educational and health outcomes, 
through heightened planning and assessment, 
including a steady increase in the educational 
achievement of the lowest attaining 20 per 
cent of students, and in groups such as looked-
after children.71
A 2007 inspection of Child Protection Services 
in the Highlands by HM Inspectorate of 
Education highlighted a number of strengths 
including the effectiveness of early intervention 
services, good communications, professional 
commitment, voluntary sector service quality 
and clarity of vision. When compared to the 
weaknesses in the overall strategy identified 
in earlier inspections, this represented a 
significant improvement in the Service.
However, the Council has acknowledged that 
changes of the magnitude it wants to see 
require time before the effects become widely 
apparent. An evaluation commissioned by the 
Council to evaluate the effect of integration 
has found that the “change in practice has 
been spectacular in some areas of Children’s 
Services, and slower to emerge in others”.72 The 
evaluation also pointed out that “sea change 
will only take place once there is clear evidence 
of positive outcomes for the child, the family 
and those professionals in universal services 
who work with them on a day-to-day basis”.73 
And there are some remaining tensions 
between the participating agencies in the new 
integrated service. Bringing together different 
organisational cultures has created challenges 
about different working practices. It has 
also raised practical issues about employees 
working together in comparable roles being 
remunerated on different pay scales. This has 
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been a particular issue for social workers; some 
agencies have reported the loss of frontline 
social workers as a result. 
5. Analysis: Drivers and Enablers of 
Innovation in the Highlands
5.1 Drivers: Underperformance
The underperformance of the Highland’s 
Children’s Services revealed by the negative 
report in 1999 spurred the Council to take 
practical steps to improve the Service, 
appointing new senior leaders, developing a 
new strategy and creating new structures. 
5.2 Drivers: Leadership
Strong leadership was a driving force for 
innovation in the Highlands. However, 
leadership was not restricted to one charismatic 
individual but involved several people from 
different agencies, each playing different roles 
at different stages of the innovation cycle.
Interviews have identified Councillor Margaret 
Davidson as an important catalyst for change. 
Councillor Davidson raised the inadequacy of 
Children’s Services and advocated radical and 
risky changes before 1999. By gaining support 
from other elected members, she ensured 
Children’s Services remained a priority on the 
Council agenda. Described as a “woman of 
great passion for Children’s Services” by one 
senior manager, Margaret became the chair of 
the Children’s Committee in 1999, a position 
she still holds after eight years. 
Her political leadership was essential in 
initiating changes. It created a strong 
internal pressure which catalysed activity 
and innovation in the Council. Councillor 
Davidson has since played a principal role 
in implementing changes by acting as the 
Children’s Champion on the JCCYP and working 
closely with officials within the Council’s other 
bodies, using her networks and relationships to 
gain support for a more integrated system of 
working.
The leadership team appointed to implement 
the changes to Children’s Services included a 
new Head of Children’s Services, Director of 
Social Work and Director of Education. These 
senior leaders were responsible for transforming 
the culture of Children’s Services. They created 
an environment that encouraged staff at all 
levels to work towards a shared vision, with 
greater organisational ambition as well as 
measured risk-taking and experimentation. 
Interviews with a variety of frontline staff 
and managers identified that the individual 
charisma, passion, drive and vision of the 
individuals on the leadership team were crucial 
to the success of innovation in the Service. 
Most of these individuals remain in post today.
More than three-quarters of the people 
interviewed for this project identified the Head 
of Children’s Services, Bill Alexander, appointed 
in January 2000, as one of the most crucial 
elements in the success of the integration 
strategy. Interviewees described him as: driving 
forward the strategy to place children at the 
centre of service provision; acting as a pioneer 
and champion for innovation; communicating 
a clear vision regarding Children’s Services; and 
creating a positive momentum in the area.
One interviewee from the voluntary sector 
described the Head of Children’s Services as 
having: “been fundamental in driving change…
he has created the vision and strategy”.
Another interviewee said: “I might agree with 
Bill on some things and not on others but 
without a doubt he is very gifted at driving 
forward the agenda”. 
However, frontline staff interviewed for this 
project also voiced fears about over-reliance on 
individual leaders and the risks this may pose 
to continuing innovation and improvements in 
the Highlands should these individuals leave. 
The responsibility for innovation in Children’s 
Services is currently concentrated in a relatively 
small number of individuals, who own and 
drive the innovation process. This reinforces 
the importance of embedding a culture of 
innovation within the Service and building the 
capacity for continuous change and learning, 
so that innovation is sustainable in the long 
term.
5.3 Drivers: Capacity Restraints
Capacity restraints encouraged the Council and 
other agencies to be innovative, particularly 
limited human resources to cover a wide 
geographical area as well as difficulties in 
retaining qualified and experienced staff. 
Integrated services and partnership working 
were believed to increase effectiveness, 
reducing duplication, making agencies 
more efficient. This drove the organisations 
involved in the integrated Children’s Services 
and subsequent GIRFEC Pathfinder. Strong 
partnerships have increased the capacity of 
individual organisations, with many central 
bodies pooling their funding for Children’s 
Services to maximise impact.
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A lack of skilled individuals – and retention 
difficulties – have also encouraged the Service 
to develop creative approaches to tackle 
skills shortages. New posts such as Children’s 
Services Workers represent a particularly 
innovative approach to handling the lack of 
qualified social workers. One senior manager 
said: “the creation of certain posts that aren’t 
social workers, aren’t teachers, aren’t health 
visitors, but are Children’s Services workers, 
has been innovative”. However this has not 
solved the problem of retaining and attracting 
frontline staff in some areas. 
The Highland Council has also been particularly 
adept at identifying funding opportunities 
and placing bids for resources. It is known 
to be keen to be involved in new pilot or 
pathfinder initiatives. This strategy of being at 
the forefront of national developments in order 
to gain substantial resources has driven the 
Highlands to innovate. The Council shows great 
ability in attracting external resources through 
participation in these high profile projects.
5.4 Enabler: Organisational Culture 
Once the new leadership team and structures 
were in place, good internal communication 
was important in establishing a shared vision 
for all the agencies involved in the new 
integrated Children’s Services.
Communication and consultation among 
staff were widespread before changes were 
introduced to Children’s Services. This helped 
staff to engage with the innovation process 
and made them aware of the overall vision 
for the future of Children’s Services. The 
message that dramatic structural changes and 
organisational innovations were necessary 
to improve children’s lives was successfully 
communicated. Interviews identified that staff 
feel that the drive for innovation was driven 
by a genuine desire to improve services, even 
though some staff may not agree with aspects 
of the integration strategy.
To embed the culture of joint working 
and collaboration, senior managers have 
instigated greater consultations between 
different agencies. Alongside this, they have 
brought together individuals from different 
backgrounds, with a variety of expertise and 
skills. All staff are actively encouraged to share 
information and ideas through structures such 
as the JCCYP and area forums and to think 
about innovation in their day-to-day job. 
The Council places great importance on 
continuous learning from its innovations and 
evaluating its successes and failures. A variety 
of research projects has been commissioned 
from universities and other external bodies. 
The Council has benefited from working closely 
with researchers investigating their practices 
who can assess and provide feedback about 
their practices. This enables the Council to 
learn lessons that enable them to change 
their strategy and direction when necessary. 
This has also been translated into a culture of 
organisational learning, which has helped to 
drive innovation as senior managers are able 
to reflect on and assess their own performance 
and direction. However this process is less 
apparent on the frontline. 
Over the last eight years, the Highland 
Council has developed a reputation for 
being an innovative, campaigning and 
leading Scottish council. Council leaders are 
extremely vocal in their awareness of social 
innovation, communicating their knowledge 
and understanding of social innovation 
and its terminology to different agencies 
and departments. At all levels within the 
organisation, staff are acutely aware of the 
external recognition and praise from the 
Scottish Government for its innovation in 
Children’s Services, as well as awards for 
improvements and outcomes connected to 
this innovation. This has helped to increase 
organisational and individual ambitions around 
improvements in Children’s Services, especially 
among frontline staff. Interviews revealed 
that many staff now feel the Highlands has 
a ‘culture of continual change’ focused on 
improving and innovating all the time.
5.5 Enablers: Networks and Informal 
Relationships
Geographically isolated from the rest of 
Scotland, the Highland’s Children’s Services 
has weak connections to agencies and bodies 
outside the region, apart from the Scottish 
Government. 
Its unique geographical circumstances also 
mean that there is a sense that it is hard to 
identify lessons and good practice from other 
councils than can be imported and adapted 
to the Highlands. As a result, many Highland 
agencies involved in Children’s Services have 
difficulties interacting or engaging with 
equivalent agencies outside the region. 
However, the region has very strong informal 
networks and good communication links 
between different agencies, despite staff 
working across an enormous area often based 
in offices miles apart from each other. These 
52
strong informal relationships have played a vital 
part in encouraging and supporting innovation 
and change.
The Highlands is quite a tight-knit community. 
Many frontline staff and middle managers 
have lived and worked in the Highlands for 
a substantial period of time, some of them 
for generations. Migration of staff between 
agencies is quite common. So, there are strong 
informal personal relationships between these 
individuals and their communities. Strong 
informal communication between senior 
officials and elected members at the start of 
the innovation process had already created 
a degree of collaboration and integration; 
this was further developed through the new 
structures and bodies introduced, ensuring 
senior ‘buy in’ and commitment to the 
integration process early in the innovation 
cycle.
The leadership team could draw on strong 
networks that gave Highland’s Children’s 
Services connections upwards to the Scottish 
Government, and downwards to the frontline. 
This enabled the team to raise awareness 
nationally of innovation in the Highlands and 
gave them access to advice and resources, 
such as the GIRFEC Pathfinder. It also helped 
them to communicate the vision for change 
successfully, motivating frontline staff. 
5.6 Enablers: Connections to Central 
Government
The Scottish Government has been heavily 
involved in supporting innovation in Highland’s 
Children’s Services. This is due to a number 
of factors. The strong informal links between 
the two bodies are particularly important, 
supported further by the migration of senior 
personnel from the Highland agencies to the 
Scottish Government. 
The Council’s role as Pathfinder for the 
Getting it Right for Every Child initiative has 
enabled the Council and its partners to consult 
closely with the Government, evaluating 
progress and informing national policy about 
Children’s Services. Early involvement in the 
GIRFEC project has enabled the Council to 
access substantial additional funding. While 
the Scottish Government has made clear its 
expectations and goals for initiatives such 
as GIRFEC, the Council has also benefited 
from the space and flexibility to be creative 
in how it meets these targets and implements 
innovations.
The traditionally risk-averse Council has taken 
great pride in the support and recognition it 
has received from the Scottish Government, 
which has encouraged its innovation and 
reduced the risks associated with restructuring. 
6. Summary and conclusions
A clear picture has emerged about the factors 
that triggered and enabled innovation in 
Children’s Services in the Highlands. The 
Council’s recognition of its underperformance 
in Children’s Services in the late nineties, 
combined with concerns about a declining 
young population and the long-term 
implications for the region’s economy, acted 
as a spur for innovation. Strong political and 
managerial leadership were crucial to driving 
forward changes and supporting the creation 
of an organisational culture that was conducive 
to change, risk taking and experimentation. 
Consultation and strong communication 
played a key role in encouraging agencies 
to collaborate. And, the lack of human 
and financial resources accelerated this 
collaboration by pressing agencies to work 
together to overcome capacity restraints.
The Council pioneered an approach to 
integrating Children’s Services in Scotland that 
was ahead of national strategy and practice 
in this field but was in tune with the direction 
of national policy priorities. This enabled the 
Council to gain support from the Scottish 
Government including financial resources 
and national recognition through the GIRFEC 
Pathfinder. Strong informal networks between 
the individual leaders of Children’s Services, 
Highlands agencies, the Council and the 
Scottish Government helped to strengthen this 
relationship.
The Council’s development of an integrated, 
multi-agency Children’s Service can be 
described as a radical innovation in the 
context of local and national approaches to 
service delivery. The changes resulted in the 
development of a new philosophy and the 
fundamental re-organisation of planning 
and delivery of services. The Council has 
reported steady improvements against certain 
health and education targets in Children’s 
Services, which suggest that integration was 
a valuable innovation.74 This includes a steady 
increase in the educational achievement of 
the lowest attaining 20 per cent of students, 
and of groups such as looked-after children.75 
However, many changes are still underway 
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and it is too early to claim that innovation 
in Children’s Services has led to widespread 
innovation across other services in the 
Highlands. Fieldwork suggests that a strong 
culture of innovation has been established 
successfully in Children’s Services, both at 
the centre and at the frontline. Interviewees 
feel empowered and supported to experiment 
and take risks. If the lessons from Children’s 
Services can be transferred to other services, 
then ideas about local social innovation may 
spread to other services and agencies in the 
Highlands.
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Case study 2: Innovation within Secondary Education in Knowsley, England
Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council has put in place a number of radical changes to 
the Borough’s secondary school system through its ‘Secondary Transformation Scheme’. 
This includes the development of seven new learning centres, which will replace all of the 
Borough’s secondary schools by 2010.
Innovation in Knowsley was driven by the following factors:
A history of poor performance in education, in particular poor examination results, which •	
placed Knowsley at the bottom of national league tables. 
A challenge to Knowsley’s schooling system, caused by students transferring to schools in •	
neighbouring boroughs, which resulted in the closure of schools and comparatively high 
levels of secondary pupil absenteeism. 
Pressure within the Council to ensure school leavers had the right skills to create an •	
adequate workforce for the future, linked to lower than average entry levels into Further 
and Higher Education and persistently high levels of unemployment in the 16-24 year old 
age group.
National and international policy initiatives and debates about the future direction of •	
education (such as The Excellence in Cities Programme, the Every Child Matters agenda 
and the Building Schools for the Future programme) and new research (including thinking 
about the use of technology and information, research into the brain and learning styles).
Strong leadership from the new Director of Education and other senior officials who put •	
in place a vision for change and developed partnerships between agencies in Knowsley to 
implement the Secondary Transformation Scheme.
Knowsley background data
Geography:
Knowsley is a small metropolitan borough in •	
Merseyside which covers an area of 86 km2.
Population:
The Borough has a population of around •	
150,000 people. 
Between 1981 and 2005, the population •	
of Knowsley fell by around 24,200 people 
(approximately 1,000 per annum) from 
173,600 to 149,400, a decline of 13.9 
per cent overall. The main reduction in 
population occurred before 1988, since when 
the decline has been more gradual.
The number and percentage of children has •	
declined and is declining, whilst the number 
of elderly is growing.
Labour Market:
Unemployment in Knowsley at 4.3 per cent •	
is higher than the national average of 3.4 per 
cent. In 2001 it stood at 5.9 per cent. 
By the mid-seventies, almost 50 per •	
cent of all employed persons worked in 
manufacturing; by the 2001 census, this had 
fallen to just over 15 per cent. By contrast, 
the percentage of persons employed in the 
service industry increased from around 40 
per cent to over 70 per cent. 
Deprivation:
Knowsley is an area of significant •	
deprivation, placed as the sixth most 
deprived borough nationally in the 
Department of Environment, Transport and 
the Regions Index of Deprivation in 2000.
Council:
Knowsley is historically a stable Labour •	
constituency. 
Ofsted (1999) ‘Inspection 76. 
report Knowsley Local 
Education Authority.’ 
London: Ofsted.
Knowsley Council is currently dominated •	
by Labour councillors (50), with a modest 
but significant number of Liberal Democrat 
councillors (13).
1. Summary: Context and Need
The Metropolitan Borough of Knowsley is 
situated in Merseyside, in the heart of the 
North West region. Knowsley was identified as 
the eighth most deprived borough nationally in 
the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Index 
of Deprivation in 2004, with higher levels of 
social and economic disadvantage than the 
national average. Eighteen of the Borough’s 
22 wards fall within the most deprived 10 
per cent of wards in England. One in three 
households is in receipt of Council Tax Benefit. 
Unemployment is 4.3 per cent, above the 
national average of 3.4 per cent. 
In 1999, an area-wide inspection by Ofsted, 
the schools inspectorate, led the Council to 
act to address the Borough’s record of poor 
performance in education. In 1997, only 51 
per cent of pupils aged 16 were in full-time 
education, compared to 67 per cent nationally, 
and a growing number of pupils were choosing 
to attend schools in neighbouring boroughs. 
In 1999, there was a net loss of over 14 per 
cent of pupils to secondary schools outside 
the Borough,76 resulting in school closures. 
Knowsley was ranked consistently at the 
bottom of national league tables for GCSE 
results since their introduction in the eighties. 
Surplus school places looked set to continue 
to grow due to a declining youth population in 
the Borough. 
The inspectors reported that Knowsley was 
failing to tackle pupils’ low attainment and 
aspirations. Ofsted was particularly concerned 
about the needs of post-16 year olds, noting 
that 14 per cent of all pupils achieved no 
grades at GCSE (compared with the national 
average of 6.1 per cent) and many were 
failing to continue their education or to enter 
employment. The report also acknowledged 
that a: “significant culture shift was needed” in 
the Local Education Authority.
2. Innovation Strategy
Following the inspection, elected members and 
senior officials in the Council and educational 
establishments recognised that the education 
system was in crisis and required significant 
improvement. 
They perceived the challenge as twofold. First, 
how to make the existing system work better 
for those who were not being sufficiently well 
provided for, and second, to begin to examine 
what structural reforms were required to 
transform the system into one that would and 
could sustain longer-term improvement.
The most immediate challenge was the 
performance of those young people who were 
falling out of the education system and failing 
to get into training or employment.
The Council’s response was to examine how 
the entire schooling process could become 
more seamless for students. This would 
mean creating greater continuity between 
traditionally separate stages of schooling to 
prevent young people from disengaging. It 
would particularly require better routes in to 
vocational training, which would enable young 
people to obtain the skills they needed for 
further learning and employment. 
At this point, work was already underway, in 
partnership with the University of Liverpool, 
to explore how broad socio-economic factors 
would influence the future organisation of 
schools. The Borough was developing plans to 
use regeneration funding to establish a ‘School 
of the Future’ project to help counteract 
historic underperformance. The work with 
Liverpool University looked at challenges 
facing the education system in the 21st century 
and the readiness of the existing system in 
Knowsley to meet them. This work was to 
be highly influential in informing Knowsley’s 
innovation strategy, with much of the thinking 
around introducing technology to encourage 
interactive and personalised learning.
The Ofsted inspection acted as a catalyst 
to drive forward this work. At this point, a 
number of critical decisions were made about 
developing a new philosophy for education in 
the Borough, including: 
The decision to develop and adopt a new •	
teaching philosophy and strategy that would 
more effectively develop pupils’ skills and 
enable them to take ownership of their 
learning. This involved moving away from an 
emphasis on remembering facts to one that 
developed their thinking skills, and which 
would encourage a culture of research in 
schools. 
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The decision to integrate the education •	
system, which involved reassessing the 
existing, traditional educational stages at 
ages 14-16 and post-16, and combining 
these into a new phase of 14-19. The 
11-13 phase was still considered a separate 
educational stage.
This philosophy was formalised into strategy 
in 2001, when the Council created the 
Transformation Agenda, with the aim of 
increasing attainment in Knowsley’s primary 
and secondary schools. The Transformation 
Agenda brought together five different 
programmes to initiate change in different 
aspects of the Borough’s education system. 
These were: Transforming Teaching and 
Learning; 14-19 Collegiate; Plus One 
Challenge; Year 5-8 Transition Project 
(designed specifically to improve transition 
from primary education to secondary education 
by improving the transfer of data on the child), 
and the Excellence in Cities programme, which 
played a crucial part in Knowsley’s innovation 
strategy.
The Excellence in Cities Programme (EiC) was 
launched by the Department for Education 
and Employment in 1999 to drive up standards 
in schools in major cities to those found in 
the best schools in England. The Programme 
covered entire local authority areas, with a local 
partnership between the local authority and 
headteachers leading the initiative locally.
Excellence in Cities involved seven key strands 
of activity to tackle a range of educational 
issues, from Learning Support Units to help 
pupils at risk of exclusion and Learning 
Mentors to reduce barriers to learning by 
addressing underlying issues affecting pupils, 
to a programme to support gifted and talented 
children. A key element of the programme for 
Knowsley was the City Learning Centres strand, 
which provided local authorities with capital 
resources to establish high-tech facilities 
designed to enhance the whole curriculum. The 
aim was to raise educational standards and skill 
levels in order to promote employability and 
social inclusion, with the City Learning Centres 
providing resources to be shared not only by 
schools but by the community. 
This initiative enabled Knowsley to build three 
new City Learning Centres, using a combination 
of funding from EiC and regeneration monies. 
It also provided an opportunity to take forward 
and experiment with the earlier ‘Schools of the 
Future’ work, resulting in markedly different 
layouts and approaches to standard classrooms. 
These will open in 2009.
The five programmes making up the 
Transformation Agenda enabled Knowsley to 
tackle different aspects of its education system 
using a variety of strategies and measures. 
Whilst some of these initiatives were adopted 
to show short-term improvement and results 
(such as the Plus One Challenge), others such 
as the 14-19 Collegiate were designed to have 
a more lasting effect on the educational system 
in the Borough.
For example, the Plus One Challenge consisted 
of a number of different measures to help 
pupils to gain an exam result at least one 
grade higher than their predicted grades. This 
included access to websites, online virtual 
examinations and accessing e-mentors through 
the internet to support revision. It also used 
mobile phones to aid pupils’ revision by 
sending text messages to students’ phones 
with revision tips and subject quizzes. 
The Transforming Teaching and Learning 
Project focused on developing the new 
teaching strategy and ensuring that teaching 
in the Borough reflected the change in 
approach towards a more pupil-led system 
of learning. This used partnerships with a 
variety of external agencies and bodies such 
as the National College of School Leadership, 
the Centre for Education Leadership at the 
University of Manchester, and private agencies 
such as Alite, and more recently Microsoft, all 
of whom brought expertise and knowledge to 
the Borough’s schools. These partnerships and 
this strand of the Transformation Agenda also 
included action research projects that enabled 
schools to reflect on their current practices and 
support the progressive development of the 
new teaching and learning methods.
Excellence in Cities and the wider 
Transformation Agenda were crucial to 
Knowsley’s innovation programme. Together 
they provided access to resources and the 
focus to enable the Borough and schools to 
experiment with new concepts and approaches 
to education. As one interviewee put it, they 
were: “a road out of desperation for many of 
our schools”. 
This was a turning point in Knowsley’s 
innovation strategy. Performance began to 
improve significantly. However, at this point, 
the Council and educational partnerships 
recognised that it would be increasingly 
difficult to focus on improving the existing 
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system and fundamentally reforming it at the 
same time. Despite rapid improvements in 
some schools, the existing system remained 
flawed and the earlier work on the challenges 
to education in the 21st century had identified 
questions around the long-term viability of the 
system.
In response, the Council adopted a twin-track 
innovation strategy:
First, to maintain the Transformation Agenda •	
around the improvement and reform of the 
existing system.
Second, to carry out further development •	
work to ensure the Borough’s education 
system would be adequate to meet new 
challenges.
Track two of this strategy involved two 
key areas of work. First, they appointed an 
independent Schools’ Commission in 2002. 
Second, the Every Child Matters agenda, which 
aligned the work of schools with the overall 
needs of the child, was introduced. Both these 
areas of work were important in identifying 
the long term challenges to education and 
reinforcing the fact that Knowsley’s education 
system would not be viable without significant 
change.
The Schools’ Commission consisted of 
four leading national experts, who were 
appointed to analyse the local school system. 
The Commission produced two key reports 
in late 2002 and early 2003, setting out 
12 propositions. These included proposals 
on school size, the nature of buildings, 
extended schools, inclusion, partnership and 
collaboration, and pupil retention. It also 
recommended the creation of a new type of 
school and the closure or amalgamation of 
around 25 schools in the area. 
In 2003, Knowsley published its key Schools 
Policy document Options	for	Change:	Future	
Schooling	in	Knowsley:	A	Joint	Statement	of	
Intent in partnership with the local Catholic 
Archdiocese and Anglican Diocese. While the 
new school proposal was not taken forward, 
the wider propositions remained intact. 
In late 2003, the Government announced its 
intention to establish the Building Schools 
for the Future (BSF) programme to support 
educational reform. Based on its work during 
the previous two years, Knowsley was able 
to access significant funding to support 
investment in buildings and ICT. The Schools 
Policy document (2003) played an important 
role in establishing Knowsley’s case for Wave 
1 BSF funding. To date, Knowsley Council has 
been allocated approximately £250 million 
through BSF. 
Knowsley has used BSF to support a radical 
programme of innovation, which will see all the 
Borough’s secondary schools replaced by seven 
new learning centres. The new learning centres 
will open from 2010 onwards and are described 
by Children Services’ officers as the physical 
manifestation of Knowsley’s Transformation 
Agenda and pupil-centred learning philosophy. 
Students, residents and teachers have played 
an active role in the design of the new 
buildings. The centres will make greater use 
of ICT in classrooms to create an environment 
more conducive to personalised learning. 
These learning centres will be integrated within 
Knowsley’s local communities, with many of 
the Council’s public services delivered from 
their buildings. The learning centres’ facilities 
will also be available for use by the local 
community, including adult learners. Securing 
BSF funding also required a more fundamental 
evaluation of the existing system in areas such 
as leadership, management, and governance.
Knowsley proposes to introduce federated 
governance structures for the new learning 
centres, which will merge governing bodies 
from former secondary schools and involve 
a variety of local stakeholders. The new 
governance structures are currently being 
developed with the support of the Innovation 
Unit and will come into practice when all 
the learning centres are opened in 2010. 
The aim is to involve external partners and 
communities in collective decision-making 
about the learning centres, and wider issues 
such as neighbourhood regeneration and 
public service delivery. Knowsley’s decision to 
develop federated governance structures has 
been controversial – going against the grain of 
Whitehall policy – despite the Borough’s wider 
work on BSF reflecting national government 
priorities.
 
3. Innovation process
3.1 Leadership: creating innovation 
champions
Innovation in Knowsley has been driven by 
strong leaders within the Borough Council 
and in different educational agencies. In 
2000, a new leadership team was appointed 
58
to implement Knowsley’s innovation strategy. 
However, prior to these appointments, the 
Council had demonstrated strong leadership in 
undertaking significant work to identify issues 
that would impact on Knowsley’s education 
system in the future. 
The new leadership team included the 
appointment a new Director of Education 
in 2000, Steve Munby, who had previously 
worked with the Borough’s new Chief Executive 
at another local authority. Interviewees felt this 
relationship was beneficial for Knowsley:
“The	two	of	them	had	an	understanding.	
So,	the	Director	of	Education	actually	
developed	the	vision	and	the	Chief	
Executive	supported	him	and	got	the	
members’	‘buy-in’	and	so	on.	So	it	was	a	
very	useful	bit	of	leadership.”
The other leaders central to the innovation 
process were the College Principal at Knowsley 
College, the Chief Executive of Connexions, 
and the Director of the local Learning and Skills 
Council (LSC). 
These individuals instilled a vision for the 
future of Knowsley’s educational services 
within different agencies. Research suggests 
the fact that these leaders were present in 
both the Council and key agencies within the 
education system also created a partnership 
between these bodies and a collaborative 
approach to improving the education system.
Individuals such as the Chief Executive of 
Connexions and the College Principal were 
crucial in instilling the vision and gaining 
support amongst frontline workers and staff in 
their own institutions as well as more broadly, 
using their wider professional networks to 
access government decision-makers.
3.2 Organisational restructuring 
The formation of the 14-19 Collegiate in 2001 
was designed to integrate different educational 
phases in order to address low attainment and 
continuation onto Further Education post-16. 
The 14-19 Collegiate was a partnership with 
the aim of developing a new, more vocational 
curriculum for 14-19 year olds, with the goal of 
ensuring that each young person in Knowsley 
would be able to plan a coherent learning 
pathway with sound advice and guidance. The 
partnership would enable: 
“a	new	coherent	and	flexible	single	14-19	
phase	of	education	that	will	enable	young	
people	to	learn	and	achieve	in	ways	best	
suited	to	their	individual	needs.	This	will	
support	the	young	people	of	Knowsley,	
by	addressing	the	challenges	ahead	that	
will	contribute	to	raising	attainment,	
achievement	and	employability,	positively	
impacting	on	the	economic	and	social	
development	of	the	Borough	and	its	
residents.”
The 14-19 Collegiate consisted of a number 
of partners and representatives from a range 
of different agencies including the Council, 
secondary schools and colleges, work-based 
learning providers, and private organisations 
such as Jaguar. The partnership had the 
following objectives:
To widen the choice of curriculum pathways •	
from the age of 14 and increase progression 
to Further and Higher Education.
To promote the role of innovation within •	
education.
To extend high-quality provision that puts •	
individual student needs at the heart of the 
process. 
To maximise the use of the Vocational Skills •	
Centre, which will allow students to access 
learning pathways within technological 
environments that replicate the workplace.
To promote the achievement of recognised •	
vocational qualifications.
To promote the role of enterprise and •	
entrepreneurship within education.
This partnership also brought together funding 
in order to bring about change and services in 
a coherent manner. One interviewee described 
this approach:
“The	14-19	collegiate	was	a	partnership	
venture	between	the	local	authority,	local	
connexions,	schools,	colleges,	local	learning	
and	skills	council,	private	sector	and	
training	provider,	which	brought	together	
a	mosaic	of	funding	while	presenting	a	
sustainable	curriculum	offer	for	over	1,000	
pupils	outside	of	their	host	schools.”
This work underpinned further major 
reorganisation under the BSF programme, 
which will see Knowsley shut down all the 
Borough’s secondary schools and replace 
them with seven new learning centres. These 
will open from 2010 onwards and are central 
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to the Borough’s new pupil-centred learning 
philosophy.
3.3 Community involvement and 
consultation
Community involvement and consultation 
have been central to the process of innovation 
in Knowsley. The Council felt this was 
fundamental given the scope of the proposed 
changes to secondary education, both to 
reflect local needs and priorities and to gauge 
peoples’ fears and worries.
The Council and other agencies involved in 
the education system have created a culture 
of local collaboration that is partly led by 
service users and communities to ensure that 
changes and innovation reflect their needs and 
requirements. At the start of the innovation 
process, Liverpool FC’s Anfield ground was 
hired for a ‘visioning’ conference bringing 
together council officers, heads, teachers, 
governors and other interested community 
groups to discuss the way forward. Many 
of those present said that this was the first 
time they had been asked their opinions or 
felt involved, and the event was felt to be a 
way to communicate how collaboration and 
consultation would be at the heart of the 
Transformation Agenda. 
Consultation with experts was also critical 
to innovation in Knowsley. The four national 
experts that made up the independent School 
Commission in 2002 were able to analyse the 
current system and formulate a strategy for 
change. The seventies steered debate away 
from the concerns of individual schools and 
analysed issues on a system-wide basis. Most 
importantly, it set out a succession of reforming 
principles around which the Council and its key 
partners could agree. The effects of this work 
are clearly identifiable in the BSF programme 
in that it is the only programme nationally to 
close all existing schools and replace them as 
institutions with a radically new concept.
The Schools’ Commission process was also 
consultative, consisting of meetings with 
stakeholders to discuss their ambitions 
for education in the Borough as well as 
visiting each school in the Borough. Their 
recommendations were then taken out by the 
Council into community forums and public 
meetings. Responses were actively encouraged 
not just to proposals for individual schools but 
also to the fundamental principles for wider 
reform. 
Following the securing of BSF Wave 1 status, 
the authority also held a two-day Design 
Festival for 150 young people from across all 
secondary schools. This looked into the issues 
facing young people in schools and their 
wishes for a new learning environment. 
This approach was further rolled out into 
the formal process of securing private sector 
partners for BSF. Twelve focus groups were 
created as an ongoing panel for the BSF 
programme, with a total of 150 pupils, 
teachers, governors and parents. These 
groups have often been central to decision-
making about the learning centres and 
played an important role in the evaluation 
and commissioning processes for the design 
and building of the learning centres. Officers 
articulated the value of the focus groups to the 
local authority and affirmed they will use this 
format for consultation in future projects. One 
interviewee describes the impact of the focus 
groups:
“In	terms	of	the	consultation	exercises,	
and	the	way	in	which	we	have	drawn	the	
school	population	into	redesigning	the	
schools,	I	think	that	in	itself	has	been	quite	
innovative.	We	have	really	looked,	for	
example,	at	involving	pupils	in	the	design	
of	the	learning	centres…	we	have	asked	
the	local	school	population	what	they	want	
from	their	building.”
4. Outcomes
In spite of the fact that Knowsley still 
struggles with performance at GCSE level with 
only 26.3 per cent gaining five good GCSEs 
including English and Maths,77 there have 
been significant improvements in performance. 
Over the last eight years, the number of 
students in Knowsley gaining five or more A* 
to C GCSE grades or their equivalent in any 
subject has doubled from 23.6 per cent in 
1999 to 50.4 per cent in 2007, four times the 
national rate of improvement over the same 
period.78 In Key Stage 3 results Knowsley has 
shown a performance increase that exceeded 
the national rate in both English and Maths.79 
Knowsley also met some Government targets 
early with no schools achieving below 20 per 
cent of 5 A* to C GCSE grades.80 
Government data shows that local authorities 
involved in the EiC programmes achieved 
rates of improvement in GCSE performance of 
around twice that of non-EiC areas. However, 
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Knowsley exceeded these rates, with the 
Borough’s EiC schools improving from 28.2 
per cent of pupils achieving 5+ A*-C GCSES in 
2001, to 45.4 per cent of pupils in 2005.81
Evaluating bodies such as Ofsted and the Adult 
Learning Inspectorate have also identified 
improvements, commenting in 2005 after a 
joint inspection that:
“Education	and	training	in	Knowsley	
are	outstanding	at	meeting	the	needs	of	
learners,	employers	and	the	community.”82
Knowsley has also gained much national 
recognition for being chosen as one of the 
first authorities to participate in the BSF 
Authority initiative. The Audit Commission’s 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
in 2005 rated the Authority as ‘excellent’. 
Knowsley has been chosen by the Innovation 
Unit as a Pathfinder to investigate new forms 
of governance and leadership, which it is 
currently developing in conjunction with the 
development of their new learning centres. The 
Borough was also highlighted in the Schools’ 
White Paper in late 2005 as an example of best 
practice in linking the transformation of public 
services to investment.83 Knowsley’s ability and 
desire to innovate around education has also 
gained international recognition and support 
with a secondary school being designated 
by Microsoft as one of its fifteen Innovative 
Worldwide Schools. 
5. Analysis: Drivers and Enablers of 
Innovation in Knowsley
5.1 Driver: Crisis and Underperformance
The consistently poor performance of 
Knowsley’s education system against a series 
of performance measures had led to a sense 
of growing crisis in the Borough. Drastic and 
radical innovation was seen as the only method 
to bring about the improvements needed to 
lift Knowsley from the bottom of the national 
league tables. 
The increase of surplus school places and the 
increasing number of pupils leaving Knowsley’s 
schools for neighbouring boroughs was an 
additional factor that contributed to senior 
officials’ and elected members’ belief, that 
without change, many of the Borough’s schools 
would be unsustainable and would have to 
close. As one interviewee described:
“We	identified	that	of	the	eleven	original	
schools	in	the	Borough	at	least	four	would	
have	to	close.”
The 1999 Ofsted inspection acted as a catalyst 
to drive forward new thinking and plans for 
education innovation that were already being 
developed in the Borough. 
5.2 Driver: National Policy Frameworks
Central government has directly and indirectly 
supported Knowsley’s Transformation Agenda. 
At times, elements of the Borough’s innovation 
strategy have run in parallel with many 
different national policy initiatives and projects 
(as discussed below), while at other times it has 
challenged the Government’s agenda.
Where there has been alignment, Knowsley 
has been able to access significant funding 
and resources to support its innovation 
strategy. Arguably, without access to resources 
to develop a new physical infrastructure for 
education, the Borough would not have been 
able to make as much progress even with its 
significant work to develop new thinking about 
educational reform and innovation.
Knowsley’s Secondary Transformation Agenda 
was aligned to government priorities for reform 
and modernisation. The Borough’s involvement 
in the Excellence in Cities programme provided 
access to capital resources and support 
that proved to be crucial for the long-term 
development of the Building Schools for the 
Future programme.
The Borough’s decision to integrate 14-19 
year-olds into a single educational phase has 
since been adopted by central government. 
The Government recognised that, compared 
to other countries, the UK had a relatively low 
proportion of students continuing in education 
after sixteen and felt that by looking at 14-19 
as one stage in education they would be able 
to better challenge this trend. In a 2005 White 
Paper, the Government described its concerns, 
recognising that:
“Many	employers	are	not	satisfied	with	the	
basic	skills	of	school	leavers	going	directly	
into	jobs.	Some	young	people	drift	outside	
education,	employment	or	training	between	
the	ages	of	16	and	19.	The	most	able	
young	people	are	not	as	fully	stretched	as	
they	could	be.”84	
Between 2003 and 2005, the Government 
created the 14-19 Pathfinders programme, 
which developed and implemented approaches 
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to 14-19 learning. This included 39 
Pathfinders, introduced in two phases, covering 
a range of geographical and socio-economic 
circumstances. Knowsley was chosen as a 
Pathfinder in the first phase of this programme, 
with the aim of creating:
“Through	partnership,	a	new	coherent	and	
flexible	single	14-19	phase	of	education	
that	will	enable	young	people	to	learn	
and	achieve	in	ways	best	suited	to	their	
individual	needs.	This	will	support	the	
young	people	of	Knowsley	by	addressing	
the	challenges	ahead	that	will	contribute	
to	raising	attainment,	achievement	and	
employability,	positively	impacting	on	the	
economic	and	social	development	of	the	
Borough	and	its	residents.”85	
In Knowsley, the Pathfinder supported the 
innovative work already occurring around 
the 14-19 Collegiate, helping to extend its 
activities into new vocational areas. The 
Pathfinder also provided funding to create a 
new Vocation and Skills Centre in 2003, and 
included much work exploring and evaluating 
new models of funding that were introduced to 
the area. 
Knowsley has also acted as a Wave 1 Authority 
for the Government’s BSF programme, which 
consists of a substantial amount of funding to 
renew England’s secondary schools. The BSF 
programme has brought together significant 
investment in buildings and in ICT in order to 
support the Government’s educational reform 
agenda. Knowsley was chosen as one of the 
first local authorities for the BSF programme in 
2004.
However, Knowsley’s decision to approach 
the BSF programme on a system reform 
basis, introducing innovative new federated 
governance structures, has been controversial.
5.3 Drivers: Leadership
Leadership from a combination of individuals 
was central to driving innovation in Knowsley. 
In the early stages, key figures such as the 
Director of Education, Principal of Knowsley 
College, representatives from the Learning 
and Skills Council (LSC), and the Chief 
Executive of Connexions, played an important 
role in initiating changes. One interviewee 
commented:
“We	had	strong	senior	leadership	which	
made	it	happen.	And	I’m	talking	about	
leadership	in	the	college;	I’m	talking	about	
leadership	in	the	local	authority.	I’m	talking	
about	innovative	leadership	with	regard	
to	the	LSC	and	these	three	key	players,	
connections,	these	managers,	senior	
managers	came	together	and	said,	‘listen	
we	need	to	do	something	different,	what	
should	we	do?’”
Leadership was especially critical to the 
innovation process in Knowsley because of 
the scale and radical nature of the proposed 
changes, which would involve a large number 
of staff from multiple agencies. The leadership 
team worked closely with staff and were able to 
communicate a strong vision for change across 
the many institutions involved.
The initial leadership team has now moved 
on but a succession team that supported the 
original senior management team has carried 
forward the original vision and values for 
transforming education in Knowsley. Officers 
and frontline staff felt that this continuity 
was an important factor in embedding and 
consolidating innovation and change in 
Knowsley. One interviewee described that past 
leaders have “been very inclusive with their 
own leadership teams … the baton has been 
passed on really.” Past and current leadership 
has created a culture that embraces innovation 
and is prepared to take risks.
5.4 Drivers: Organisational Culture
Knowsley had previously been described as a 
‘depressed authority’ suffering from a culture 
of ‘low aspiration’.86 As one interviewee 
described:
“There	were	a	lot	of	talented	people,	
but	also	a	lot	of	low	self-esteem	in	the	
community,	in	schools	and	the	department.”
The leadership team recognised that if the 
proposed changes were to be successfully 
implemented, it would be crucial to create a 
positive working environment and a culture 
that embraced change and risk-taking. The 
first step was to communicate to all staff 
and agencies why there was a need to aspire 
towards better education provision. One senior 
official interviewed commented: “you have to 
inspire before you can aspire.”
Innovation has been encouraged both formally 
and informally. Many frontline staff are 
encouraged to take time to come up with new 
ideas for improving the classroom environment 
or creative approaches to learning. In some 
cases, time is built into teaching schedules 
for researching new ideas and for networking 
with peers in other schools and other parts 
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of the country. As a result, some creative 
approaches have been trialled and adopted to 
improve pupil learning. Examples include the 
distribution of soft music mood CDs to help 
relax pupils and assist in their revision and the 
creation of research journals by schools on 
pedagogy.
The innovation strategy consisted of both 
short- and long-term changes. This enabled the 
Borough to achieve some early improvements 
in attainment, thereby making the value of the 
overall innovation process clear to managers 
and frontline workers. These early outcomes 
helped to compel frontline staff in the Borough 
to adopt and support the changes that were 
taking place. This momentum has more recently 
been supported by recognition from national 
bodies and the Government, which have 
chosen Knowsley as a Pathfinder for a number 
of different initiatives.
5.5 Enabler: Political Support and Stable 
Political Environment
Innovation in Knowsley has been possible 
because of the stable political environment. 
The majority of interviewees commented 
on how radical change would have been 
difficult to introduce in a less stable political 
setting, where the emphasis may have been 
on minimising risk, and how important local 
political support has been to the innovation 
process. One interviewee said: “one particular 
political factor is important and that is the 
general stability of the political leadership.”
However, there is conflicting evidence in the 
literature about innovation that suggests that 
political volatility can be equally important as 
a catalyst and driver of local social change. 
Research by the National Audit Office and 
Audit Commission has suggested that political 
crisis or a change in political leadership can be 
a cause of innovation in the public sector (this 
is further expanded in the literature review 
found in Section 5).
5.6 Enabler: Partnerships
Prior to the Excellence in Cities programme 
in Knowsley there had been a limited amount 
of partnership working and collaboration 
between agencies in the Borough, with schools 
and colleges often working in isolation, 
moderated by a small number of ad hoc and 
pragmatic partnership-based projects. The 
Council’s strategy to bring about change within 
secondary education was to implement a 
cross-borough programme – the Transformation 
Agenda. The common agenda and priorities 
encouraged agencies to work in collaboration, 
and formalised structures such as the 14-19 
Collegiate were used to encourage and support 
partnerships between the Borough’s schools, 
colleges, local authority, training services, 
private sector, Learning and Skills Councils 
and local Connexions service. One interviewee 
described the impact of the integrated 
approach:
“In	Knowsley	when	we	started	to	look	at	
partnership	work,	it	was	totally	new.	It	was	
totally	innovative.	Areas,	schools,	colleges	
hadn’t	worked	together.”
Partnership working also enabled the Council 
to understand better the needs of communities 
and young people, and to communicate and 
translate the vision for the future of Knowsley’s 
education system to those in different 
agencies, from senior managers to frontline 
staff. This was done through an emphasis on 
consultation and strong informal collaboration 
between many senior officials at different 
agencies and across different sectors.
Collaboration enabled the Council to gain 
‘buy-in’ for the partnership approach from all 
of the schools involved. This also ensured that 
this ownership was reflected back in press and 
media messages and avoided the alienation of 
the educational institutes who would be most 
affected by the changes. Schools and colleges 
were also well represented on bodies such as 
the 14-19 Collegiate, which acted as a vehicle 
for them to put forward their ideas, concerns 
and opinions.
The Council also formed partnerships with a 
number of private sector organisations in the 
Borough, including them in the educational 
process and using them to support the 
Council’s strategy of developing vocational 
routes. This included a partnership with Jaguar, 
which approached the 14-19 Collegiate 
because the company wanted to invest in skills 
development to support local regeneration. 
Jaguar viewed this partnership as part of its 
corporate social responsibility role and was in 
the process of developing educational centres 
at all its plants. The company was able to 
contribute to the development of the 14-19 
Collegiate, including by helping design a new 
Engineering and Manufacturing GCSE and 
work experience module. Jaguar also seconded 
a member of staff to lead the development 
of the this course with college staff. This 
subsequently developed into a pilot for the 
Government’s new Student Apprenticeships.
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The Innovation Unit was 87. 
established in 2002 to 
promote innovation to 
improve education.  It was 
part of the Department for 
Education until 2007 when 
it became an independent, 
government-funded 
organisation.
Knowsley also established a partnership 
with Microsoft in 2007 as part of its Global 
Innovative Schools initiative, which involves 
applying technological expertise to education 
at Bowring School. This support includes 
the provision of resources and technology to 
support teaching, as well as Microsoft sharing 
its experience of how to use technology in the 
classroom to make teaching more effective and 
learning more personalised. 
6. Summary and conclusions
Knowsley’s innovation in secondary education 
has been driven and enabled by a combination 
of factors. The Council’s recognition of its 
underperforming schools and failure to 
challenge the poor attainment of students was 
brought to light through external evaluations 
conducted by Ofsted. The Borough was also 
heading towards a state of crisis with a rising 
number of surplus school places and the 
resultant closure of some of its secondary 
schools, as pupils chose to join schools in 
neighbouring boroughs. 
The 1999 inspection acted as a catalyst to 
drive forward innovative ideas and approaches 
to education that the Borough had been 
developing for some time. International 
policy debates about the future direction and 
challenges to education provided context to 
Knowsley’s experience and access to new ideas 
about improving the learning experience for 
pupils. 
At the same time, Knowsley’s innovation 
strategy has been aligned with central 
government’s national policy agenda at 
crucial points in its development, allowing 
the Borough to access significant capital 
resources and support through the Excellence 
in Cities Programme and Every Child Matters. 
The Borough’s Secondary Transformation 
Agenda was aligned to government priorities 
for educational reform and modernisation. 
However, at other times Knowsley’s strategy 
has directly challenged government priorities. 
The Borough’s decision to approach BSF 
without introducing a strong role for Academies 
has been controversial. Critical in this is 
Knowsley’s work with the the Innovation Unit87 
to examine ways in which governance can be 
reformed to support the wider educational and 
social objectives of the BSF programme, out of 
which came the plan for federated governance. 
Government continues to support this work 
and is examining how it might be taken forward 
in the context of the Education and Inspection 
Act 2006 while continuing to give the Borough 
the opportunity to experiment with a genuinely 
new and innovative structure. 
Innovation in Knowsley is at a relatively early 
stage. However, the Borough has already 
developed an international reputation for its 
radical new models for schooling. Knowsley 
has recognised the need to create a culture of 
innovation to assist the Borough in creating a 
modern education system which will be able 
to adapt to economic and social change in the 
21st century. 
This stimulated the Council to develop a 
strategy for radical innovation with the support 
of an independent Schools Commission. This 
innovation has involved redesigning the entire 
secondary education system and undertaking 
radical reorganisation which will see all the 
Borough’s secondary schools close and be 
replaced by seven new learning centres in the 
coming years.
As with South Tyneside and the Highlands, 
political and managerial leadership and 
collaboration between different agencies 
were critical to establish a clear vision for 
change and to achieve ‘buy-in’ from the many 
different schools that would be affected by the 
Transformation Agenda.
Many respondents identified political support 
and a stable political environment as crucial 
enablers of innovation in Knowsley. It was 
felt that the Borough’s radical programme 
of innovation would not have been possible 
without a strong political leadership that could 
support risk taking without concerns about 
undermining the stability of the majority party.
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Timeline 2: Innovation in Secondary Education in Knowsley
Non-decent homes are those 88. 
that fail to meet at least one 
of the following criteria: the 
current minimum standard 
for housing (the fitness 
standard), a reasonable state 
of repair, reasonably modern 
facilities and services, 
a reasonable degree of 
thermal comfort.
A Super Output Area is 89. 
an aggregate of existing 
output areas, such as council 
wards, designed to ensure 
comparability of statistics 
over time. They have two 
sizes – lower SOAs have 
between 1,000-5,000 
people and middle SOAs 
have over 5,000 people 
living in them.
IDeA (2006) ‘Journey 90. 
to Improvement: South 
Tyneside.’ [Online] London: 
IDeA. Available at: http://
www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/
page.do?pageId=5607813
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Case study 3: Innovation to address social exclusion in South Tyneside, England
South Tyneside has developed a number of innovative projects to address social exclusion, 
including the Council-led Neighbourhood Appraisal and Action Planning project, as well as 
the Beacon-awarded financial inclusion scheme pioneered by leaders in the local voluntary 
sector. South Tyneside has successfully pioneered new projects as well as replicating and 
adapting other socially innovative projects.
The innovation was driven by the following factors:
Poor performance assessed by inspections and a realisation that the Council was not •	
actively challenging the decline in the area.
Deprivation, population decline and multiple interrelated needs in the area.•	
Strong leadership from the new Chief Executive and other senior officials, who have since •	
established a culture of innovation in South Tyneside.
South Tyneside Background Data
Geography
With an area of 64km•	 2, South Tyneside is 
England’s smallest metropolitan borough. 
Situated in North East England, the Borough 
is sandwiched between the North Sea to the 
east, the River Tyne to the north and an area 
of green belt to the south and south-west. 
Population
The total population of South Tyneside is in •	
decline, having fallen by 2 per cent between 
1998 and 2005.
It is a very deprived area with 74.5 per •	
cent of social sector housing classified as 
‘non-decent’,88 one of the highest levels in 
England.
19.4 per cent of the Super Output Areas•	 89 in 
South Tyneside are ranked in the top ten per 
cent most deprived in England.
It is a predominantly white area (97.29 per •	
cent) with a small Asian, mainly Bangladeshi, 
community (1.58 per cent) and Arab 
community.
Labour market
Unemployment is high at 6.25 per cent •	
compared to the UK average of 5.4 per cent 
due to the decline of industry.
The main industrial and economic sectors •	
are retail, hotels and restaurants, health 
and social work, and manufacturing. These 
sectors employ 23 per cent, 17.1 per cent 
and 13.8 per cent of the local population 
respectively.
Council
Consists of 54 elected members of whom •	
34 are Labour, seven Independents, six 
Progressives, four Liberal Democrats and 
three Conservative.
1. Summary: Context and Need
South Tyneside is a small metropolitan borough 
in North East England, bordering Newcastle 
and Gateshead. The Borough consists of three 
distinct towns – Jarrow, South Shields and 
Hebburn. With a history of heavy industry, 
South Tyneside was once responsible for 
building a quarter of the world’s ships, as well 
as having extensive coalmining and chemical 
industries. During the latter half of the 20th 
century, these industries declined, resulting 
in high unemployment, population loss and 
deprivation. South Tyneside contains nineteen 
of the UK’s most deprived neighbourhoods, 
according to the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation.90 
In the nineties, South Tyneside Council received 
national recognition for its performance. 
However, in 2000, an Ofsted Inspection 
and two Best Value reports from the Audit 
Commission revealed that South Tyneside was 
underperforming; while services were doing 
well in isolation, they were not effectively 
working together to meet complex social needs 
in the Borough.
This evaluation has been described by the 
current Chief Executive, Irene Lucas, as coming 
as “a real shock to the Council … [and] acting 
as a catalyst for change in the authority”.91 This 
was followed in 2004 by an IDeA report that 
identified South Tyneside as having poor levels 
of health and educational achievement, as well 
as high levels of social exclusion and reported 
crime. These interrelated needs are one of the 
underlying pressures driving innovation in the 
area, with social and financial exclusion closely 
linked to the area’s deprivation. 
After the Council’s acknowledgement of the 
need for change, the international urban policy 
consultancy COMEDIA, was commissioned in 
2002 by the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) 
to evaluate the Council’s performance and 
service delivery. 
COMEDIA’s report was seen by the Council as 
the first milestone in South Tyneside’s decision 
to innovate and its subsequent transformation. 
The report contained an array of suggestions to 
support transformation, acting as an embryonic 
action plan for future change, and setting 
out recommendations for the LSP. It also 
highlighted the untapped potential for change 
in South Tyneside, above all stating the need 
for a change of culture within the LSP.92 
2. Innovation Strategy
Creating and retaining wealth was a core 
element of South Tyneside Council’s corporate 
strategy for tackling social exclusion. 
Consultations with communities identified 
poverty and financial exclusion as primary 
concerns for residents. Tackling financial 
exclusion and over-indebtedness were 
identified as key elements of the Council’s 
‘closing the gap’ approach to regeneration and 
transformation. 
South Tyneside recognised the impact of social 
exclusion on all the Council’s services, and 
their importance in reducing that exclusion. 
As a cross-cutting issue rather than a service 
function, the Council acknowledged that if 
social exclusion was successfully to be tackled, 
it had to be seen as ‘everyone’s problem’, as 
one senior official described it. 
The core objective of the Council and LSP was 
to overcome the ‘silo mentality’ within services 
and to bring departments together behind a 
coherent vision for innovation in order to better 
serve the needs of the Borough’s communities 
and residents. Assessments showed the 
Borough was ‘drowning under a plethora of 
unrelated plans’93 and there was a need to 
establish a clear framework for change, whilst 
working against the ‘that’s how we do it here’ 
attitude and culture prevalent in the Council at 
that time. 
Following the COMEDIA report in 2002, a new 
Chief Executive, Irene Lucas, was employed 
to bring about improvement, change and 
integration across the Council and its services. 
With a new executive team she began the 
process of transformational change to 
modernise the Council.
At this point, the Council decided to pursue a 
localisation strategy, reorganising both strategy 
and operations around neighbourhoods, to 
create a structure better able to focus on the 
very local problems and issues connected to 
social exclusion. 
Neighbourhood working was seen by the 
leadership as a tool to assist this process and 
to improve the coordination of services. A 
localised structure was also envisaged as a way 
to devolve decision-making, and make better 
use of the skills and expertise of individuals on 
the frontline. The aim was to create a Council 
structure more attuned to the varying needs of 
different neighbourhoods and more effective in 
addressing social exclusion. It was also felt that 
structural changes would reduce duplication 
and facilitate the pooling of resources. 
This strategy enabled the most deprived 
neighbourhoods to be tackled differently from 
the rest of the Borough.
South Tyneside’s corporate plan Performing	
Together, published in 2003, provided a 
framework for change. The report stated 
four specific objectives agreed by the LSP to 
address and tackle social exclusion: 
Stimulating people to become involved in •	
their community.
Helping people to get involved.•	
Celebrating the diversity of our communities.•	
Tackling deprivation in the community.•	 94 
National policy has particular relevance to 
innovation in South Tyneside. The strategy 
adopted by the Council to transform the 
Farrer, M. (2003) 91. 
‘Chief executive, South 
Tyneside Councillor.’ 
[Online]. London: The 
Guardian. Available at: 
http://society.guardian.
co.uk/publicvoices/
story/0,,670296,00.html
COMEDIA (2002) ‘From 92. 
Ordinary to Extraordinary, 
Transforming South 
Tyneside’s Future.’ South 
Shields: South Tyneside 
Council.
IDeA (2004) ‘Local 93. 
Government Improvement 
Programme, Visit to South 
Tyneside Council Report.’ 
London: IDeA.
South Tyneside Council 94. 
(2003) ‘Performing Together 
2003-2006.’ [Online]. 
Available at: http://
www.southtyneside.info/
search/tempDocuments/
tmp_38373.pdf
67
Social Exclusion Unit (2001) 95. 
‘A New Commitment to 
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National Strategy Action 
Plan Report.’ London: 
Cabinet Office.
This is an approach which 96. 
involves building social 
capital from the ‘bottom-up’ 
within a community.
IDeA (2006) ‘South Tyneside 97. 
community engagement.’ 
[Online] London: IDeA. 
Available at: http://www.
idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page.
do?pageId=5608104
Borough by tackling social exclusion 
through neighbourhood-based renewal and 
regeneration was very much in tune with 
central government’s National Strategy for 
Neighbourhood Renewal.95 This meant that 
their decisions to localise engagement and 
service delivery in neighbourhoods could 
be supported and recognised within the 
prevailing policy and performance frameworks 
including Neighbourhood Renewal Funding, 
Government Office interventions and the Audit 
Commission’s Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment.
3. Innovation process
3.1 Localisation and a ‘One Team’ Approach
In 2003, the Council identified a total of 
71 natural neighbourhoods and created a 
Forum structure of six community areas each 
comprising two or three political wards. The 
Council collated information around these 
neighbourhoods to provide a base from which 
to address social exclusion issues. The new 
structure made frontline staff much more 
aware of the issues and needs of specific 
communities. This localised approach to 
strategy is felt by many frontline staff to be the 
main driver of innovation in South Tyneside, 
enabling ideas from communities to be 
successfully communicated and taken further 
by the Council. 
The new structures enabled the Council to 
address issues on an area and neighbourhood 
basis, facilitating partnerships within the 
separate neighbourhood areas. These 
improvements have led other bodies in 
the area such as the Police to reorganise 
their operations into these identified 
neighbourhoods. One senior manager 
explained: “following the success of our 
work, our partners such as the Police have 
reorganised their area inspectors on the 
same geographical boundaries and have 
neighbourhood managers that are now 
aligned.” This process also enabled South 
Tyneside to target the 19 most deprived 
neighbourhoods with specific social exclusion 
initiatives, and to pilot new ideas.
In 2003, the Council established an area 
coordination team to develop its new 
approach. This team brought together external 
funding opportunities, resources and social 
regeneration initiatives. The team suggested 
piloting the Participatory Appraisal Approach to 
neighbourhood working, a community-based 
consultation technique that is widely used 
by development agencies and NGOs in the 
southern hemisphere. 
The method was piloted in three of South 
Tyneside’s most deprived neighbourhoods 
(Horsley Hill, Biddick Hall and Lukes Lane) in 
2004, using Neighbourhood Renewal Funding, 
and in partnership with Northumbria University 
and the Borough’s Community Empowerment 
Network. The pilots involved training local 
people to carry out their own research using 
their local knowledge to engage others in 
their communities. A community development 
approach96 was used to build relationships 
between residents’ and community groups and 
service providers. This also helped residents to 
identify their own solutions to the issues that 
they faced. Communities then became actively 
involved in the planning and delivery of these 
services. 
Participatory Appraisal, a technique which 
places equal value on the knowledge and 
experience of local people and their capacity to 
come up with solutions to problems affecting 
them, was used for two reasons: 
With an increasingly diverse range of needs, •	
individual citizens are more aware of their 
own needs than others.
Positive outcomes depended on individuals •	
within a community as well as the quality of 
public services, so individuals needed to be 
empowered within their localities.
The considerable structural changes and 
movement towards neighbourhood working 
has resulted in many innovative projects such 
as ‘Blitz It’, an area-based street maintenance 
initiative that encourages local communities 
to take collective action visibly to improve 
the local environment, whilst also raising 
awareness of general environmental issues 
through education and publicity. Through 
improved communication structures within 
South Tyneside, this project empowers local 
residents to address and vocalise their concerns 
about their local environment. Other innovative 
pilot projects include initiatives for engaging 
the community in health scrutiny such as the 
‘Alcohol Harm Reduction Project’. The Pride of 
South Tyneside awards and an initiative called 
‘We asked …. You said …. We did’ also raised 
awareness of local activity and how the Council 
and its partners were addressing community 
needs.97 
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The Chief Executive also initiated a ‘one 
team’ approach, where all departments 
and services would work in collaboration to 
engage with South Tyneside’s communities in 
neighbourhoods. 
3.2 Leadership: Creating Innovation 
Champions
Strong leadership from managers and 
officers was seen by senior officials and 
elected members as crucial in bringing about 
change. To support stronger leadership, 
senior managers had their management skills 
improved so they could better motivate staff to 
work across departments. This supported the 
Council in embedding the ‘one team’ approach 
and creating a more positive mentality 
supportive of innovation. 
This process included significant changes to 
the political, directorate and management 
structures of South Tyneside. This included 
clarifying members’ performance management 
roles, as well as using community perceptions 
to measure and improve service performance. 
These changes empowered frontline staff, 
since agencies became more receptive to their 
ideas and expertise. The changes established 
a transformation in South Tyneside’s culture, 
creating a more responsive organisation where 
innovation was able to flourish.
3.3 Recognising and Supporting Innovation 
Creating and retaining wealth was a core 
element of South Tyneside Council’s corporate 
strategy. Financial exclusion and tackling over-
indebtedness were seen as important issues in 
the process of regeneration and transformation.
The Council was quick to recognise and support 
voluntary sector projects to tackle these 
issues. One such project was the ‘Enterprise in 
Disadvantaged Communities’ project (EDC), 
a multiple activity Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund Project aimed at reducing hardship that 
ran in South Tyneside from 2004 to 2006. 
According to those involved in the project, 
the Council became a central body in this 
project’s partnership, providing resources and 
support without dominating and taking over 
the project, realising and valuing the skills, 
expertise and experience of the other partners 
involved.
The EDC project was driven by the same 
pressures driving the Council’s strategy to 
tackle poverty in the area. Doug Scott, the 
head of the Tyneside Economic Development 
Company Ltd (TEDCO), realised that in order 
more effectively to address these needs, 
organisations had to work effectively in 
partnership. 
Using his own personal networks and informal 
relationships, Scott was able to form an anti-
poverty partnership consisting of the Council, 
TEDCO, South Tyneside Credit Union, South 
Tyneside Resources for Initiating Development 
of the Economy and the South Tyneside 
Citizens Advice Bureau. This partnership 
combined forces that served the same client 
group, and used a collaborative approach to 
analyse need and develop customised services. 
The partners worked together to tackle 
disadvantage on different levels by offering 
a range of different services. These helped 
to maximise benefit and tax credit take-up, 
improve financial awareness and grow South 
Tyneside Credit Union. They also helped to 
promote enterprise in disadvantaged areas 
through more affordable loans, business 
support and microfinance, all of which were 
designed to stimulate a vibrant and mixed 
economy.
4. Outcomes
Innovation to address social exclusion and 
neighbourhood working in South Tyneside 
has led to an overall improvement in the 
Borough’s performance. In both 2002 and 
2003 the Council was judged as ‘fair’ by the 
Audit Commission during its Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA). However in 
2004, South Tyneside achieved an ‘excellent’ 
status becoming the only unitary council in the 
six years of CPA to move directly from ‘fair’ to 
‘excellent’.98 The Council was acknowledged 
as having addressed challenges from past 
Corporate Assessments and was judged as a 
‘four star, improving strongly council’ amongst 
the top ten in the country.99
The Borough’s Beacon Assessment in 2007 also 
noted that:
“In	a	number	of	successful	initiatives	and	
programmes	they	are	effectively	delivering	
quality	services	for	local	people	and	
devolving	power	to	communities	to	improve	
their	environment	and	quality	of	life.”100	
Innovation around social exclusion has also 
been recognised by the Audit Commission, with 
the body reporting in 2007:
“[The]	Council	continues	to	take	significant	
action	to	improve	its	engagement	with	local	
South Tyneside Council 98. 
(2007) ‘Councillor 
Neighbourhood Champions.’ 
South Shields: South 
Tyneside Council.
Ibid.99. 
Ibid.100. 
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people	and	their	overall	satisfaction	with	
the	Council	has	improved	significantly.”101	
The positive impacts of the Borough’s 
Participatory Appraisal Method have also been 
documented. For example, the ‘Horsley Hill 
Estate Community Appraisal’, describing the 
work done through the Participatory Appraisal 
Method between 2005 and 2006, showed 
that the project in the neighbourhood of 
Horsley Hill involved 1,300 voluntary hours, 
speaking to over 600 people and collating 
1,400 responses. One of the residents involved 
commented: “we have always been the 
experts about what is wrong with the area. 
Now someone has asked us and we have the 
confidence to explain.”102 
The Council has been very vocal in 
communicating the positive impact on 
operations and development of the 
Participatory Appraisal Method:
“Our	unique	neighbourhood	appraisal	
and	action-planning	process	has	further	
developed	service	standards.”103	
“Our	Area	and	Neighbourhood	Working	
Strategy	sets	the	pace	nationally	on	
delivering	area	and	neighbourhood	
working,	detailing	how	action	planning	
and	governance	arrangements	are	to	be	
developed	at	area	and	neighbourhood	
levels.”104	
A survey conducted by Ipsos-MORI in 
2006, found that South Tyneside’s residents 
believed that the Council’s performance was 
improving.105 In 2002, 20 per cent of residents 
agreed or strongly agreed that the Council’s 
performance had improved in the last five 
years. In 2006, that figure rose to 39 per cent. 
In 2006, 41 per cent of residents were recorded 
as feeling that the Council asks for the views 
of local people, an increase from a figure of 29 
per cent recorded in 2002. Public attendance at 
South Tyneside’s Community Area Forums has 
also increased by 33.7 per cent from 2002-03 
to 2005-06.106 
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Figure C1: Perceptions of the quality of South Tyneside Council’s communication with its 
communities
Source: South Tyneside Council, (2007)
South Tyneside’s innovation in financial 
exclusion has also been nationally recognised, 
with the Borough being awarded a Beacon 
Award in 2007 for Promoting Financial 
Inclusion and Tackling Indebtedness. The 
authority was praised for:
“A	measurable	increase	in	the	number	
of	individuals	with	access	to	appropriate	
banking,	affordable	credit	and	free	face-
to-face	money	advice	amongst	groups	most	
likely	to	suffer	from	financial	exclusion.”107	
5. Analysis: Drivers and Enablers of 
Innovation in South Tyneside
5.1 Driver: Need and Underperformance
South Tyneside’s widespread deprivation and 
its high levels of social and financial exclusion 
were the underlying pressures for change. 
However, several reports in 2000 revealing 
the Council’s poor performance triggered 
innovation by acting as an external catalyst for 
change.
The LSP was acutely aware of the area’s high 
levels of deprivation, in particular its poor 
health, high crime and high unemployment. 
It felt pressured to innovate to address these 
problems. Twelve of South Tyneside’s 21 
wards are in the lowest decile for deprivation 
nationally. As a result, South Tyneside received 
£15.6 million of Neighbourhood Renewal 
Funding between 2006 and 2008.108 
The new structure of dividing the Borough 
into six community area forums and 71 
neighbourhoods enabled service providers and 
the LSP better to gauge the needs of different 
communities, and assisted in directing the 
actions of the Council and other agencies. This 
was further supported by involvement and 
collaboration with the Borough’s voluntary and 
community sector. 
Lord Layard of Highgate stated in 2006 that: 
“through engaging with their customers and 
communities, South Tyneside Council are 
establishing what needs are unmet and with 
partners, particularly Voluntary and Community 
Sector partners, devising and implementing 
solutions to address the needs of those most 
disadvantaged.”
The innovation around financial exclusion has 
also been driven by need, with the partnership 
working closely with communities to develop a 
range of services to address their hardship. In 
its 2003 Beacon Bid for Financial Inclusion the 
Council stated: “Financial inclusion and tackling 
over indebtedness is on the agenda, because 
the community told us it was important.”
5.2 Drivers: Leadership
Irene Lucas’s appointment as Chief Executive 
in 2002 stimulated change. Many interviewees 
associated the changes in organisational 
culture and new vision with her arrival in South 
Tyneside. In effect, she acted as a champion 
for change and innovation. Her charismatic 
leadership and passion enthused senior 
managers and frontline workers; she has been 
consistently referred to by staff as driving the 
innovation. One interviewee commented that: 
“the Chief Executive has been the champion 
really…helping to transfer a transparent 
approach.”
The Chief Executive’s ‘one team’ strategy 
sought to overcome departmental and ‘silo’ 
mentality with services and sectors working 
together. This was further communicated to 
services and agencies external to the council 
through her motto “one of us is not cleverer 
than all of us.”
Her role in working more effectively with 
partners was also identified by the voluntary 
and community sector, with one interviewee 
commenting: “that was the catalyst, that Irene 
was not only willing to play the partnership 
game, but she was very active in promoting it 
and visible in supporting it.”
Her Area Coordination team also helped to 
drive innovation in South Tyneside. This new 
core of individuals used their position to 
find innovative approaches to tackle social 
exclusion in neighbourhoods with high levels of 
deprivation and social and financial exclusion. 
With support from senior officials within the 
Council, the team were given the freedom and 
space to be creative in their proposals. 
Strong leadership was also essential outside the 
Council. Doug Scott, the Head of TEDCO, had 
a personal vision of an effective partnership 
that he drove with his own personal links 
and informal relationships. The organisations 
involved in the antipoverty partnership had 
no prior history of collaboration and many 
were unsure of how they could effectively 
work together to alleviate poverty, being 
more concerned with their differences. Scott’s 
charismatic leadership and strong vision 
brought these organisations together as 
he pioneered the project using his informal 
networks and social capital. One interviewee 
South Tyneside Council 107. 
(2007) ‘Councillor 
Neighbourhood 
Champions.’ South Shields: 
South Tyneside Council.
South Tyneside Council 108. 
(2007) ‘Regeneration 
and Resources Scrutiny 
Committee Scrutiny 
Commission on External 
Funding.’ South Shields: 
South Tyneside Council.
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involved in the partnership commented: “I 
would say the fundamental difference is 
probably an individual. Doug Scott, he was 
the one who had the vision of pulling all these 
different aspects together.”
Both within the Council and in the voluntary 
sector, charismatic individual leadership, in 
combination with effective team working, was 
crucial in driving forward innovation to address 
both social and financial exclusion.
5.3 Drivers: Organisational Culture
Changing organisational culture is 
acknowledged to be a long and complex 
process. However, South Tyneside was able to 
establish a change in mentality and culture 
relatively quickly, something acknowledged by 
the Audit Commission in its 2004 report.
Since Lucas’s appointment, the Council has 
made rapid changes to move away from its ‘silo 
mentality’, and to create an environment that 
focuses on partnership working and frontline 
integration. Planning documents such as South 
Tyneside’s corporate plan Performing	Together, 
as well as the LSP’s A Spirit of Change, have 
enabled the Council and agencies to work 
together to tackle social exclusion.
The Council actively promotes innovation, 
encouraging staff to suggest and try creative 
methods by which to tackle social exclusion. 
The leadership team believes that frontline 
staff and communities often hold the solutions 
to meeting social problems and have tried to 
capture their ideas by devolving authority and 
decision-making to neighbourhood level. The 
Council encourages staff to experiment and 
put forward new ideas for development. Many 
interviewees commented on the Council’s 
receptiveness to their suggestions and the 
space and freedom they have to be creative. 
The Council has also taken steps to create a ‘no 
blame culture’, acknowledging that failure is a 
part of innovation by encouraging greater risk 
taking among staff.
5.4 Enabler: political support
Political support within the Council from 
councillors and local MPs, and their recognition 
of innovative projects and initiatives, has 
enabled innovation and supported the growth 
and diffusion of existing innovation. 
Councillors and local MPs have helped bring 
recognition to good examples of local work and 
validate projects addressing social exclusion. 
The MP for South Shields, David Miliband, has 
been very vocal in his support for projects such 
as the EDC Financial Exclusion Scheme and the 
effects of the Neighbourhood Participatory 
Appraisal, as well as smaller schemes such as 
a project pioneered by the Citizens’ Advice 
Bureau to tackle the financial exclusion of 
ethnic minority groups. 
5.5 Enabler: finance
In July 2005, the Government announced 
funding allocations to local authorities which 
it considered needed extra help to work 
with partners to tackle crime, education, 
housing, liveability, health inequalities and 
unemployment. South Tyneside was allocated 
£15.6 million through the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Fund – £8.3 million for 2006-07 and 
£7.3 million for 2007-08. This has been used to 
pilot and fund new innovations and projects. 
This funding enabled the Neighbourhood 
Participatory Appraisal pilot and Financial 
Inclusion Scheme to be supported and 
extended. Without this funding it may have 
been more difficult to allocate resources to 
these innovative high risk initiatives.
5.6 Enabler: Partnerships
The partnerships and collaboration in South 
Tyneside have been fundamental in enabling 
and supporting the transformation of the 
culture of agencies and the way in which they 
approach innovation in a more cohesive and 
integrated way. The importance of partnership 
working was acknowledged by all the agencies 
involved in South Tyneside’s LSP at an early 
stage, and set out in key documents. 
6. Summary and conclusions
The Council’s recognition of its 
underperformance and problems associated 
with ‘silo’ working were brought to light 
through external evaluations and an internal 
report in 2000. These events, which could 
be described as ‘external shocks’, combined 
with high levels of deprivation in the area, 
stimulated the Council to develop a strategy for 
innovation to address both social and financial 
exclusion issues.
As in the Highlands, strong leadership and 
partnership played an important role in 
initiating and driving change in South Tyneside. 
A new Chief Executive and leadership team, 
supported by political leaders and the voluntary 
and community sector, were champions for 
innovation. The LSP played an important role 
in setting out a vision for collaboration and 
partnership working, which helped to break 
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down silos within the Council and to tackle the 
broad theme of social exclusion by working 
across a number of services.
The Council’s decision to develop a 
neighbourhood working strategy with localised 
planning, decision-making and service 
delivery, enabled it to target resources to 
the most deprived neighbourhoods and to 
develop focused social and financial exclusion 
initiatives. 
Arguably this decision aligned South Tyneside’s 
innovative strategy with national policy 
priorities, in particular the National Strategy 
for Neighbourhood Renewal. This enabled the 
Council to secure Neighbourhood Renewal 
Funding to support local innovation. Perhaps 
more interestingly, this alignment with national 
policy has enabled South Tyneside quickly to 
gain significant recognition for its achievements 
within the local government community and 
from national government. Compared with 
local authorities (for example, Tower Hamlets or 
Knowsley) where innovation can genuinely be 
described as radical or systematic, innovation 
in South Tyneside has been highly effective 
but incremental. This seems to suggest that 
alignment of local social innovation with 
national policy priorities can enable localities to 
capitalise on central government’s awareness 
and interest in particular services at particular 
times, irrespective of the true extent of that 
innovation.
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Case study 4: Innovation in Youth Services in the London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets, England
In 2002, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets developed a commissioning model for the 
delivery of its Youth Services, which involved letting a series of local and thematic contracts 
to voluntary and community sector organisations. Tower Hamlets was one of the first local 
authorities in England to develop a commissioning model for youth services; it was part of a 
wider decision to develop a Third Sector Strategy for the entire Borough.
These innovations were driven by four main factors: 
Pressure from residents and local councillors to improve and modernise services and •	
facilities (for young people in the Borough), which were acknowledged to be failing.
The highly political nature of youth services in Tower Hamlets, a Borough with a large •	
youth population and high levels of councillor involvement in local youth groups.
An impending Ofsted inspection which meant the long-term failure of the service would •	
be brought to light.
Changes to political leadership, which created a desire for change and improvement within •	
the Council.
Tower Hamlets background data
Geography
Tower Hamlets is an inner city borough •	
located to the east of the City of London.
Several large pockets of deprivation remain, •	
despite regeneration since the eighties, 
which led to economic development, 
particularly in Canary Wharf and Docklands. 
Population
Tower Hamlets has a long history of in-•	
migration, resulting in high ethnic diversity, 
with Bangladeshis making up one-third of 
the population.
Largely as a result of this migration, Tower •	
Hamlets had the third highest population 
increase of any local authority area in 
England between 1991 and 2001. It now has 
the fifth highest population density of any 
local authority in England and Wales, causing 
severe levels of overcrowding.
The Borough has a very young and growing •	
population, with the number of dependent 
children and young adults significantly 
higher than the national average. 52 per cent 
of the population fall under the age of 30 
compared to the national average of 38 per 
cent.
Labour market
Despite recent economic growth, Tower •	
Hamlets has the lowest employment rate 
in Great Britain: it was just 52.6 per cent in 
2006.
The area is blighted by benefit dependency, •	
with 21 per cent of people of working age 
claiming a key benefit in 2001, one-and-
a-half times the national average of 14 per 
cent. 
Council
This traditional Labour stronghold has had a •	
more volatile recent history: the Council was 
controlled by the Liberal Democrats from 
1986 until 1994. It has since been Labour, 
although the newly-formed Respect party 
became the main opposition at the last local 
elections.
The Council is currently made up of 26 •	
Labour, 12 Respect, seven Conservative and 
six Liberal Democrat councillors. The council 
is led by a Labour councillor. 
1. Summary: context and need
The London Borough of Tower Hamlets is 
located east of the City of London, just north 
of the River Thames. One of the smallest 
boroughs in London, it has historically suffered 
from great need and is ranked as the fourth 
most deprived borough in England in terms of 
average deprivation.109 
The Borough is one of great diversity, featuring 
the affluent finance and business centres of 
the Docklands alongside many of the most 
deprived neighbourhoods in the country. It is 
also one of the most densely populated areas 
in Britain, suffering from overcrowding as its 
population continues to grow at a fast rate. 
Despite the redevelopment of financial districts 
such as Canary Wharf and the Docklands, 
much of this regeneration has failed to benefit 
many of the Borough’s local communities. 
This deprivation has had a large impact on the 
Borough’s young people. In 2004, 58.7 per 
cent of all children in Tower Hamlets were living 
in low income families.110
Tower Hamlets has one of the youngest 
populations in the UK, with 52 per cent under 
the age of 30, compared to the national 
average of 38 per cent.111 Tower Hamlets 
also has one of the most ethnically diverse 
populations in London. In the 2001 census, 
58 per cent belonged to an ethnic group 
other than White British. Ethnic diversity is 
even more prominent in the Borough’s youth 
population, with 78 per cent of young people 
belonging to an ethnic group other than White 
British. A third of the Borough’s population is 
of Bangladeshi origin.112 
In the nineties, services and facilities for young 
people in the Borough were recognised to be 
outdated and insufficient to meet the needs 
and demands of a modern youth population. 
In the late eighties and early nineties, Tower 
Hamlets had a budget of approximately £10 
million for Youth Services. A decade later this 
had been reduced to just £3m (in part due to 
the abolition of the Inner London Education 
Authority) and many of the Borough’s youth 
facilities had been sold off with Youth Services 
staff seconded to voluntary organisations. The 
Audit Commission described the Borough’s 
services as “performing poorly in the mid-
nineties”.113 
At this time, the Youth Service had lost 
credibility within the Council among politicians, 
youth workers and young people. In particular, 
the Service was thought to suffer from a 
lack of structured provision, direction and 
coordination, and was felt to be out of step 
with thinking about modern youth work 
practice. 
But this was to change because of the 
development of a new commissioning model 
for youth services. Interviewees identified 
the political context in Tower Hamlets as an 
important factor influencing this innovation. 
Many ward councillors were involved directly 
with youth groups. Combined with the high 
proportion of young people in the Borough, 
this made youth services and young people 
highly politicised. As a result, many young 
people saw youth work as a potential route 
to local power and resources. This was 
complemented by the highly competitive 
nature of local politics in the Borough, which 
encouraged councillors to campaign for 
improvements to youth services, creating 
strong pressure within the Council for change. 
In the late nineties, Ofsted inspections had 
already identified a number of authorities that 
were failing to deliver an acceptable youth 
service. Interviews indicate that innovation in 
the Borough’s Youth Service was partly driven 
in response to an impending inspection which 
many believed would declare the Borough’s 
Youth Service to be failing.
2. Innovation strategy
In 2001, the Council agreed to commission 
a number of ‘third sector’114 organisations to 
deliver the Borough’s Youth Services. At the 
time this was a bold decision as third sector 
commissioning was not an accepted model 
in local or central government. At the time, 
only Bromley in Kent had adopted a similar 
‘commissioning model’ for delivering its youth 
services, but it was not felt to be working 
well. So, there was little evidence or direct 
experience to draw on, and little chance of 
gaining support or interest from others in local 
government.
The Council’s decision to adopt a 
commissioning model was driven by a number 
of reasons. First, despite several previous 
attempts to restructure Youth Services to 
improve performance, the Service continued 
to fail. Second, the Council recognised that 
much local youth work capacity and expertise 
was in the Borough’s particularly vibrant third 
sector organisations. These were better placed 
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Libra Consulting is part of 115. 
Capital Consulting.
than the Council to engage with hard-to-
reach groups and would also have significant 
opportunities to lever in funding from external 
sources. Third, the Council’s Youth Services 
had lost credibility with young people, youth 
workers, politicians and officers. It was felt 
that only a radical change to the Service could 
improve performance and rebuild confidence.
A commissioning model was felt to offer the 
most effective route to improve and modernise 
services for young people, and to increase 
the Council’s collaboration with the third 
sector. The decision to adopt this model was 
taken alongside broader discussions within 
the Council about the development of a Third 
Sector Strategy for the entire Borough, which 
would enable the authority to support social 
enterprise in Tower Hamlets by identifying a 
range of public services that could be delivered 
by local organisations. 
Research suggests that many councillors and 
local youth groups strongly supported the 
commissioning model in the early days, when it 
was thought that decentralising service delivery 
would create significant opportunities for local 
groups to control services and new sources 
of funding. However, as the commissioning 
model was developed, it became apparent that 
a more strategic approach to commissioning 
was being adopted, in which the Council would 
retain control over some elements of service 
delivery. Interviewees describe how there was 
some opposition from backbench councillors 
at this point, and how strong leadership from 
executive members and senior officers was 
required to support and drive through changes 
to the Service.
As commissioning was not a widely accepted 
model at the time, the Council appointed Libra 
consultants115 to work with officers to develop 
the Borough’s Third Sector Strategy and a 
model and process for commissioning Youth 
Services. 
3. Innovation process
3.1 Developing a commissioning model
A new senior management team was created 
to drive forward innovation and change 
in the Youth Services. This team included 
newly-appointed outsiders as well as existing 
Council staff. They worked closely with the 
consultants to develop a strategy and model 
for commissioning.
The consultants identified a lack of 
commissioning guidelines not only within the 
Tower Hamlets, but across local government. 
The first task was to develop a set of principles 
and guidelines for the Youth Services 
commissioning model. Several important 
strategic decisions were made in these early 
stages. First, the Council needed to retain 
strategic control of Youth Services in order 
to manage the commissioning process and 
subsequent contracts, as well as monitoring 
and assessing service delivery. This was 
felt to be a crucial decision, one that was 
different from Bromley, where all aspects of 
Youth Services had been outsourced. The 
management team and consultants felt that 
without central control of the Service and 
opportunities for scrutiny and overview, the 
Council could not guarantee quality or address 
any problems with third sector delivery.
Second, it was necessary to create a wide 
market for the commissioning of services. This 
meant opening the process to organisations 
outside the Borough, and allowing any local 
or national organisation, whether in the 
voluntary, public or private sector, to bid for 
a contract. However, the management team 
and consultants acknowledged the importance 
of involving local organisations in the 
commissioning process and so worked together 
to assess the scope and capacity of the market 
in Tower Hamlets.
The first stage of this scoping work focused 
on researching the capacity of the third sector 
in the Borough. The consultants sought to 
identify the scale of the sector, by developing 
databases to record and monitor the work of 
local organisations. They found that despite 
the active and dynamic nature of the sector, 
many organisations had neither the capacity to 
take part in the bidding process nor to manage 
contracts.
The Council agreed to provide initial support 
to these organisations to build their capacity 
to enable them to bid for contracts, as 
individual organisations or in partnerships. 
The Youth Services management team and 
consultants developed a cohort of locally-
based consultants to work with the third sector 
to build capacity around different areas, such 
as human resources and the management of 
finances. To support this research a number of 
papers were also commissioned from specialists 
exploring the Voluntary and Community 
Sector further. This included research into the 
European standardisation of nomenclature for 
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the sector, as well as a paper on the use of 
existing grants and money in the sector. 
This was felt by the Council to be a successful 
process because of the high level of bids the 
Council received from local organisations 
during the initial phase of the commissioning 
process.
The first round of commissioning took place in 
2001. Eight area contracts were let for three 
years with scope for a two-year extension. 
These eight areas aligned with Tower Hamlets 
Local Area Partnerships (LAPS), which act as 
local engagement and influencing structures. 
Four curriculum programmes were also 
established to reflect more strategic cross-
borough themes such as special educational 
needs or sport. Both the local and strategic 
dimensions would enhance the commissioning 
process. The total value of the contracts was 
£1.8 million.
A core team within Youth Services strategically 
oversaw the commissioning process and 
management of the contracts. Although some 
service providers opposed this approach, the 
core team enabled the Council to retain strong 
accountability for the overall service and 
to manage the risks of commissioning. The 
approach was vindicated when one outsourced 
contract failed and had to be brought back 
into the Council temporarily before it could be 
reallocated to another service provider.
A core part of the commissioning strategy was 
to develop ‘zip’ projects, which would link 
the outsourced services in the Borough to the 
work of the central team within the Council. 
One such project was the Rapid Response 
Team, a joint initiative between the Police 
and the Youth Service to respond quickly to 
serious youth gang disorder. The Team runs a 
street work programme to reduce anti-social 
behaviour, youth conflicts and youth crime. 
Lessons from the first round of commissioning 
included the need:
to extend the length of contracts to allow •	
time for new relationships to be established; 
to set stronger targets for service providers •	
to ensure improved and consistent levels of 
delivery (for example, the number of young 
people to be involved, targets for the late 
night opening of youth projects); and
to improve evaluation and management of •	
the Service. 
An Ofsted inspection in 2005 also identified 
weaknesses in the new model, such as that: 
“too much of the provision in youth clubs 
lacks educational purpose…Young people 
are insufficiently involved in the planning and 
evaluation of programmes at a local level”.116 
These issues were reflected in the second 
round of contracts, which were let in 2006. 
These contracts had a value of £2.4 million and 
were agreed for five years, with the possibility 
of two-year extensions. Three new providers 
won contracts in this round. 
The core Youth Services team has grown 
considerably since the first round of contracts 
was issued, and has amalgamated with other 
organisations such as Connexions to form a 
group of 30 people working on strategic youth 
services tasks. Their work now includes strategy 
management, developing youth employment 
opportunities and increasing outreach 
work – in addition to their management of 
commissioning and contracts. Four of the 
team are from within the Council, whilst 
others are externally funded through partner 
organisations. 
Alongside these initiatives, the Council has 
used money from the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund to improve facilities for young people. 
A programme of renovation and building new 
premises for youth projects has improved 
satisfaction with services and improved staff 
morale.
4. Outcomes
The radical changes to the structure and 
delivery of Tower Hamlets Youth Services led 
to some initial difficulties. Senior officials from 
the Council who were interviewed for this 
project describe how the first 18 months of 
the new commissioning model were extremely 
challenging. 
The management team encountered significant 
disapproval and dissatisfaction with the new 
system among staff, especially some long-
term youth workers, and staff turnover rates 
were high in the first two years. However, the 
central Youth Services team focused on training 
frontline youth workers and modernising 
approaches and practices in the Borough. 
Interviewees report that this created a new 
sense of opportunity and opened up new 
career opportunities, which helped to change 
the atmosphere within the Service.
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In 2003, the Council conducted an internal 
inspection of their Youth Services which 
highlighted the need to improve quality 
assurance and to increase youth participation 
in the running of the Service. Since then, 
significant improvements have been made. 
The Council claims to have seen very direct 
improvement in frontline service delivery, 
which they believe is due to their innovative 
approach. 
The 2005 Ofsted inspection found that 
Tower Hamlets provided an adequate Youth 
Service with good strategic leadership and 
management from elected members and senior 
managers. The inspection also noted that 
rigorous quality assurance procedures had led 
to significant progress and improved the quality 
of provision, and that successful partnerships 
had effectively met the needs of young people. 
Standards of young people’s achievement and 
the quality of youth work practice were also 
found to be very high in some targeted work.117 
In Tower Hamlets’ 2006 Annual Performance 
Assessment by Ofsted, the Borough was graded 
as ‘outstanding’ in maintaining and improving 
outcomes for children and young people; 
the Council’s overall capacity to improve its 
services for children and young people; and 
the contribution of the local authority’s social 
care services in maintaining and improving 
outcomes for children and young people.
Comprehensive Performance Assessments 
undertaken by the Audit Commission in 2005 
and 2006 also rated Tower Hamlets Children’s 
and Youth Services as performing strongly.118 
Tower Hamlets is now receiving national 
recognition for its Youth Services and funding 
from central government for new initiatives 
such as the Youth Opportunity Card, which will 
be tested in 2008.119 This project has received 
£1 million in funding from the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families (DCSF).
The Council has developed a borough-wide 
Third Sector Strategy. Its pioneering status has 
gained Tower Hamlets national recognition 
as commissioning has become increasingly 
popular with Government.
5. Analysis: drivers and enablers of 
innovation in Tower Hamlets
5.1 Drivers: underperformance
Underperformance in Tower Hamlets’ Youth 
Services and their failure to meet the needs 
and requirements of the significant and 
growing youth population was a central driver 
of innovation. 
The political nature of youth work and youth 
facilities in the Borough created strong 
pressures for change from local politicians, 
communities and residents. The Council’s 
underlying awareness of the failing system and 
the lack of credibility and confidence in the 
Borough’s Youth Services, combined with the 
new Ofsted regime, an imminent inspection 
and fears that the authority would be identified 
as failing, acted as a catalyst for change within 
the Council.
Alongside these pressing drivers, Youth Services 
were viewed by the Council as a powerful 
vehicle to support community cohesion 
between the different ethnic groups within the 
Borough. Concerns had been raised about the 
need to engage with minority groups to ensure 
they did not become isolated. One interviewee 
commented:
“I	know	that	what	they	need	is	facilities	and	
support	and	so	on	but	at	the	moment	they	
are	really	angry	and	frustrated	–	they	have	
nothing	to	do.”
5.2 Drivers: local political pressure 
Tower Hamlets has had a turbulent political 
history. In the eighties the Borough’s radical 
programme of decentralisation under Liberal 
Democrat leadership attracted widespread 
attention . Significant power and devolved 
budgets were controlled by ward councillors 
with little accountability to the central 
administration, resulting in political infighting 
and the politicisation of ultra-local issues.
The strong connection between local politics 
and youth work in Tower Hamlets played an 
important role in pushing the issue of young 
people and youth services up the agenda 
within the Council and creating great pressure 
to innovate in order to address these concerns. 
The local political instability in Tower Hamlets 
has also encouraged local politicians to drive 
forward innovation in the Borough, as they 
have been keen to be seen as addressing the 
issues with which local communities are most 
concerned and interested with the aim of 
retaining their seats. One interviewee said:
“There	is	a	selfish	element	to	local	
politicians’	focus	on	the	youth	agenda.	
With	so	many	youth,	it	is	an	issue	central	
to	the	community.	That’s	why	it	gains	local	
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political	attention;	Tower	Hamlets	needs	the	
young,	they’re	not	just	some	add	on,	these	
are	the	future	voters,	the	community	have	a	
vested	interest	in	their	engagement.”
5.3 Drivers: leadership
Many interviewees cited strong political 
leadership as an important factor in driving 
innovation. In 1999, the Labour council 
leadership adopted a new executive structure, 
which was felt by many to create a great 
thrust for change within the Borough. One 
interviewee described the new political 
leadership that came about in Tower Hamlets:
“Executive	members	in	the	Borough	were	
very	supportive	of	the	commissioning	
model,	and	through	this	support	were	able	
to	dissipate	the	risk	associated	with	this	
approach.”
One interviewee described how both the Lead 
member for education and Lead member for 
youth played a key role in pushing through 
change and supporting changes to Youth 
Services:
“Education,	the	Youth	Service,	all	these	
things	were	given	a	kind	of	real	importance,	
and	also	that	kind	of	message	about	
equality	underpinned	all	that.	That	was	a	
big	moment	I	think.”
Interviewees identified the then Chief 
Executive, Christine Gilbert, as crucial to 
innovation because of the role she played 
in instilling a new culture and enthusiasm 
for improvement within the Council. One 
interviewee described that without the Chief 
Executive’s leadership at that time, it would 
have been likely that Ofsted would have 
imposed special measures in the Borough:
“When	Christine	Gilbert	came	here,	she	had	
a	message	…	the	issue	is	what	do	you	need	
to	put	in	place	to	enable	young	people	in	
Tower	Hamlets	to	compete	on	the	national	
stage.	So	deprivation	is	not	an	excuse	and	
that	kind	of	message	of	striving,	achieving,	
which	she	then	carried	on	when	she	became	
Chief	Executive.	I	suppose	that’s	an	event	
and	that’s	a	personality.”
Many interviewees describe the sense of 
‘urgency’ within the Council that this new 
leadership created. Interviewees felt there 
was a change from a culture of low self-
esteem, where staff felt constrained and 
powerless to tackle the deprivation and 
challenging circumstances in the Borough, to 
an environment where striving for continuous 
improvement was encouraged at all levels and 
across all departments. Despite the fact that 
the political and corporate leaders who instilled 
this culture have now left, officers feel the 
attitude has remained and become embedded 
in the Council’s organisational culture. 
In Youth Services, the sense of urgency and 
drive for improvement focused on the need to 
deal with ‘today’s cohort of children and their 
problems’, and not just on developing long-
term strategies. In practical terms, interviewees 
described how this meant that the senior 
management team aspired towards success, 
which resulted in ideas being successfully 
implemented. 
Interviewees reported that national recognition 
of the Borough’s pioneering role in developing 
third sector commissioning has made staff 
more motivated and comfortable with change 
and risk-taking. Tower Hamlets’ reputation as 
an innovative local authority has also strongly 
impacted on the Council’s recruitment. One 
interviewee explained how in the last three 
years there has been a significant change in 
recruitment patterns in the Council, with more 
highly skilled and ambitious people wanting 
to work in Tower Hamlets. This has created a 
sense of pride in the Council and helped to 
support and sustain the culture of innovation. 
One interviewee commented:
“We	have	some	very	good	staff	and	
managers	and	that	makes	a	huge	
difference.	And	we’ve	had	managers	
prepared	to	work	24/7	and	you	can’t	
legislate	for	that	element	of	luck.	Once	you	
have	a	few	good	people	you	can	get	more.	
Tower	Hamlets	is	a	borough	of	total	change	
and	that’s	exciting,	a	very	rich	borough	in	
money	and	humanity;	it’s	fun	and	creates	
an	energy	that	attracts	certain	people.”
Additionally, many communities in Tower 
Hamlets such as the Borough’s substantial 
Bangladeshi community have recently come 
of age, with a new generation of individuals 
from these communities joining agencies and 
establishments in the Borough, including 
the Council. These individuals have also 
contributed to creating a culture of innovation, 
enabling the Council to benefit from a better 
understanding of the Borough’s community 
needs. 
5.4 Enabler: history and culture 
Tower Hamlets has a strong history and culture 
of social reform and innovation that has 
79
impacted the innovation that has occurred in 
the Borough’s Youth Services. One interviewee 
commented on the unique history of the area:
“There’ve	been	those	kind	of	great	political	
moments:	the	birth	of	the	Labour	party	
or	its	first	MP	in	West	Ham,	just	down	the	
road,	the	Unions	in	the	docks,	the	reaction	
against	Moseley	and	fascism,	the	70s	anti-
racism,	you	know.	The	Respect	party	locally	
at	the	moment,	you	know,	there’s	just	a	
kind	of	wealth	of	all	that	stuff.”
Whilst it is difficult to distinguish the factors 
that have created this historic culture of 
innovation, many of those interviewed 
attributed this culture to the constant change 
that has been associated with the Borough’s 
long history of migrant communities moving 
into the area. One interviewee said:
“I	think	historically,	this	has	been	one	of	
the	most	innovative	places	in	the	country	-	
and	you	can	go	back	centuries.	But	in	the	
last	sort	of	century	[you	can	look]	to	the	
settlements	movement	where	many	social	
reformers	came	here	in	this	area	because	it	
was	a	place	where	exciting	things	happened	
at	grass	roots	level,	at	community	level.	And	
I	think	it’s	partly	because	of	its	history,	it’s	a	
place	that’s	always	been	quite	edgy;	there’s	
been	a	long	history	of	migration.”
Many other interviewees felt that much of this 
innovation stems from the need to address the 
great poverty and deprivation of the area. One 
interviewee said:
“In	the	last	20	or	so	years,	there’s	been	a	
lot	of	work	at	the	community	level.	A	lot	of	
grassroots	activism	which	has	been	matched	
with	community-based	organisations;	and	
in	the	eighties	there	were,	because	of	the	
high	levels	of	unemployment,	huge	social	
inequalities.”
This sense of innovation and opportunity has 
helped to create a strong and vibrant third 
sector, and has encouraged much innovation 
around youth engagement at grassroots 
level as well as within the Council, as one 
respondent put it: 
“[It’s]	been	a	rich	history,	which	I	guess	
sometimes	we	kind	of	forget.	We	somehow	
think	that	all	of	these	things	that	we	do	are	
bright	modern	ideas,	but	they	come	from	a	
culture	of	a	place.”
5.5 Enabler: capacity of the third sector
The established and active third sector has also 
enabled innovation in the Borough. Although 
many local organisations required initial 
support to build specific capabilities around 
service management, tendering, financial 
planning and human resources, the original 
capacity of the sector was crucial in enabling 
the Council to envisage the possibility of 
commissioning out their Youth Services. 
5.6 Enabler: funding
The availability of flexible funding to support 
the very early stages of the commissioning 
strategy was identified as a crucial enabler 
for innovation. Although investment was 
relatively small (approximately £150,000), it 
was sufficient to support the new management 
team and consultants to research and develop 
the commissioning model.
Further funding was attracted when 
improvements to the service became apparent. 
This enabled the management team to bid 
for growth and to receive Neighbourhood 
Renewal Funding, which supported training 
programmes, a renovation and new build 
programme, and the new Rapid Response 
Team.
Now that the Council has received national 
recognition for its Youth Services, it has 
attracted funding for new pilots and initiatives.
6. Summary and conclusions
Tower Hamlets’ pioneering approach to third 
sector commissioning can be described as a 
radical innovation. The Council has adopted a 
new organisational model, changed its patterns 
of service delivery, developed new services and 
initiatives, and created an innovative culture 
within Youth Services and more broadly across 
other service functions. 
Arguably, of the four case studies, Tower 
Hamlets is the only authority than can be 
said to be comprehensively innovative with 
significant changes being made in education, 
Children’s Services, initiatives to promote social 
enterprise and the adoption of a borough-wide 
Third Sector Strategy.
A unique set of political, socio-economic, 
cultural and historical factors have exerted 
pressure on Tower Hamlets to innovate. 
Political change and the strong relationship 
between local politics and the growing youth 
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population in Tower Hamlets created pressure 
for change. The Council’s recognition of its 
underperforming Youth Services in the late 
nineties, combined with concerns that an 
Ofsted inspection would identify the service as 
failing, acted as a catalyst for change. The scale 
of the problems in the Youth Service prompted 
the Council to develop a radical solution.
The Borough’s dynamic third sector acted as an 
important enabler for innovation. The strength 
of the third sector was a crucial element in the 
Council’s decision to adopt a commissioning 
strategy, despite recognition that it would have 
to support a programme of capacity building 
around certain key skills.
Interviewees felt that Tower Hamlets’ history 
of experimentation and social innovation, and 
its proximity to Whitehall, have all enabled 
the Borough to gain a high profile in central 
government and among local government 
peers.
81
Tower Hamlets
Youth Services
recognised by
Council as
underperforming
and outdated
Ofsted finds
that Tower
Hamlets
provides
adequate
Youth Services
with good
strategic
leadership
The Audit
Commission
assesses that
services are
‘performing
poorly’
Local elections
result in new
political
leadership
in the Council
New leadership
group created
to formulate
strategy and
pioneer change
led by Steve
Sipple
Tendering
process
begins.
In 2003/04
Council
contracts
the service to
Youth Action
UK, Poplar
Harcaand
Oxford
House
Audit
Commission
evaluates
Tower
Hamlets’
Children’s
and Youth
Services
as excellent
First round of
commissioning
ends
1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007
Christine
Gilbert
joins the
Council as
Corporate
Director of
Education
in 1997
Second round of
commissioning begins
Introduction
of new
modernised
political
structures
Council decides
to commission
out Youth
Services.
First round of
commissioning
begins
Consultants
from Libra
Consulting are
commissioned
to help support
the Council in
adopting a
commissioning
model
Timeline 4: Innovation in Tower Hamlets to address Youth Services
Announced by the Central 120. 
Bureau of Statistics in 
2006.
82
Case study 5: Gouda, Netherlands: Innovating to tackle community cohesion 
issues 
Gouda, like other cities in the Netherlands, has experienced tensions between long 
established Dutch residents and Moroccans – particularly young men – who settled 
in particular neighbourhoods from the 1950s. The municipality was freed from central 
government constraints in 2000; one result has been the development of intensive multi-
agency partnership working to support young Moroccan men. At the same time, very local 
groups have emerged to support the Moroccan community. 
These innovations were driven by a number of main factors: 
Low educational achievement and high unemployment among Moroccan boys.•	
Social problems and a sense of crisis as clashes between Moroccan young people •	
intensified in 2002.
Leadership from senior city officials, as well as certain agencies and individuals in the •	
voluntary and community sector.
Background data
Geography: 
Gouda is a medium-sized city and •	
municipality in the province of South Holland 
in the western Netherlands. The city covers 
an area of 1,811 hectares.
Population: 
In 2007, Gouda’s population was 70,943, and •	
increasing. The population density was 39.2 
inhabitants per hectare. Approximately nine 
per cent of the population are Moroccan, the 
largest ethnic minority group in the city.
Labour market: 
Gouda was originally famous for its cheese •	
and smoking pipes. Yet it has also had a 
history of economic deprivation as one of 
the poorest Dutch cities – indeed, the term 
“Goudaner” was once a colloquialism for 
beggars. However, large scale development 
in the 20th century benefited the city’s 
economy, which now includes automation 
services, business administration, engineering 
offices, health and welfare, and retail and 
wholesale trade. Health care and business 
services are the largest employment sectors.
Local government structure: The Netherlands •	
has three tiers of government. There are two 
levels of local government: provinces and 
municipalities. Twelve provinces are each 
governed by a provincial council (Provinciale 
Staten) whose members are elected 
every four years. The provincial executive 
(Gedeputeerde Staten) is responsible for 
day-to-day management. There are 458 
municipalities, the lowest tier of government. 
Municipal council (Gemeenteraad) members 
are also elected every four years. 
1. Summary: Context and need 
Gouda is a small city in the western delta of 
the Netherlands. Like many other Dutch cities 
it has experienced tensions between white 
Dutch (described in the Netherlands as ‘original 
Dutch’) and Muslim residents over the past five 
years. 
The Netherlands has nearly one million 
Muslim residents from countries including 
Somalia, Morocco and Turkey.120 Social 
problems affecting Muslim communities, such 
as unemployment and the poor performance 
of boys in the Dutch education system, have 
undermined community cohesion in many of 
the country’s major cities including Rotterdam, 
The Hague and Amsterdam. 
These tensions have been fuelled by a 
number of high profile incidents including 
the assassination in 2002 of the right-wing 
politician Pim Fortuyn, a controversial figure 
with strong anti-immigration policies and 
negative views about Islamic culture. Although 
Fortuyn was murdered by a Dutch national 
his death was described by Dutch media as a 
politically motivated attack. In 2004, the film-
maker Theo van Gogh was murdered by Islamic 
extremist Mohammed Bouyeri. This incident 
has been described by many commentators as 
a turning point for many liberal Dutch voters 
and politicians and has contributed to growing 
public hostility and mistrust towards Dutch 
Muslims.
Over the past two years, anti-immigration 
discourse among mainstream political parties 
(that a decade ago would have been unlikely) 
has created much public and political debate. 
There has been a move to ban the Burqa. 
There have also been proposals to tighten 
immigration controls by increasing the age 
and income limits for immigrants, preventing 
unmarried spouses entering the country, and 
requiring new migrants to speak Dutch. One 
controversial proposal even suggested that new 
migrants watch a two-hour video about Dutch 
liberal values, which includes a scene of two 
men kissing; that film led to accusations that it 
was intended to discourage Muslim migrants. 
In 2006, the centre-right Dutch Government 
collapsed after a row about extremist 
immigration policy. Today the Government is 
a coalition of Christian Democratic Appeal, 
Labour Party and Christian Union. New 
elections are not required until 2011.
In Gouda, tensions between Muslim and 
original Dutch residents reflect these national 
problems. But they have been intensified by 
two factors. First, Gouda is unusual in that 
the overwhelming majority of its non-white 
population originates from Morocco. Other 
Dutch cities have a greater mix of ethnicities. 
Moroccan communities have been established 
in Gouda for over 50 years; they were actively 
recruited to work in the city’s pottery and 
meat handling industries. However, historically, 
Gouda was a conservative city with a strong 
and devout Protestant community. The 
absence of a broader experience of ‘diversity’ 
to accustom people to living with other 
values and lifestyles has intensified divisions 
between these two communities. Second, 
Gouda’s Moroccan Muslim residents are 
concentrated in two of the city’s most deprived 
neighbourhoods, Gouda Oost and Korter 
Akkeren. This has resulted in a geographical 
concentration of social problems, including 
poor housing, lack of infrastructure and 
unemployment. 
Moroccan boys and young men are most 
affected by these problems. Compared to 
Moroccan girls, they suffer lower aspirations, 
lower educational attainment, and higher 
levels of unemployment, which in turn, have 
increased involvement in petty crime, anti-
social behaviour and drug abuse. 
Fear of crime has also become an issue, despite 
crime rates being no higher than in other 
Dutch cities. This perception was compounded 
by clashes between Moroccan youths on the 
streets of Korter Akkeren and Gouda Oost 
in 2002. Some municipal officials question 
whether the city’s Moroccan youth are a ‘lost 
generation’. These issues have had a negative 
impact on all parts of Gouda’s Moroccan 
communities, fuelling crude stereotypes about 
criminality.
Gouda is not the only city trying to improve 
community cohesion. However, the city’s 
approach is notable because it involves so 
many groups working in partnership – the 
voluntary and community sector, business 
and the public sector – and because it has 
been driven by both grassroots organisations 
and the municipality taking different but 
complementary approaches. Gouda’s 
experience is also interesting in the way it is 
aligned with some national policy priorities yet 
directly challenges others.
2. Innovation strategy 
Local social innovation in Gouda has been 
driven by grassroots community action and two 
initiatives developed by the municipality and 
local public agencies. However, this work has 
not developed as part of an overall strategy 
led by the municipality but appears to have 
evolved in response to persistent social issues, 
with different agencies taking the lead at 
different times. In this way, the city’s approach 
to innovation is distinct from UK case studies 
like Knowsley or Tower Hamlets that set out to 
develop an overall strategy for innovation in a 
particular service. 
There are three complementary strands to 
Gouda’s work on community cohesion: 
Grassroots activity•	 : initiated and led by 
residents and community groups.
Neighbourhood renewal•	 : initiated by 
the municipality with a focus on physical 
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and social regeneration in priority 
neighbourhoods.
New approach to partnership working•	 : 
to share data and target interventions at 
Moroccan youth.
3. Innovation Process
3.1 Grassroots activity
Gouda has a number of grassroots projects and 
initiatives designed to tackle social problems 
in the city’s Muslim communities. The most 
high profile and well organised of these is the 
Rachid and Melchior (R&M) Activity Centre in 
Gouda Oost. 
Gouda Oost is a neighbourhood just to the 
east of the city centre with a population of 
approximately 5,500, of whom more than 60 
per cent are of non-Dutch origin. There is a 
high proportion of rented social housing in the 
neighbourhood and a high turnover of tenants. 
The neighbourhood has many social issues 
including low quality housing, generational 
tensions between first generation immigrants 
and young people, low aspirations and poor 
educational attainment among boys and young 
men, and unemployment.
R&M operates from a former school building 
in the middle of the neighbourhood, offering 
a café, gym, internet access, theatre groups, 
Arabic lessons, targeted youth work and a 
warden scheme known as neighbourhood 
‘parents’. The association’s approach is low key, 
encouraging people to come in and take part in 
social activities, and develop their confidence 
to go out and do more in the community. 
The Activity Centre building belongs to 
the municipality and is rented by R&M at a 
subsidised rate.
R&M was established as a youth project in 
1997 by local Moroccan businessman, Rachid 
Tighadouini and former economist and civil 
servant, Melchior Verstegen. Its aims were 
to demonstrate that municipal social welfare 
services were not dealing with entrenched 
problems effectively and to develop alternative 
approaches to tackle problems with disaffected 
youth. By doing so it hoped to improve the 
overall quality of life, to unify the Moroccan 
community and build bridges between original 
Dutch and Moroccan residents. 
R&M has gone through a number of 
organisational changes in the last decade. 
At times it has struggled to engage with 
the municipality; on other occasions, it has 
received strong support from the council and 
local politicians. In 1997, it was established 
as ‘Every Youngster is One’. In 2000, it 
started a Foundation and was encouraged 
by the municipality to become part of the 
city’s social welfare agency, although this 
approach was rejected by the founders. In 
2004 the Foundation was abolished but the 
Activity Centre was retained. Today, the R&M 
Activity Centre operates as a neighbourhood 
association with 527 paying members and is 
staffed entirely by volunteers.
The R&M Activity Centre has close connections 
to the municipality, local politicians and 
agencies, and works with Factor G, the delivery 
agency for local welfare services, on initiatives 
to target Moroccan youth. The organisation 
receives small grants from the municipality to 
support individual projects to tackle community 
cohesion. It also works closely with the city’s 
social welfare agencies to reach some of the 
most disaffected young Moroccan boys and 
men, and runs its own projects targeting young 
people.
However, there are also tensions between 
R&M and the local authorities. R&M has been 
offered relatively large-scale funding in the 
past to deliver community welfare and youth 
services for the municipality. This offer was 
rejected by R&M, which preferred to remain 
independent. However few, if any, of R&M’s 
projects are self funding; they rely entirely 
on volunteer support and donations from 
neighbourhood association members. Recently, 
some of the Activity Centre’s services have 
been cut back due to a lack of volunteers to 
staff the building. 
In the long-term, the municipality’s plans for 
neighbourhood regeneration pose a greater 
threat to the sustainability of the R&M Activity 
Centre.The building that currently houses the 
Centre will be demolished within four years. A 
proposed new community and sports centre will 
provide some space for community initiatives. 
However, these will no longer be at the centre 
of the neighbourhood and the municipality 
is proposing to significantly increase rents 
for community groups. This raises serious 
questions about the long-term sustainability of 
the R&M Activity Centre and other grassroots 
cohesion and neighbourhood initiatives in 
Gouda. 
There are also tensions between community 
organisations and public agencies about the 
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municipality’s approach to targeting Moroccan 
youth. The criticisms voiced were that although 
the work is intensive and highly targeted, it 
does not empower the Moroccan community 
to improve their own quality of life, and that 
its services do not benefit many Moroccan 
women. 
Opinions differ on whether R&M’s structure 
and range of activities are in themselves 
innovative. R&M maintained that they are, 
but others argued that similar organisations 
exist in other cities. However the organisation 
undeniably plays an important role in Gouda’s 
overall approach to tackling community 
cohesion. R&M’s founding partnership between 
a Moroccan businessman and an original Dutch 
economist was unusual and has attracted much 
attention. Although Verstegen is no longer a 
board member of the R&M and is much less 
involved in its activities, current board members 
are high profile and well networked within the 
city. These strong personal connections with 
the municipality, local politicians, academics 
and business community have enabled R&M 
to gain political support and involvement 
(two members of the Centre’s board are local 
councillors) and a high profile for the Centre’s 
work over the past decade, which has helped 
to perpetuate the organisation’s reputation for 
innovation. 
3.2 Neighbourhood regeneration
Historically, Gouda has had high levels of 
central government intervention. Located in 
one of the lowest parts of the country, the area 
has received significant investment for tackling 
irrigation, flood defences and issues with 
poor quality soil. In 1999, central government 
oversight of the city’s spending was removed 
and it devolved a range of powers to the 
municipality that enabled it to take control 
over its own spending and priorities for the 
first time in 25 years. The transfer of power 
was accompanied by a lump sum payment from 
central government to the municipality for 
tackling local issues. 
In 2000, the municipality identified the most 
pressing social issues in the city as including 
problems with housing, physical infrastructure 
and worklessness in Gouda Oost and Korter 
Akkeren. In response, the municipality decided 
to develop a regeneration programme to target 
these two neighbourhoods involving both 
physical improvements and social programmes 
to improve quality of life. A visioning exercise 
in 2003 sought to develop regeneration plans.
Work began on the programmes in 2004 
and will continue until 2015. In both 
neighbourhoods, the renewal programme 
will involve significant investment in physical 
regeneration, focusing on improvements 
to housing stock, landscaping, community 
facilities and transport connections, and 
economic and social regeneration activities. 
Action plans have already been put in place 
and investments made in neighbourhood 
policing and CCTV cameras to tackle crime and 
fear of crime in the two neighbourhoods. Social 
enterprise initiatives include a programme to 
tackle unemployment by encouraging young 
Moroccans to set up local businesses. Although 
only 30 young men are currently involved in 
this programme, the municipality believe it is 
raising aspirations. Another initiative targets 
Moroccan mothers who do not work but play a 
crucial role in the domestic lives of families.
Gouda’s focus on neighbourhood renewal 
is aligned with a new national interest in 
neighbourhoods. Central government has 
recently identified the country’s 40 most 
deprived neighbourhoods. It proposes to 
target investment and interventions to these 
communities in an initiative similar to the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Programme in 
England. However, Gouda Oost and Korter 
Akkeren are not included in the national list 
of priority neighbourhoods because their 
postcodes include pockets of relative affluence.
Project Wijkontwikkeling, the city’s 
Neighbourhood Development office, is 
responsible for the redevelopment, working 
with advisory boards of local residents. The 
regeneration programme is funded jointly by 
central government, the municipality and the 
local housing corporations. The Netherlands 
has a strong tradition of rented social housing 
without the stigma that is attached to it in 
the UK. Half of Dutch residents own their 
own home compared to 70 per cent in the 
UK. Moreover, half of Dutch housing stock 
belongs to local housing corporations, which 
are similar to British housing associations, 
but more powerful. Central government is 
now encouraging housing corporations to sell 
housing stock to generate money that can be 
invested in the social and physical regeneration 
of neighbourhoods. This is being negotiated 
nationally, mirrored in local conversations 
between municipalities and housing 
corporations.
In the early stages, Gouda’s neighbourhood 
renewal programme was led by officers with 
frontline responsibilities and the housing 
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corporations. The programme now has 
political support although the social aspect 
of the renewal programme is not universally 
supported. Some in the municipality feel that 
a more direct, hardline approach to tackling 
crime and anti-social behaviour would be a 
more effective way to tackle the divisions 
between the original Dutch and Moroccan 
residents.
3.3 Agency integration and targeted 
interventions
The third strand of local social innovation in 
Gouda is a new partnership between the city’s 
agencies.
Although partnerships between public agencies 
are common in the Netherlands, Gouda’s 
approach is unusual both in its intensive focus 
on targeting Moroccan youth and the data-
sharing initiatives – the ‘persoonigerichte 
aanpak’ – that have been developed by local 
partners.
The driver for the data-sharing initiative came 
in 2002, when Gouda experienced disturbances 
involving Moroccan young people, the first 
time that the city had experienced this type of 
problem. These incidents created significant 
public concern. Gouda’s public agencies with 
responsibility for youth protection, crime, 
social services and welfare acknowledged they 
did not have the experience or information to 
respond to the crisis and multiple, inter-related 
social problems.
Conversations with the community and 
frontline agency staff to discuss possible 
strategies for tackling the problems began 
within a week at neighbourhood level. 
However, across the city it took another year 
to bring together the municipality and relevant 
agencies to commit to tackling problems 
together. 
The result is an intensive partnership launched 
in 2005, bringing together the city’s key public 
agencies to share information and to develop a 
new ‘cure and prevention’ approach to tackling 
entrenched social problems.
In practice, the partnership brings together 
different agencies including the Police, the 
municipal council, youth and child protection 
agencies, legal officers, the Department of 
Justice, and welfare institutions, in a new 
data sharing system – SOS – that collates 
information on what is happening in the 
two priority neighbourhoods and helps to 
develop joint responses to social problems. The 
partnership focuses on 10-26 year olds, both as 
individuals and in groups, and has two different 
levels. 
At the senior level, the local authority, the 
Police and welfare institutions meet every 
three weeks to share information between 
partners about what is happening in the 
priority neighbourhoods and problems 
related to groups of young people. Locally, 
frontline workers from key agencies share 
data about individuals and how interventions 
can be targeted to support them. Meetings 
are organised by the municipality, which has 
appointed an officer to integrate all the records 
held by different agencies about targeted 
individuals. These include detailed records on 
young people under 25, including their family 
context, which can be used by the participating 
agencies to target welfare and social support. 
One initiative is an intensive coaching 
programme for Moroccan boys, which currently 
involves two hundred individuals. Each boy 
has a case manager from one of the agencies 
involved who has oversight of their progress. 
The coaching programme involves intensive 
work to help the boys to regain some structure 
in their lives and to tackle specific individual 
problems. Professionals meet weekly with the 
boys to talk about family issues, encourage the 
boys to go to school or back to work, and to 
tackle problems with money or drug abuse. 
The overall approach goes against the grain 
of current Dutch national policy which 
discourages social welfare interventions 
targeted at particular ethnic groups. National 
policy has emerged from debate and anxiety 
about multi-culturalism. However, Gouda’s 
Labour party and its partner agencies have 
chosen a different stance in their strategy 
aimed at creating community cohesion. 
4. Outcomes
There is little hard independent evaluation of 
the outcomes of Gouda’s various initiatives to 
tackle community cohesion issues. However, 
anecdotal evidence indicates that collectively 
the initiatives are having impact. 
Factor G, the agency responsible for delivering 
welfare services and a key agency in the 
partnership working initiative, claims the 
programme has had a significant impact 
on the ability of agencies to improve their 
effectiveness and has delivered targeted 
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interventions. The agency claims that 80 per 
cent of the Moroccan boys involved in the 
coaching programme succeed in restoring some 
structure to their lives, enabling them to return 
to school or work. Success is also measured by 
the partnership in terms of a reduction in Police 
contact with the Moroccan boys. Gouda’s SOS 
data sharing system is widely acknowledged to 
be an effective response to the city’s problems 
and the municipality now wants to extend the 
approach to other sectors.
Grassroots initiatives and investments 
in neighbourhood policing, CCTV and 
physical improvements in the two priority 
neighbourhoods have resulted in lower crime 
rates, cleaner streets and improvements in 
perceptions about crime levels.
5. Analysis: drivers and enablers of 
innovation in Gouda 
5.1 Driver: Social problems and crisis
Both grassroots innovation and the 
municipality’s neighbourhood renewal 
programme have been driven by persistent 
and concentrated social problems in Gouda’s 
Moroccan communities. The clashes between 
Moroccan youths in 2002 acted as a trigger for 
innovation in partnership working in the city. 
5.2 Driver: Leadership and Influence
R&M’s original founders, Rachid Tighadouini 
and Melchior Verstegen, were an unusual and 
charismatic partnership with strong networks 
in Gouda’s business and political communities. 
These informal links enabled R&M to gain 
support from local political leaders, including 
the Mayor, aldermen and councillors, at crucial 
times in R&M’s development. When R&M 
became a Foundation in 2000, these networks 
were extended to influential academic contacts 
who became part of the Board, enabling 
R&M to gain profile for its activities in the 
academic community in a way that other similar 
organisations have not achieved. R&M has also 
been criticised for having too many white board 
members, although this is now less true than in 
the past.
Leadership has also been important to the 
development of the city’s partnership working 
initiative. Immediately after the riots of 2002 
senior officers from the city’s different agencies 
came together to discuss the way forward. 
Individual agencies recognised the city’s lack of 
experience in dealing with community cohesion 
issues and that no agency had the breadth 
of experience or the remit to deal with the 
problems individually. While agency leaders 
quickly committed to working together, it took 
another year for the idea to gain support from 
the municipality’s political leaders.
5.3 Enabler: National policy context
Gouda is an interesting case study because 
local innovation has been enabled indirectly by 
changes in policy at national government level. 
In particular, the decision to devolve power to 
the municipality allowed the city to identify 
local spending priorities and national policy 
to focus public investment on neighbourhood 
renewal. However, the municipality’s targeted 
interventions to reach Moroccan young people 
clash with a recent change in national policy, 
which now focuses on the shared problems that 
cut across different social, cultural and ethnic 
groups, discouraging initiatives that target 
individual cultural groups. 
5.4 Enabler: Resources
The availability of central government funds 
as a result of the devolution of powers to the 
municipality, and of resources from the housing 
corporations, has enabled the city to invest in 
physical and social regeneration programmes 
targeting priority neighbourhoods. 
6. Summary and conclusions
Local innovation in Gouda has emerged in a 
more organic way than some of our other case 
studies. All three initiatives have been driven 
by pressing social problems that impact most 
significantly on the city’s Moroccan residents 
and are concentrated in two of the most 
deprived neighbourhoods. 
Grassroots activity has responded to public 
concern and local social problems and has 
evolved into practical initiatives, activities and 
groups targeting the Moroccan community. 
In themselves, these grassroots activities are 
probably not unusual, but as part of the city’s 
overall response to community cohesion issues, 
they play an important role in ensuring that 
public agencies better meet residents’ needs.
The municipality’s response to local problems 
is innovative in its combination of intensive 
partnership working, data sharing and 
integrated agency responses, and the focus 
on highly targeted interventions to reach 
Moroccan young people at a time when 
national government policy is stressing a 
different kind of approach.
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There was a notable lack of co-ordination 
between the different initiatives. Grassroots 
activists did not know about the data-sharing 
and targeted resources; and neighbourhood 
regeneration initiatives appeared to be 
disconnected from both. There was some 
cynicism amongst different stakeholders 
about the appropriateness of other agencies’ 
activities. There are questions around the 
sustainability of Gouda’s grassroots initiatives, 
particularly future funding and provision of 
subsidised accommodation. Similarly data 
sharing and targeting of resources towards 
Moroccan youth appears to be held together 
by a fragile consensus, which could easily be 
destabilised by political change.
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Case study 6: Cultural regeneration of Lille, France
Assisted by the ongoing process of decentralisation, the Urban Community of Lille in 
France has undergone significant regeneration in the last 20 years, tackling the effects 
of deindustrialisation. Lille has now established itself as an industrial hub and commercial 
centre of Northwest Europe. Many of its projects to revitalise the area have been 
supplemented by innovative alliances and government structures.
Innovation has been driven by four main factors: 
Charismatic leadership from the Mayor of Lille, Pierre Mauroy.•	
Strong informal networks between the different agencies and sectors.•	
The impact of Lille’s bid to become Europe’s Capital of Culture in 2004, and to host the •	
2004 Olympics, which strengthened existing networks.
The opportunities that arose from Lille’s emergence as a transport hub through the •	
development of the Channel Tunnel interchange station in 1987. 
Background data
Geography: 
Lille is the main city of France’s fourth •	
largest metropolitan area. It is located to the 
country’s north, on the Deûle River, near the 
border with Belgium. 
Population: 
Lille has 220,000 inhabitants, making it the •	
tenth largest city in France. The wider urban 
area, Metropolitan Lille, has a population of 
over one million inhabitants and is France’s 
fourth largest urban area. 36 per cent of the 
population of Metropolitan Lille is under 25.
Labour market: 
Lille has France’s third largest university •	
complex after Paris and Nantes. It is the 
European capital for catalogue sales and 
mass distribution. It is France’s leading 
centre for clothing and technical textiles; the 
country’s second city for accommodating 
international head offices and the third 
largest centre for banking, food processing 
and mechanical and electrical industries. 
Lille was a major textiles manufacturing 
centre until the eighties and the collapse 
of this industry led to high unemployment 
particularly for the immigrant population. 
The unemployment rate was 14 per cent in 
2001, above the national average of 9 per 
cent.
Local government structure: 
The commune is the lowest tier of •	
government in France. Although there is 
no exact British equivalent a commune 
has a status that falls somewhere between 
that of local government districts and civil 
parishes. The average area of a commune is 
around 15 km_. 88 communes join together 
to form the Lille Métropole Communauté 
Urbaine, one of the 14 Métropoles in France 
created in 1966 to assist in the devolution 
of power from central government. This 
acts as a metropolitan authority that 
shares the income from local taxes with the 
communes. The President of Lille Métropole 
Communauté Urbaine is former French Prime 
Minister, Pierre Mauroy. 
1. Summary: context and need
Located in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region in 
Northern France, Lille Métropole Communauté 
Urbaine (LMCU) covers an area that spans 
both France and Belgium. Including the 
Belgian cities that are also incorporated in 
the urban area of Lille, the entire city-region 
has a population of just under two million. 
The LMCU is the strategic authority that 
encompasses the Lille city-region. LMCU acts 
as a local public authority, made up of 88 
extremely varied communes. The core includes 
the cities of Roubaix, Tourcoing and Villeneuve 
d’Ascq.
L’Agence de 121. 
développement et 
d’urbanisme de Lille 
Métropole (2006) ‘The 
Urban Regeneration of Lille 
Metropole.’ Lille: L’Agence 
de développement et 
d’urbanisme de Lille 
Métropole.
Ibid.122. 
Lille has had a richer history than its French 
counterparts, having been ruled for centuries 
by the Spanish, only joining France in 1668. 
This mixed heritage is still apparent and the 
Métropole has a more distinct culture and 
appearance than other French areas. Lille also 
was affected greatly by the two world wars; in 
both cases the city was occupied by foreign 
troops. 
Lille historically built its prosperity upon the 
textiles industry, being located in what was 
known as ‘the cradle’ of French industrial 
revolution. Lille’s economic growth and thriving 
industry resulted in a rapid population increase: 
for example, in Roubaix, the population grew 
from 8,000 in 1806 to 125,000 in 1900. 
However, in the seventies, the area was greatly 
affected by deindustrialisation, leading to the 
closure of many factories and high levels of 
unemployment with a resultant increase in 
poverty and need. The collapse of the textile 
industry also led to population loss and an 
excess of vacant property. Some communes 
became ‘ghost towns’.
As Lille’s industries continued to decline and 
unemployment grew rapidly, senior officials, 
politicians and business leaders recognised 
the need for Lille to diversify its economy, 
build new industry and establish new markets. 
Pierre Mauroy, who became Mayor of Lille 
in 1973, used his leadership to help create 
consensus between the Mayors of the four 
main cities within the LMCU. The new Mayor 
also led and supported the LMCU in taking a 
more strategic role in developing a vision for 
economic development and urban regeneration 
and implementing a proactive strategy of 
development and regeneration. Pierre Mauroy, 
who has also served as Prime Minister of 
France in the early eighties, is now head of the 
LMCU.
2. Innovation strategy
Lille’s strategy for innovation began with a 
period of stabilisation and consensus-building 
in the eighties. Mauroy recognised the need for 
collaboration between communes and senior 
officials to formulate a strategy that they could 
jointly implement. This consensus was achieved 
using existing structures such as the LMCU, 
which until then had played a largely technical 
role. An alliance was also created by the 
LMCU’s leading cities, Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing 
and Villeneuve d’Ascq. During the eighties the 
LMCU launched a number of projects to assist 
in this unification process between Lille’s many 
communes. These projects brought together 
both public and private investment.
Whilst Lille’s strategy for innovation has 
emphasised the physical regeneration of the 
area, this was not the focal point of innovation. 
The strategy for rejuvenating the Métropole 
consisted first of improving the image of 
the city to both the outside world and its 
inhabitants. The local authorities, cities and 
LMCU decided upon a long-term strategy to 
rehabilitate the Métropole’s general image. The 
repositioning of the area’s image supported the 
reorganisation of Lille’s economy by helping 
to attract external investment. A long-term 
physical and cultural strategy helped to tackle 
the interrelated dimensions of regeneration, 
requiring commitment from local public 
agencies irrespective of changes in national 
policy. 
Lille implemented major schemes and 
developed flagship projects around different 
themes such as bio-medical research and 
modern textiles, which they called ‘poles 
for private investments’. These built upon 
existing strengths, expertise and experience. 
Lille sought to identify new opportunities 
complementing the area’s cultural regeneration, 
by building upon its unique history and 
identity. The strategy also included moving 
from a largely industrial to a more service-
oriented economy.
These high profile projects began in the late 
eighties with the development of EuraLille, a 
major business and retail centre. The centre 
was based on the idea of creating “a new 
district typical of the intricacy and functional 
co-existence of the metropolises, right at the 
centre of a city that already exists”.121 This 
innovative and symbolic project was designed 
to take advantage of the planned arrival of 
Eurostar and interchange station at Lille for 
North-West Europe. The EuraLille project was 
supported by a public-private partnership 
in 1990 based upon the French ‘Sociétés 
d’Economie Mixte’ costing an estimated five 
billion francs, 1.5 billion of which were from 
public funds and the remainder from private 
investors.122 EuraLille’s shopping centre, which 
opened in 1994, the same year as the Channel 
Tunnel, has since become a popular attraction 
for tourists and the local community, helping to 
reposition Lille’s image.
Other projects which have been launched by 
the LMCU in connection with private investors 
include Eurasanté, a business park and service 
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centre specialising in bio-medical research and 
hospitals. Lille has also developed Haute Borne, 
a science park containing almost 60 research 
laboratories and five engineering schools. 
Spurred by a sense of competition with 
other French local authorities, these projects 
increased the international profile of the area 
and helped boost the local economy, attracting 
investors as well as accelerating cultural 
regeneration. Lille has also attempted to spread 
these different projects and sites across the 
Métropole to ensure that the regeneration 
benefited the whole city-region. 
Alongside these high profile projects, the 
LMCU’s strategy also enforced the ‘ville 
renouvelée’ policy, a strategy which seeks to 
address the problems of economic, social, 
cultural, environmental and urban decay. This 
was achieved by building upon potential assets 
whilst restricting urban expansion in areas of 
natural beauty or farming districts. The strategy 
aimed to launch specific projects in Lille’s most 
deprived areas, tailored to inhabitants’ needs. 
This ‘ville renouvelée’ policy included the 
following key elements:123 
Recreating attractive and safe public spaces •	
and promoting the architectural heritage of 
the city.
Bringing retail back to the city and making •	
the city a shopping destination.
Encouraging economic development through •	
a designated ‘Enterprise Zone’ and other 
targeted development. 
Developing an innovative and proactive •	
cultural strategy to make the city of Roubaix 
a focus of culture and tourism.
Supporting housing renewal for the benefit •	
of the local population, seen as crucial in 
retaining and attracting new residents. 
The Lille Métropole Basic Master Plan, a key 
component of the metropolitan urban project, 
describes the six coordinated objectives of the 
strategy as:124 
Rethinking the territory’s economic and •	
urban activities.
A large scale renewal of the housing stock.•	
Upgrading urban road systems and gaps.•	
Upgrading and dealing with brownfield sites •	
as well as polluted and abandoned areas.
Launching public building refurbishment and •	
public area reclamation programmes.
Coordinating and integrating social action •	
and participatory approaches.
3. Innovation process
3.1 Creating structures and a consensus for 
innovation
In 1985, the elected Mayors of the LMCU’s 
four largest cities (Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing and 
Villeneuve d’Ascq) created an alliance. This 
was initially formed to “overcome what was 
seen as the dominance of the small towns”.125 
The alliance acted as a strategic framework in 
the development of a partnership between the 
many communes within the Métropole’s vast 
area to address cultural regeneration.
Existing structures were used to regenerate 
the Métropole’s cultural image. These included 
the LMCU, which until then had performed 
a largely technical role in managing simple 
infrastructure and day-to-day street issues. 
The structure was also blighted by local politics 
connected to the smaller communes.126 
Mauroy decided to use this existing structure 
to help realise a vision and strategy for the 
urban regeneration and economic development 
of the region. The structure connected 
representatives from all of Lille’s smaller towns, 
with approximately 170 local councillors 
elected by the communes. The LMCU enabled 
a coherent strategy to be developed in 
partnership. In 2002 the LMCU’s strategic focus 
shifted from urban development to economic 
development as well as the environment and 
major cultural events. More recently, the LMCU 
has been used to develop and implement a 
strategy for housing renewal and provision 
across the Métropole. 
The LMCU has also developed several papers 
which lay out Lille’s framework for sustainable 
development. This includes the Development 
and Urbanisation Master Urban Plan (DUMP) 
which focuses on enhancing urban life in Lille 
from both a social and economic viewpoint. 
The DUMP consists of seven development 
fields, bringing together institutional 
stakeholders in the implementation of its 
outlined strategies. This included the State, the 
Region Nord-Pas de Calais, the Department 
du Nord, local authorities, economic managers 
and not-for-profit organisations.127 The 
existing structure of the LMCU has provided 
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a platform for social innovation, benefiting 
from the continuing decentralisation of central 
government power since its creation. 
New structures have also been created to 
help support innovation. These include the 
Comité Grand Lille (CGL), a forum started 
in 1993 by a proactive regional industrialist, 
Bruno Bonduelle, to strengthen informal 
Lille networks. CGL brings together many 
representatives from different agencies, 
encouraging collaboration and strengthening 
relationships within the area. Its organic and 
somewhat relaxed form helps to support 
innovation, with its goal of creating genuine 
and natural alliances and partnerships, rather 
than the more mechanistic and rigid system 
provided by other structures such as the 
LMCU and APIM. The CGL culture drives and 
facilitates creativity, and was often described 
by interviewees as an exciting place to 
introduce and discuss new ideas. 
3.2 Creating a culture for innovation
The people of Lille suffered acute low self-
esteem following deindustrialisation and the 
area’s resultant poverty. Reversing what was 
described as a negative and self-defeatist 
attitude was seen as central to creating a 
culture that would support regeneration.
The LMCU’s strength was in its realisation 
that to regenerate the area and develop its 
economy, it would also have to address the 
cultural and social elements of regeneration. 
The LMCU introduced a proactive cultural 
policy, developing and promoting Lille’s rich 
cultural and historical heritage128 including the 
modern art museum in Villeneuve d’Ascq, and 
La Piscine, a disused railway station converted 
into a museum of arts and industry in Roubaix, 
which has encouraged private investment. 
Lille has encouraged and supported the work 
of artists through projects such as Quartier 
du Monde, where designers, painters and 
bakers collaborate with distributors to sell 
their products. Lille has also made an effort 
to strengthen and develop its musical scene 
through actions such as the refurbishment 
of the city’s Opera House. These projects 
supported local talent, giving confidence to 
Lille’s cultural industries, and encouraged 
innovation.
Lille’s strategy has focused on building on 
existing and historical strengths. Much work 
has been undertaken to protect and sustain the 
area’s rich architectural heritage, with certain 
neighbourhoods dating back to the 16th 
century. The region’s strong industrial past has 
also been promoted through La Piscine. Lille 
has chosen to build upon its previous strengths 
and expertise: a good example is Roubaix’s 
highly specialised textile cluster which contains 
many innovative small and medium-sized 
textiles enterprises, some specialising in new 
products such as fire resistant textiles or space 
textiles. Unable to complete globally with the 
mass production of textiles, Lille has built 
upon its prior knowledge and historic identity 
by moving towards a more highly skilled and 
specialised area of the textiles industry.
These different methods describe how 
Lille developed the Métropole’s identity by 
capturing and building upon its history. Lille 
has also put forward high profile bids to 
restore local pride. In 1994, the city bid to 
host the 2004 Olympic Games. The process 
of putting together the Olympic bid brought 
together many of the region’s agencies, 
building relationships between them and 
strengthening informal networks. Leaders in 
both the public, private and not-for-profit 
sectors came together within the CGL to 
formulate and lobby for Lille to host the 2004 
Games. Whilst the bid was unsuccessful, the 
process significantly increased the confidence 
and pride of local communities and residents. 
The bid raised Lille’s profile nationally, re-
establishing the city’s image within the rest of 
France. The bid also created a strong network 
between agencies and actors within Lille, 
strengthening the structure of the CGL and 
the relationship between important individuals 
in local business, the local political arena and 
Lille’s public sector. 
Shortly afterwards, Lille was nominated as 
the European Capital of Culture for 2004. 
This brought together the same actors and 
agencies as the Olympics bid, reinforcing and 
embedding their relationships, and making 
them more sustainable in the long term. Lille 
used this opportunity to develop a large and 
rich programme of events, involving the whole 
region. The selection as Capital of Culture 
further raised Lille’s profile internationally, 
establishing it as a tourist destination. Lille’s 
image was further repositioned, perceived as 
“a dynamic, creative, young city with lots of 
potential and qualities”.129 
 
4. Outcomes
Despite its loss of jobs and increased poverty, 
Lille has managed successfully to innovate 
and revive the urban area, diversifying the 
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economy and sustaining physical and cultural 
regeneration. 
This innovation has had a number of impacts 
on the Métropole. Lille has transformed its 
economy to one that is much more service-
oriented. Fifteen per cent of the new jobs 
created have been in the city’s cultural 
industries. Unemployment has also fallen 
from 33 per cent in the eighties to 22 per 
cent in 2005.130 Inward investment from both 
individuals and businesses has increased as new 
companies have moved to the area. Population 
decline in the LMCU’s inner cities also stopped 
during the nineties.131 Cities which were 
severely affected by deindustrialisation, such as 
Roubaix, are also now gradually attracting back 
middle-class residents. 
Perceptions of Lille have improved and Lille has 
also established itself as a tourist destination. 
Tourist flows have increased significantly in 
the last ten years and Lille is now a city with a 
vibrant image.132
5. Analysis: drivers and enablers of 
innovation in Lille
5.1 Drivers: Need, economic crisis and 
competition
In earlier centuries, Lille greatly benefited from 
the industrialisation of France. Its population 
and prosperity grew. Following the closure of 
Lille’s coal and textiles industry in the eighties, 
the economy collapsed, resulting in high 
unemployment and deprivation. An economic 
crisis and the resultant need to address it acted 
as key drivers in the innovation process.
Senior officials, politicians and leaders in Lille’s 
private and not-for-profit sector recognised 
the need to regenerate the area by building 
new industries, high-tech parks and creating 
new markets. The economic crisis brought 
agencies and actors together to regenerate 
the area both physically and culturally. The 
LMCU and CGL also appreciated the complex 
nature of regeneration and prioritised the 
need to reposition Lille’s image and address its 
inhabitants’ low self-esteem. 
The sense of crisis also helped to create 
a culture of innovation. Key agencies and 
individuals realised that taking risks was 
necessary to revitalise the area. The crisis also 
helped to create a general consensus in the 
region, with many realising that Lille’s social 
problems and needs could not be addressed by 
communes working in isolation.
Competition was also important in driving 
innovation, as awareness grew of the 
Métropole’s relative performance against other 
French areas and other European cities. This 
acknowledgment helped to justify the need to 
take appropriate risks. One interviewee recalled 
how, as the region saw other areas doing better 
and becoming wealthier, senior officials in Lille 
felt greater pressure to act and innovate. 
5.2 Drivers: Transportation hub
Following the announcement of the 
French-British cooperation agreement for 
the construction of the Channel Tunnel in 
1986, the Mayor of Lille began to campaign 
and lobby central government to place an 
interchange station for North-West Europe in 
Lille. In 1987 Lille received a contract for TGV 
and Eurostar linking Lille to London, Paris and 
Brussels. The city became a transportation hub, 
central to North West Europe. The train station 
was situated at the heart of the city, connected 
to the local, well developed metro and tram 
line. Lille had previously been associated with 
innovation in transportation, designing and 
constructing the first driverless metro system 
in 1983. 
Lille’s transformation into a transportation hub 
gave rise to many opportunities in regenerating 
the area, repositioning its image and 
developing its economy. Leaders were quick 
to recognise this opportunity and maximise 
benefits. This included the construction of the 
EuraLille development, acting as a landmark 
and tourist destination in the city. Projects such 
as EuraLille have helped to establish Lille as a 
significant European city.
5.3 Drivers: Leadership
Many of those interviewed attribute the 
success and innovation to charismatic 
leadership provided by the former Mayor 
of Lille, Pierre Mauroy. A French Socialist 
Politician, Mauroy was Mayor from 1973 to 
2001. He also served as Prime Minister of 
France from 1981 to 1984, under President 
François Mitterrand. His leadership was 
crucial in triggering the innovation processes, 
revitalising existing structures and using 
political clout to lobby the French government 
to place the Eurostar station and TGV 
interchange station in Lille. 
Mauroy also played an important role in 
building consensus within Lille. He used his 
strong informal networks and social capital to 
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communicate a vision for Lille’s future, creating 
a stable environment in which politicians 
worked together. 
After his time as Mayor of Lille, Mauroy 
became the director of the LMCU, a position he 
holds today. This has enabled him to continue 
playing an active role in the regeneration of 
the city, helping to put into place the strategies 
formulated to continue economic development.
Leaders in Lille’s different communes and 
regions also played an important role, 
translating the overarching strategy for change 
to individual cities and communes. One such 
was Michel David, head of education, culture, 
and urban regeneration in Roubaix, who was 
an important leader in the innovation process 
within Roubaix. Other important leaders 
include Bruno Bonduelle, a proactive regional 
industrialist who created the CGL. Leadership 
in the private sector has helped to facilitate 
collaboration between agencies and to attract 
joint private and public funding.
5.4 Driver: Strong informal networks and 
collaboration
The dialogue between Lille’s different public 
and private actors through structures such as 
the LMCU and CGL has often been the starting 
point for many innovations. Strong informal 
networks that were strengthened under Pierre 
Mauroy’s leadership, have helped to create a 
culture of innovation through the sharing of 
knowledge and ideas.
The organic nature of the CGL has also helped 
to drive innovation. Much creativity and many 
innovative approaches have started and been 
developed within this forum. The bringing 
together of representatives from different 
organisations, sectors and levels has improved 
information-sharing through its cross-cutting 
structure. 
Such networks have also helped to 
communicate a strategy for regeneration and 
bring agencies together to put into place a 
clear vision. Collaboration has also ensured 
‘buy in’ from many crucial individuals in 
both the private and public sector. With an 
incredibly diverse area consisting of small rural 
towns as well as very large cities, consensus 
and collaboration is essential to the success 
of the wide-scale and complex strategy of 
regeneration. 
5.5 Enabler: Continuation of leaders 
Lille has benefited from long-term leadership, 
which has helped to sustain and implement 
innovation. As the area of Lille has evolved, 
leadership has begun to come from many 
different sources. The small select set of 
individuals whose input was central at the 
start is reported as no longer crucial to the 
innovation process. Innovation is found in 
many different aspects of Lille’s regeneration. 
Some interviewees described how they now 
felt that if individuals such as Pierre Mauroy 
were to leave the area, innovation would be 
sustained. Many more people are now actively 
involved in the innovation process due to 
structures such as the LMCU and CGL.
5.6 Enablers: political stability and 
consensus 
Innovation in Lille has been possible because 
of a stable political consensus and commitment 
for change. The majority of interviewees felt 
that such radical change would have been 
difficult to introduce in a less stable political 
setting and they noted how important it was 
that Lille’s politicians were able to work well in 
collaboration, irrespective of their individual 
parties.
5.7 Enablers: Decentralisation and the 
devolving of power
There has been an on-going process of 
decentralisation of government power in 
France supported by legislation in 1968, 1982, 
1986 and 2003. The LMCU is a new tier of local 
government composed of cities and suburbs, 
with fiscal power. This gradual devolution of 
power from central government has enabled 
the social innovation, providing the Métropole 
with the space and freedom to experiment. 
One interviewee believed that central 
government facilitated long-term innovation 
in Lille by accepting experimental regional 
government. 
LMCU’s fiscal power gave it control over 
a significantly large amount of resources, 
enabling the body to utilise and apply them 
according to its own priorities and agenda. In 
2005 the LMCU budget was €1.4 billion.133 
The bulk of this is invested in key fields such 
as public transport, urban ecology, the road 
network, land planning and development. 
The LMCU has become more active and a 
key public stakeholder in the development 
processes. 
6. Summary and conclusions
In Lille, local authorities, cities and the LMCU 
have been implementing a careful urban 
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regeneration strategy for several years now. 
The approach has successfully rehabilitated 
the Métropole’s image, repositioning it as a 
place associated with a dynamic, creative and 
youthful image. This innovation was driven 
and enabled by a number of clearly identified 
factors.
The placing of the new Eurostar and 
interchange station in the city transformed 
Lille into a transportation hub. However the 
city’s agencies were quick to capitalise on the 
benefits from this opportunity. The need and 
deprivation caused by the deindustrialisation 
of Lille and the long-term implications for 
the region’s economy also created strong 
internal pressures from agencies, officials and 
politicians. As with a number of our UK-based 
case studies, including South Tyneside and 
the Highlands, leadership from politicians 
was crucial in triggering and acting as a spur 
for innovation, establishing a strategy and 
vision for change. The creation of a new 
organisational culture also helped to support 
innovation in Lille, not unlike the structures 
for innovation developed by the Highland and 
Knowsley Councils. The long term leadership of 
certain figures and the gradual creation of an 
innovative culture has meant that Lille appears 
to have entered a phase where innovation can 
be sustained and is no longer dependant on 
key individuals. 
Innovation in Lille is much further along in 
the innovation process than our other case 
studies. Innovation has spread beyond cultural 
regeneration and is now apparent in a number 
of other fields, including housing. Lille has 
also benefited greatly from decentralisation 
in France, taking advantage of the freedom 
and control associated with the devolution of 
power, able to use fiscal autonomy to support 
the area’s own agenda and regeneration 
strategy. 
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Case study 7: Work force development and unemployment, Pittsburgh, US
Following the decline of many of its industries in the eighties, Pittsburgh has repositioned 
its economy to address deprivation in the area. Even though the voluntary and community 
sector in the US is larger and more established than in the UK , Pittsburgh contains many 
socially innovative organisations and has one of the most active voluntary and community 
sectors in the country. Innovation is present in a number of different fields including 
workforce development, healthcare, regeneration and the environment. This innovation is 
driven by:
Deprivation and resultant need following the collapse of the steel and coal industries. •	
A high concentration of finance and support in well-established foundations, created •	
through wealth earned from previous economic success.
Collaborative leadership from a number of Pittsburgh’s universities and foundations, many •	
with an interest in social innovation.
Background data
Geography: 
Located in South Western Pennsylvania, •	
Pittsburgh city has a total area of 151km2 
and is the thirteenth largest city in the 
United States. 
Population: 
The population of Pittsburgh in 2000 was •	
334,563 with 2,658,695 in the surrounding 
metropolitan area. The population is 
declining and had fallen to 312,819 by 2006. 
Twenty per cent of the population lived 
below the poverty line in 2000.
The demographic of the region is diverse, •	
reflecting the city’s immigrant history 
including African American, Jewish, Irish 
American, Italian American, German American 
and Eastern European communities. In 2000, 
68 per cent of the population was white and 
27 per cent African-American. 
Labour market: 
Since the decline of steel, Pittsburgh’s •	
primary industries have shifted to advanced 
technology, including robotics and 
biomedical technology; education is also a 
major employer. Pittsburgh still maintains its 
status as a corporate headquarters city, with 
seven Fortune 500 companies calling the city 
home. The unemployment rate in Pittsburgh 
was six per cent in 2000 compared to the US 
average of four per cent in 1999. 
Local government structure: 
Pittsburgh City Council is the legislative •	
branch of government and has nine 
members. Each member represents one 
council district, and is appointed to chair 
a committee which corresponds to a city 
department. 
From the American Civil War to the 1930s, •	
Pittsburgh was a Republican stronghold. 
However, Democratic candidates have 
controlled the Mayor’s office consecutively 
since 1933.
Like the council, the Mayor serves a four-•	
year term. After the death of Mayor Bob 
O’Connor in September 2006, City Council 
President Luke Ravenstahl was sworn in as 
the new Mayor. Aged just 26, he was the 
youngest ever Mayor in any major American 
city. City council members are chosen by 
plurality elections in each of nine districts.
1. Summary: context and need
The city of Pittsburgh is situated in Allegheny 
County in south-western Pennsylvania. The city 
centres on the meeting point of the Allegheny 
and Monongahela Rivers, which then form the 
Ohio River. 
Pittsburgh has a rich industrial past. It started 
in the early nineteenth century as the region 
began producing significant quantities of iron, 
brass, tin and glass products. By 1875, it had 
transformed into an industrial centre, with 939 
factories located in Pittsburgh and the nearby 
Allegheny City, employing more than 10,000 
workers and producing almost $12 million 
worth of goods. Using its rivers, Pittsburgh 
became one of the busiest ports in the US. 
This success continued to the early twentieth 
century, as Pittsburgh became an industrial 
centre for steel manufacture. The growth of 
the steel and coal industries resulted in large 
population growth fuelled by many European 
immigrant populations. Among this influx were 
Irish, Scottish, Italian, German and Eastern 
European communities, settling in different 
neighbourhoods in the city. Pittsburgh’s 
patchwork of neighbourhoods has survived, 
with many still possessing their original ethnic 
character. Communities still have very strong 
relationships with particular neighbourhoods. 
Pittsburgh’s industrial success was not good for 
the environment. The city suffered from poor 
air quality and a river filled with pollutants. 
Referred to as the ‘smoky city’, thick smog 
meant that streetlights sometimes had to be lit 
during the day. The first of Pittsburgh’s social 
innovations in urban development started in 
the first decade of the 20th century as the city 
used public-private partnerships to revitalise 
the city. This clean air and civic revitalisation 
included projects to create grand public spaces 
and architecturally significant office buildings. 
In recent history, there has been further 
innovation in the voluntary and community 
sector around the environment including 
projects such as GTECH which aims to tackle 
the contamination of Pittsburgh’s land, or 
Venture Outdoors, a social enterprise that 
encourages sports and activities. 
Industrial success and wealth made Pittsburgh 
the home of many wealthy and world renowned 
industrialists. This includes Andrew Carnegie 
who was referred to as the ‘Steel King of 
America’ and retired as the richest man in the 
world, selling his steel empire to J.P. Morgan 
in 1901 for $400 million. Other prominent 
industrialists included Henry Clay Frick, Henry 
J. Heinz, Andrew W. Mellon, and Charles M. 
Schwab, who all built their fortunes in the city. 
As philanthropists, they invested significant 
sums of money in projects such as the Carnegie 
Institute of Technology in Pittsburgh, now the 
Carnegie Mellon University. 
In the seventies, the steel industry began 
to collapse. The loss of jobs and closure of 
factories resulted in high unemployment and 
a steady decrease in population as workers 
moved away in search of employment. The 
population in Pittsburgh has more than halved 
since the fifties. 
2. Innovation strategy
The voluntary and community sector 
have addressed the need of Pittsburgh’s 
communities. Non-profit and grassroots 
organisations were thought by the foundations 
and universities to be better placed to innovate 
and meet the needs of the unemployed and 
deprived. Often operating on a neighbourhood 
level, grassroots organisations were seen as 
better able to gauge the needs of specific 
communities that were not being met by 
Pittsburgh’s overstretched public sector. One 
interviewee reported: “from my experience 
much of the innovation that we’ve witnessed 
hasn’t been from the public sector; the 
leadership and innovation in Pittsburgh has 
really come from our not-for-profit sector”.
Individuals involved in such grassroots 
organisations were often local champions, 
able to use their social capital and informal 
networks to support innovation. The size and 
organic nature of many organisations in the 
voluntary and community sector also facilitated 
innovation, as these organisations were seen 
as being more flexible and responsive to 
bottom-up pressures and need, unlike larger 
organisations such as Pittsburgh’s foundations. 
A research paper by Pittsburgh’s Forbes 
Foundation articulated this view: “nonprofits 
occupy a special niche as the first responders 
to a host of social and economic problems 
that impede hopeful progress, as the first 
providers of many of the services that attract 
and hold the region’s workforce, and as among 
the area’s first champions of change toward 
organisational effectiveness”.134 
Whilst the voluntary and community sector 
were seen to occupy an important role in social 
innovation, other agencies and sectors also 
realised that they had an important part to 
play in the innovation process. Pittsburgh’s 
foundations have supported and developed the 
non-profit sector to address social problems. 
They identify social innovation and then 
provide both resources and guidance to sustain 
and scale up many projects. Whilst a lack of 
capital is often seen as the major barrier to 
sustainability of non-profits and innovation, 
many of those interviewed emphasised the 
importance of the additional support and 
practical advice provided by foundations in 
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helping organisations to meet their aims and 
goals. One interviewee explained that: “without 
foundation support and more importantly 
guidance, we would not have achieved what we 
have; I don’t think we’d be here. We’ve always 
has the ideas, but the foundations helped us to 
get there”.
The universities in Pittsburgh have also 
played an important role in building the 
capacity of the third sector. Institutions 
such as Carnegie Mellon have conducted 
research and collaborative work with the 
voluntary and community sector to gain a 
better understanding of social innovation and 
how non-profits can best be supported. The 
relatively greater awareness of social enterprise 
and social innovation in Pittsburgh compared 
to other US cities has legitimised the sector 
and its activities. 
More recently, the amount of available funding 
for the voluntary and community sector has 
decreased and competition for these funds 
has increased. Pittsburgh’s foundations and 
universities have sought to make organisations 
in this sector self-sufficient by turning their 
attentions towards the potential of social 
enterprise and trading arms. 
Social enterprises straddle both the non-profit 
and for-profit sectors and can be formed 
when a non-profit organisation launches 
initiatives to earn additional revenues. They 
are also formed when commercial businesses 
undertake collaborations or alliances to engage 
in socially responsible practices. And they 
include businesses formed in response to a 
social problem.135 Institutions such as the Heinz 
Schools’ Institute for Social Innovation say 
that they are striving to transform Pittsburgh 
into: “a Silicon Valley for social enterprise and 
innovation”. 
3. Innovation process
3.1 Identifying and supporting local social 
innovation
During the collapse of the steel industry, 
unemployment in Pittsburgh reached 12 
per cent. At the same time, many social 
welfare programmes were reduced, bringing 
a significant number of agencies close to 
financial crisis. Pittsburgh’s foundation 
community and universities filled the void in 
the absence of other leadership to address 
the growing need. Many foundations began 
to change their aims from arts and culture 
to economic development and improving 
residents’ quality of life. The Forbes Fund 
of The Pittsburgh Foundation was created, 
combining grants, loans and technical 
assistance to help agencies facing financial 
turmoil.
To help promote a culture of innovation, 
Pittsburgh’s universities, including the Heinz 
School’s Institute for Social Innovation also 
helped to support innovation by mentoring 
budding innovators and entrepreneurs among 
their students. They did this by developing 
new opportunities for hands-on learning; 
conducting data-driven and evidence-based 
research while building useful models and 
tools; coordinating university-community 
partnerships; supporting social sector spin-offs 
in Pittsburgh; and strengthening organisations 
driven by a social mission.
Organisations and social entrepreneurs were 
identified and supported to help create 
and develop a culture of innovation. They 
included entrepreneurs such as Bill Strickland, 
who is now seen as ‘one of the world’s great 
social innovators’. As head of both the 
Manchester Craftsmen’s Guild and the Bidwell 
Training Centre, Strickland created a youth 
development and adult training centre, with a 
distinct ethos and culture, in an environment 
surrounded by art and jazz. Starting with 
ceramics, photography and music, this facility 
provides free programmes to enable young 
adults and school pupils to go on to college. 
The project also supports and trains adults so 
that they can gain employment in fields such 
as pharmaceuticals, culinary arts, horticultural 
technology or medical coding. 
3.2 Making social innovation sustainable
To increase their impact, many foundations 
began to recruit staff and consultants to help 
target grants at community issues. Foundations 
realised the need to be more targeted, as 
there was increased competition for funding 
from a growing number of non-profits and 
a parallel decrease in the amount of finance 
available for the non-profit sector. This trend 
has caused a reassessment of support for 
the non-profit sector, which now focuses on 
the sustainability and robustness of socially 
innovative organisations in the voluntary and 
community sector. For example Pittsburgh’s 
Heinz School founded the Institute for Social 
Innovation to help local nonprofits become 
more financially self-sufficient: “to foster 
innovation and entrepreneurship in the social 
sector through education, research, and local 
and global partnerships”. 
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Local universities in Pittsburgh have also 
assisted by offering social enterprise courses to 
both practitioners and students. Foundations 
have supported the creation of active social 
enterprises in Pittsburgh in a number of 
ways, including holding workshops where 
practitioners are able to learn about social 
enterprise by meeting with strategists, 
attorneys and venture capitalists. Peer learning 
groups have also been formed to support the 
sector.
The Social Innovation Accelerator (SIA) was 
also created in 2002 amid growing concerns 
about the sustainability of non-profit 
organisations in Pittsburgh. The SIA works 
with non-profit organisations that have a 
goal of developing self-sustaining, profitable 
enterprises with the aim to complement the 
support of foundations by helping to develop 
non-profits’ organisational capacity.
4. Outcomes
Pittsburgh has transformed itself from a 
city that faced significant economic crisis 
after the decline of its traditional industries 
to one where service-based and advanced 
technology industries are at the heart of its 
economy. Unemployment has significantly 
decreased from 12 per cent in the eighties 
to six per cent in 2000, although it remains 
above the US national average. Following this 
transformation Pittsburgh now has clean air, a 
diversified economy, a low cost of living, and a 
rich infrastructure for education and culture, a 
combination that has seen it ranked as one of 
the World’s Most Liveable Cities. 
Pittsburgh now has over 2,700 non-profit 
organisations, many of which have taken 
innovative approaches to addressing social 
needs. In a study investigating social 
innovation in the US, Pittsburgh was identified 
as possessing a high concentration of socially 
innovative organisations.136 This has led to 
innovation across the board, driven by the 
needs of communities. For example there 
has been recent increased innovation around 
environmental issues. 
However, despite the high levels of activity 
and the strength of Pittsburgh’s voluntary 
and community sector, there are growing 
worries about the impact and efficiency of the 
current system for social innovation. The sheer 
number of non-profit organisations operating 
to address similar problems has led to much 
duplication and an incoherent approach to 
tackling need. Whilst these organisations are 
addressing different communities, problems 
such as homelessness and unemployment are 
being tackled by these small non-profits in 
a haphazard manner without strategic focus, 
leading to a significantly lower impact than can 
be achieved. One interviewee described how: 
“we (Pittsburgh) aren’t actively addressing the 
problems, there’s just a sprinkling of assets 
across 2,800 non-profits, but we aren’t solving 
the problems, or even making a dent into 
them”. 
5. Analysis: drivers and enablers of 
innovation in Pittsburgh
5.1 Drivers: Economic crisis and need
The deindustrialisation of Pittsburgh in the 
eighties was an important driver for subsequent 
innovation in the region. Like many other 
cities positioned on the American rust belt, 
Pittsburgh suffered greatly when growing 
global competition resulted in the closure of 
the city’s steel and coal factories. Their closure 
resulted in a dramatic population decrease. 
High unemployment and underemployment 
meant that laid-off workers took lower-paying, 
non-union jobs. Pittsburgh’s foundations and 
universities began to work collaboratively to 
address this need. One interviewee believed 
that: “innovation in Pittsburgh has been driven 
by two things, inspiration and desperation. 
Without that crisis that created the desperation 
I don’t think we would have seen the same 
levels of activity and innovation that we have 
here. That desperation caused our foundations 
and universities to take charge”.
Innovation in Pittsburgh’s voluntary and 
community sector has also been driven by 
need. For example, in 1981, a non-profit 
organisation called the Bethlehem Haven was 
founded in response to the growing need for 
emergency shelter for homeless women. The 
organisation has evolved and now provides a 
comprehensive approach to helping chronically 
homeless women and men in Allegheny 
County. Another such organisation is the 
North Community Hills Outreach Programme, 
a non-profit organisation addressing the needs 
of people suffering from crisis, hardship and 
poverty. This organisation was created in 1987 
following flooding in the North Hills section 
of the city, which mobilised local religious and 
community leaders into working collaboratively 
with civic groups, communities and local 
business.
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5.2 Drivers: Resources from previous wealth 
of region
Pittsburgh’s previous industrial prosperity 
has created one of the America’s most active 
Foundation communities. Modern philanthropy 
is believed to have begun in Pittsburgh, 
with the steel industry’s Andrew Carnegie 
acknowledged as the world’s richest man in 
1901. Carnegie built 3,000 public libraries 
across the world, as well as the Carnegie 
Institute of Pittsburgh, the Carnegie Institute 
of Technology and the Carnegie Institution 
of Washington for research into the natural 
and physical sciences. He wrote in his essay, 
The	Gospel	of	Wealth, that the noblest use 
of his wealth was on the lives of ‘the toilers 
of Pittsburgh’.137 Andrew Carnegie and other 
philanthropists have had a vast impact on 
Pittsburgh’s social welfare, and are thought by 
many of those interviewed to have contributed 
in the creation of a culture of philanthropy in 
the city. 
The existence of a large amount of capital 
for non-profits from foundations is thought 
by many of those interviewed to have driven 
social innovation in the voluntary and 
community sector. For example, the Pittsburgh 
Foundation’s total assets are valued at 
approximately $537 million, with grant-making 
reaching $24 million in 2003. Another such 
source of financial resources is the Sprout 
Fund, a non-profit organisation supporting 
innovative ideas and grassroots community 
projects. The Sprout Fund is currently 
deliberating on a million dollar grant to support 
projects linking to the community in innovative 
ways, called Community Connections. The 
Heinz Endowments have also prioritised social 
innovation, naming social innovation as one of 
their three key goals. 
More recently, as available funding from 
foundations has started to decrease and the 
environment for non-profits has become 
more competitive, some of those interviewed 
said that they felt under increasing pressure 
to suggest more innovative approaches 
and projects in order to continue accessing 
dwindling funding streams.
5.3 Drivers: Collaborative leadership from 
universities and foundations
Pittsburgh’s considerable and active foundation 
community, in collaboration with the city’s 
numerous universities, have provided 
leadership for social innovation in the region. 
With the aim of addressing the needs of 
the city’s people, further accelerated by the 
eighties economic crisis, these agencies have 
worked in partnership to support and develop 
the city’s non-profit sector, benefiting from 
strong informal links between senior officials 
at these establishments. One interview said: “if 
you want to answer the question of why here, 
it’s the universities, the foundations, that’s 
where the real leadership is coming from, and 
they are, always have been working together, 
that’s what’s different”. Another frontline 
worker explained: “It’s the foundations that 
have always been pushing the innovation 
here, in combination with Carnegie Mellon 
University, the academic community and 
the Social Innovation Accelerator, I don’t 
think we’ve had political leadership… the 
government here has been really constrained, 
that created a vacuum during the chaotic 
change and I suppose that allowed the non-
profit sector to take charge”. 
The universities and foundations have worked 
collaboratively, complementing each other’s 
actions. Whilst the foundation community 
finances and guides innovation, the universities 
have attempted to research, train and educate. 
Over 60,000 students are enrolled in colleges 
and universities including the University 
of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University, 
and Robert Morris University. A number of 
these universities have established dedicated 
centres for social innovation or leadership in 
the non-profit sector. Some students have 
started innovative projects whilst studying 
in Pittsburgh. One foundation member 
interviewed enthused: “I think it’s an exciting 
time, we have this group of young, enthusiastic 
people, with all this energy that bring a 
freshness to here, the universities bring these 
people here, we need to work on getting them 
to stay”. 
5.4 Enabler: Support from agencies with an 
interest in social innovation
Social innovation in Pittsburgh has been 
enabled through the support and guidance 
of the different agencies in the city with an 
interest in social innovation. These include 
Pittsburgh’s universities, foundations and the 
Social Innovation Accelerator, all of which have 
attempted to identify existing examples of 
socially innovative organisations and support 
them in succeeding to meet their goals and 
sustaining their operations. These agencies 
have also scaled up and helped to replicate 
the work of successful social entrepreneurs, 
enabling them to spread their benefits. 
5.5 Enablers: Local culture of innovation
Pittsburgh appears to have a history and 
culture of innovation. One interviewee 
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commented: “Pittsburgh has always been 
a hotbed for innovation, if we go to the 
beginning, to the steel industry they were 
innovators, we led that era here in the US”. 
Pittsburgh has also had an innovative history 
of medical research, with Dr Jonas Salk 
introducing the polio vaccine in the city in 
1955. This has continued through innovation 
in healthcare in establishments such as the 
Pittsburgh medical centre and the city’s 
children’s hospital which is one of the first to 
focus on environmental medicine. The city has 
successfully managed a successful transition 
from an industrial steel mill town to one that is 
seen as high-tech, referred to as ‘Roboburgh’ 
and successfully innovating and acting as one 
of the leaders in technological innovation 
connected to robotics. 
6. Summary and conclusions
Pittsburgh displays social innovation in 
a number of fields, including workforce 
development and tackling unemployment. 
Innovation has been mainly found in the 
city’s voluntary and community sector, where 
a vast number of non-profits and grassroots 
organisation have worked closely with local 
communities innovating to meet their needs. 
Innovation has been driven by a number of 
factors, including strong leadership from the 
foundation community and universities and 
agencies. Unlike our other case studies such 
as Lille, Gouda and all of our UK-based case 
studies, the public sector and local government 
have not played a strong role in driving and 
enabling innovation. 
Innovation has also been driven and enabled 
by a high concentration of wealth and potential 
financing for non-profits and social innovation 
from the city’s foundations, built through 
Pittsburgh’s previous prosperity. The trigger 
for innovation was the collapse of the steel 
industry in the eighties.
Pittsburgh has been able successfully to revive 
itself. However, the lack of an overarching 
strategy for social innovation has limited the 
impact of the city’s voluntary and community 
sector. A fragmented and incoherent approach 
to meeting social needs has meant that 
many organisations innovate to meet similar 
needs, resulting in duplication of effort and 
inefficiency. Available funding has sustained 
some organisations which maybe are not 
meeting needs most effectively. This has 
caused a re-evaluation of approach to social 
innovation, with growing pressure to create 
more robust and self-sufficient ventures 
for social innovation, with a new emphasis 
on social enterprise. Greater public sector 
involvement and coordinated efforts including 
Pittsburgh’s many foundation and universities 
could help in the development of a strategic 
and collaborative approach to tackling need in 
the city, and utilising resources effectively. 
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Case study 8: Social innovation, Portland, US (mini case study)
Portland has a reputation of being innovative, with social innovation in a variety of fields. 
Described as the “poster child for regional planning, growth management and a number of 
innovative urban planning policies”, Portland is often cited as one of the most liveable cities 
in the United States and as a model for ‘smart growth’.138 Portland has been described as a 
“city of engaged citizens”, bucking the trend towards declining involvement in civic life in 
the US. Widespread consultation and community engagement has been acknowledged as an 
important driver of innovation in the city and has helped to foster a sense of involvement 
and creative experimentation in the city. 
This innovation is driven and enabled by the following factors:
A culture that embraces innovation as well as pioneering and adopting new ideas and •	
practices. 
Civic participation and strong bottom-up pressures from community activists. •	
Partnerships and collaboration between Portland’s public, private and voluntary/•	
community sectors.
Strong leadership and commitment from the public sector.•	
Background data
Geography: 
Portland is a city located near the confluence •	
of the Willamette and Columbia rivers in the 
US state of Oregon. The city has a total land 
area of 375.3km2.
Population: 
The population of Portland city in 2006 was •	
537,081, with 2,337,565 in the metropolitan 
area. It is Oregon’s most populous city, and 
the third largest city in the Pacific Northwest. 
Though the population is increasing, the 
number of children is diminishing – only 21 
per cent were under the age of 18 in 2000. 
Portland is becoming increasingly racially 
diverse: 78 per cent of the city’s population 
are white, seven per cent African-American 
and six per cent Asian. Portland also has a 
strong lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
population, with one in every seven 
unmarried couples in Multnomah County 
being a same-sex couple. 
Labour market: 
Portland Metropolitan’s unemployment rate •	
in 2006 was comparable to the national 
rate of five per cent. Measured by total 
employment, the size of the Portland 
Metropolitan economy has grown 119 per 
cent since 1975, from 463,000 jobs to 
1,015,200 in 2006. Of those employed in 
Portland, 29 per cent work in services and 25 
per cent in trade. 
Local government structure: 
The Government of Portland is through a •	
city commission. Elected officials include a 
Mayor, a City Council and a City Auditor. The 
Mayor and commissioners (members of City 
Council) are responsible for legislative policy: 
they oversee the various bureaux responsible 
for the day-to-day operation of the city. The 
auditor is responsible for ensuring that the 
government operates in good faith. Each 
elected official serves four-year terms, with 
no maximum number of terms. City Council 
seats, as well as the post of City Auditor, are 
non-partisan, elected positions. The current 
City Mayor is Tom Potter. In May 2007, 
Portland citizens rejected a ballot proposal to 
introduce a more powerful mayoral system; 
similar changes have been rejected several 
times over the years. 
Portland is the county seat of Multnomah •	
County, and the core of Metro, a regional 
government primarily concerned with 
land-use planning. Both these government 
entities strongly impact on city policy . 
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1. Context
Located in the northwestern United States, 
Portland, Oregon has a metropolitan 
population of over two million. It is often cited 
as one of the most liveable American cities and 
as a model for ‘smart growth’, a doctrine that 
promotes dense urban development and public 
transport.139 
As with many US cities, in the post-war 
economic boom, families began moving from 
the city centre into the suburbs, resulting in 
urban decline. In the late sixties and early 
seventies, Portland was not immune to the 
civic unrest that was a feature of US urban life; 
the city suffered strikes and violent clashes 
between protestors and the authorities. After 
the first unrest in the sixties, the emergent 
political leadership sought to harness the 
rising tide of activism rather than resisting 
new forms of collective behaviour. Civic 
activism, with people working together through 
neighbourhood associations and non-profit 
advocacy groups, were encouraged to bring 
about change and social innovation.
The activists who emerged from the sixties 
social movements recognised the need for 
urban rejuvenation and land planning to 
impede further suburban sprawl. In Portland, 
this counter-culture was institutionalised 
with many sixties activists holding prominent 
public office. There were also more advocacy 
art and culture groups, as well as community 
associations. 
Innovation in Portland involves civic 
participation and an emphasis on the city as 
an enjoyable place to live. Urban planning has 
stifled the flight from the metropolitan area 
to the suburbs, while public investment has 
supported environmental sustainability with 
parks and waterfront rejuvenation, improved 
public transportation and social programmes. 
As a result, while many city centres have 
either grown very slowly or declined in recent 
decades, Portland’s city centre has grown 
almost as fast as its suburbs. 
2. Social innovation in Portland
Social innovation in Portland is prevalent 
in different fields and across sectors. This 
innovation appears to centre on issues 
connected to place, particularly with respect 
to the environment, sustainability, urban 
planning, infrastructure and transportation. 
Examples of such social innovation are briefly 
described below.
2.1 Sustainability and the environment
Sustainable living has been a priority in 
Portland for decades; until recently, this has 
meant going against the trend of many other 
US cities. More than 30 years ago, when 
many other American cities were building new 
freeways, Portland was tearing down a six-lane 
expressway to make room for a waterfront 
park. Oregon’s 1971 bottle bill, introduced by 
the governor, Thomas McCall, was the first US 
container deposit legislation to be passed. The 
law required carbonated soft drink and beer 
containers sold in the state to be returnable, 
with a minimum refund value, to reduce litter 
and increase recycling. 
In 1993 Portland became the first US local 
government to adopt a plan to address global 
warming. As a result, the city has limited 
emissions at a time when the local economy 
was expanding. A more recent innovation is 
a plan to penalise builders if they don’t build 
energy-efficient homes. Portland General 
Electric, Oregon’s largest utility, complements 
this environmental enthusiasm by selling more 
kilowatts of renewable power to its residential 
customers than any other utility in the country, 
regardless of size. The Portland market also 
ranks number one in the nation for per capita 
sales of environmentally-friendly hybrid 
vehicles.
The city’s urban growth boundary protects over 
ten million hectares of forest and farmland. 
Portland has started a solid-waste programme 
that recycles more than half of the city’s 
waste. It has also erected more than 50 public 
buildings that meet high environmental and 
sustainability standards set by the US Green 
Building Council. 
Innovation to protect the environment has 
been a collective effort. Citizens and politicians 
have worked together to ensure the city sets 
the standard for an emerging clean technology 
economy. For example, in 1995, voters in the 
Portland metropolitan region passed a regional 
bond measure to acquire valuable natural 
areas for fish, wildlife and people; ten years 
later, more than 3,200 hectares of ecologically 
valuable natural areas had been purchased and 
permanently protected for the public.
Portland’s Office of Sustainable Development 
(OSD) partners with public agencies, 
community organisations, businesses and 
residents to support Portland City Council’s 
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goal of protecting and enhancing the natural 
and built environment. The OSD carries out 
direct work in the community: OSD’s Fix-It-
Fairs deliver money-saving solutions as well as 
healthy, environmentally friendly home, yard 
and garden ideas directly to Portland residents. 
One interviewee remarked how: “even 
businesses are saying, let us differentiate 
ourselves by building green and environmental 
practices”. This shows how an awareness of 
environmental issues is now prevalent across 
Portland’s different sectors, with agencies 
working together to keep Portland at the 
forefront of innovation. The many initiatives 
and projects described also illustrate how 
social innovation to make Portland a ‘green 
city’ involves the whole community, from local 
residents to the leadership of Portland’s public 
and private sectors. 
2.2 Infrastructure and urban planning
Portland has been described as the 
“poster child for regional planning, growth 
management and a number of innovative 
urban planning policies”.140 The city’s approach 
to planning is inclusive. So, the Portland 
Development Commission (PDC), the city’s 
agency for urban renewal, works in partnership 
with the city’s private development community 
and public agencies to support the growth of 
local businesses, to revitalise neighbourhoods 
and to help low-income families to buy or 
repair their homes. 
Urban renewal through the PDC is a state-
authorised redevelopment and finance 
programme that helps communities redevelop 
areas, whether they are rundown, economically 
stagnant, unsafe or poorly planned. Public 
investment is often used to stimulate much 
larger private investment in such urban renewal 
areas. Neighbourhoods are also significantly 
involved in the process. This strategy enables 
Portland to guide private development toward 
public policy goals.
This better planning has produced real benefits 
for the city, with more open space, more 
efficient traffic patterns, better transportation 
options, diversified housing choices, job growth 
and significant crime reduction. 
2.3 Transportation
Portland’s metropolitan population growth 
continues to outpace projections. To help 
accommodate this growth with minimal 
congestion, the City is continuing to build 
a transportation system, which will enable 
travellers to use multiple modes of travel. 
As well as trains, buses and streetcars, there 
will be an aerial tram, a public-use heliport 
and a free transit downtown. More than 60 
per cent of metro Portland’s residents rated 
their transportation system good or excellent, 
compared to only 35 per cent of all Americans. 
Streetcar extensions and other public 
transport improvements have also benefited 
the environment by reducing the demand for 
parking. 
However, the city has also recognised the need 
for low-cost parking to support city centre 
businesses. So it has created SmartPark, which 
provides seven large garages conveniently 
located near shops, restaurants and businesses. 
Shoppers, business clients and visitors are able 
to use seven downtown city SmartParks, with 
nearly 4,000 public spaces. SmartPark partners 
with over 700 businesses to offer free parking 
with purchases. It also invests in other city 
transport improvements.
Cyclists have long revered Portland for its 
bicycle-friendly culture and infrastructure. 
The city began planning its network of bike 
lanes in the early seventies. As a result, a larger 
proportion of Portlanders commute by bicycle 
than in any other large American city – eight 
times the national average, according to the 
U.S. Census Bureau. 
3. Drivers and Enablers of social 
innovation in Portland
3.1 Driver: Culture of civic participation and 
bottom-up pressures from communities and 
activists 
Portland is described as a ‘city of engaged 
citizens’. It is bucking the trend against civic 
engagement in the US. After the first social 
movement unrest in sixties Portland, the 
emergent political leadership harnessed the 
rising tide of activism rather than resisting new 
forms of collective behaviour. One interviewee 
described how activists in Portland were not 
seen as a threat, but as a part of Portland’s 
community. Their voices were therefore heard. 
Early successful examples of participatory 
action bred institutions which solicit citizens’ 
opinions of the citizens. For example, the urban 
stream, Johnson Creek was notorious for its 
poor water quality and degraded habitat. The 
city government produced studies with citizens 
and over 175 non-profit organisations. Though 
a time-consuming approach, their solutions 
were social as well as environmental as citizen 
Ozawa, Connie P. (2004) 140. 
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Challenges and Successes 
in Growing Communities.’ 
Washington: Island Press.
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activists became well-informed amateur 
scientists. 
Portland’s ability to consult its local 
communities and respond to bottom-up 
pressures from activists has driven innovation 
in the area. The subsequent culture of civic 
participation and involvement has also been 
a key driver to innovation, as needs and 
ideas have been successfully communicated 
to Portland’s agencies. Some of Portland’s 
protesters from the seventies are now officials 
in public office, continuing to drive social 
innovation from within. 
Structures have also been created to help 
encourage and continue Portland’s legacy 
of civic participation. The Portland Future 
Focus Policy Committee (established by 
the City of Portland in the nineties) and 
the Coalition for a Livable Future are two 
examples of participative structures designed 
to involve a wide range of individuals in 
developing a coherent vision for the city. 
The Coalition involves 60 activist groups 
working in partnership to drive policy on 
urban growth, focusing on areas such as urban 
design, economic development and affordable 
housing.141 
Much of the innovation seen in Portland has 
been a response to the interests and needs of 
Portland’s communities and groups. They have 
communicated their wishes through structures 
such the Office of Neighbourhood Involvement 
and the Future Focus Policy Committee. The 
city’s Office of Neighbourhood Involvement 
serves as a conduit between city government 
and 95 neighbourhood associations (which 
are grouped into seven coalitions). These 
associations organise training so that citizens 
can understand city budgeting and master 
other bureaucratic issues. The process has led 
to much innovation in fields such as urban 
planning, environmental sustainability and 
transportation. 
This culture of civic participation is now 
embedded in the city. In the nineties, a study 
showed that Portland’s suburbs were two 
to three times ‘more civic’ than comparable 
suburbs, while the city was three to four times 
more civic than other cities. Thirty to thirty-five 
per cent of Portlanders had attended at least 
one public meeting on town affairs, a figure 
three times the US national average of 11 per 
cent. This civic involvement continues to drive 
social innovation in Portland. 
3.2 Enabler: A culture that embraces social 
innovation 
Portland seems to possess a culture that 
embraces social innovation and approaches 
problems differently. As one interviewee said: 
“Oregon used to be the place where all the 
hippies came…they are used to out-of-the-
box thinkers”. The city and state had a history 
of attracting people who wanted to live in a 
place associated with innovation. Thinkers 
such as Governor McCall, who pioneered 
legislation and practices around environmental 
sustainability, helped to create a culture 
of innovation. They placed the city at the 
forefront of the current movement towards 
‘green’ and environmentally-friendly practices. 
This culture of social innovation has been 
sustained through the city’s civic engagement 
and pride in its reputation for innovation. One 
interviewee explained that the city is: “proud 
of being innovative and plain weird”. Indeed, 
many cars are adorned with bumper stickers 
featuring the logo ‘Keep Portland weird’. 
Many organisations have also continued to 
aspire to be innovative. As one individual put 
it, there is a: “thirst for new ideas…openness 
for trying things”. This culture and appetite 
for innovation has enabled much innovation in 
Portland. 
3.3 Enabler: Collaboration between the 
private and public sector
But the city’s social innovation has also been 
enabled by collaboration between the city’s 
public and private sectors. Organisations 
and agencies have worked in partnership to 
implement citywide strategies for innovation. 
Structures have been created to help 
facilitate this collaboration around different 
issues, including the promotion of Portland 
metropolitan region as a vital economic centre. 
Such collaborations include Portland Regional 
Partners for Business, a public-private 
partnership that helps businesses stay, expand 
and recruit. It also produces marketing 
strategies and recommendations for policy 
development. The Portland Future Focus 
Policy Committee has 40 members, including 
business representatives, government officials 
and lay citizens working together to create 
a vision for the community. The PDC also 
works in partnership with the city’s private 
development community and public agencies. 
The collaboration between Portland’s different 
agencies and sectors has enabled innovation by 
helping pool resources, and adopt a city-wide 
strategy for change and innovation. 
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4. Summary and conclusions
Social innovation is apparent in a number 
of different sectors and fields including 
environmental sustainability, urban 
development, planning and transportation. 
This innovation has been driven and enabled 
by a number of common factors, including 
substantial civic participation and engagement, 
with a focus on issues that activists and 
communities prioritise. This culture of civic 
participation has generated bottom-up 
pressures which have driven social innovation.
Wider innovation is enabled through 
effective partnerships between the city’s 
private, public, voluntary and community 
sectors. Structures such as the Portland 
Regional Partners for Business and Portland 
Development Commission have also facilitated 
this collaboration and act as forums to discuss 
innovative ideas and consult with different 
agencies and sectors. Collaboration has 
been identified as a key enabler and driver 
to innovation in almost all our case studies, 
signifying its importance in creating socially 
innovative localities, irrespective of what need 
is being met. 
Whilst there is a great deal of innovation in 
Portland, it is by no means universal. Portland 
has been particularly good at innovating 
around issues connected to ‘place’, such as 
urban development and sustainability. But 
not all populations have been able to benefit 
from this innovation, and there have been 
some concerns that the African-American 
community in Portland has been excluded. 
However some more recent innovations have 
sought to broaden the fields covered, with 
recent projects around new areas such as youth 
homelessness or alternative education to tackle 
high drop-out rates among 14-18 year olds. 
These projects are examples of how Portland 
is looking to sustain its innovative culture and 
evolve into a city which innovates in even more 
fields and sectors. 
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Case study 9: Technological innovation, Cambridge, England (mini case study)
In Cambridge, population growth from the London region together with the emergence 
of new enterprises developed by University of Cambridge staff and students in the sixties 
fuelled the growth of science-based enterprises. Since then, Cambridge has been known for 
its technological innovation, establishing science parks with formal and informal networks to 
sustain this expertise. 
This innovation is driven by the following factors:
Bottom-up pressure from small and medium-sized enterprises in the region.•	
Pressure from the University of Cambridge.•	
Leadership from the University of Cambridge, innovation centres, local businesses and •	
local political leaders.
1. Summary: context and need 
Located in Cambridgeshire in the wider region 
of East England, the ‘Cambridge Cluster’ is 
approximately a 32km radius around the City of 
Cambridge where there are over 1,000 high-
tech companies generating over £1.5 billion in 
revenue a year. The area has been historically 
dominated by the University of Cambridge. 
Until the 1960s, Cambridgeshire was a wealthy 
agricultural region, with a small dispersed 
population and poor transport links to the 
rest of the United Kingdom. In the sixties, 
people began moving into the area from an 
overcrowded London. Between 1960 and 1981, 
the population increased by 28 per cent.142 
Even though the County Council sought to 
limit new large-scale production activity with 
planning controls, new small and medium-sized 
enterprises began to spring up in the area 
during the sixties and seventies. This growing 
population and economic activity, together 
with the indigenous growth of a small business 
community from the University, placed 
increased pressures on local employment, 
housing and transport. 
The 1967 Mott Report, published by a 
sub-committee of the University Senate, 
recommended a science park for the growth 
and development of the new enterprises. The 
science park would specialise in the production 
of high-tech manufactured goods and services. 
Cambridge City Council and local employers 
backed the idea, seeing in it an opportunity to 
address local housing problems and a shortage 
of skilled workers. With such consensus – a 
rarity in an area noted for its political infighting 
– Cambridge Science Park was established on 
land owned by Trinity College in 1970. 
This science park acted as a catalyst for 
innovation, encouraging the clustering 
of high-tech activity. Its success led local 
entrepreneurs, politicians and university leaders 
to recognise the need for further collaboration. 
It also encouraged greater support for 
businesses and infrastructural maintenance 
from local and central government. 
2. Innovation strategy 
The success of high-tech clusters like Silicon 
Valley in California served as a model for 
industrial revitalisation in Cambridge. High-
tech clusters are agglomerations of inter-
related industries in an area engaging in 
building an educated and trained workforce, 
creating networks of suppliers, knowledge 
diffusion, and venture capital availability. 
Clusters can affect the competitive advantage 
of an area by increasing the productivity of 
businesses within the cluster, encourage new 
start-ups, and drive innovation.143 
A high-tech cluster has emerged around 
Cambridge based on collective interactions 
within the universities, the geographical 
proximity of London and Oxford, organisational 
re-configuration with the growth of small 
businesses and new linkages like the 
Cambridge Network.144 
The main sectoral innovation in Cambridge 
has been high-tech companies specialising in 
computing, electronics, scientific instruments, 
technology consultancy, telecommunications, 
and most recently, biotechnology. These new 
companies concentrate on research, design, 
and development rather than production. This 
focus enhances their production value and is 
more valuable to the economy. 
3. Innovation process – Technological 
innovation
3.1 Creating a consensus for innovation
In the late sixties, the University, local authority 
leaders and employers reached a consensus 
that the future of the economy depended 
on forming an industrial cluster to support 
more high-tech innovation from University 
students and staff. This meant creating a 
new infrastructure, and the first step was the 
establishment of the Cambridge Science Park 
by Trinity College in 1970.
The new park triggered the growth of more 
science-based businesses, consultancy firms, 
innovation centres and investment. The 
emergence of this high-tech cluster was first 
highlighted in the mid-eighties with the Segal, 
Quince, and Partners report, The	Cambridge	
Phenomenon. Their report documented the 
cluster’s growth and confirmed that ‘something 
new’ was happening in Cambridge involving 
high-tech industry and the University. 
In the late nineties, a second ‘phenomenon’ 
was believed to be taking place around 
telecommunications and biotechnology. Segal, 
Quince and Wicksteed prepared another report, 
The	Cambridge	Phenomenon	Revisited, which 
gave an updated overview of the cluster and 
criticised the lack of support from central 
government to supply the necessary physical 
infrastructure. 
Following this second report, there was 
agreement between the University and business 
leaders that further planning was needed to 
sustain the significant growth of the high-
tech area. One result was the establishment in 
1998 of the Greater Cambridge Partnership, 
an umbrella organisation of public and private 
sector interests. This initiative has produced 
other partnerships and studies about issues 
such as land use, transport systems as well 
as collaboration between the University and 
industry. 
The relationships between local authorities 
and greater partnerships within the local area 
have since been evolving. For instance, the 
East of England Development Agency (EEDA) 
has been described as having: “an increased 
role in channelling funding from central 
Government”.145 These finances now come from 
a ‘Single Programme’ combining funds from 
various Government departments to develop 
the economy and support businesses. 
3.2 Creating structures for innovation
The consensus reached around the 
Science Park and the need for subsequent 
infrastructural developments generated 
numerous physical innovations and networks in 
the Cambridge Cluster. These structures have 
been described as ‘constructive chaos’, where 
new initiatives continually emerge as no one 
group organises the cluster.146 
The universities in the area have had a 
particularly important role as traditional 
suppliers of an educated workforce. They have 
also encouraged innovation, launched networks 
linking high-tech activity and business and 
given institutional support. Trinity College’s 
land was the site of the first science park and 
the University of Cambridge has organised 
various forums and conferences for business 
networking. 
Various other networks and incubators provide 
the growth and sustainability of Cambridge. 
For example, St John’s Innovation Centre, 
established with funding by Barclays Bank 
in 1987, provides business support and 
accommodation for early-stage companies. 
Cambridge Network links its members to a 
collective resource, enabling further diffusion 
of ideas and innovation. 
4. Outcomes
In 1978, there were around 20 high-tech 
companies in Cambridge. Since then the cluster 
has grown extensively and by 2006 the area 
was home to over 1,500 high-tech enterprises 
employing around 45,000 people.147 Large 
multi-national companies recently establishing 
a presence in Cambridge have included 
Microsoft, which made the city its European 
headquarters.
The area has been recognised as one of 
the world’s leading high-tech clusters. The 
European Commission has hailed its excellence 
as an innovative region and its support for 
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high-tech start-ups. Newsweek magazine 
ranked Cambridge in 1998 as one of the most 
ground-breaking clusters in the world.148 
But interviewees reported that the area has 
recently stalled in growth. This is confirmed by 
the statistics: in 2005, “£125m was invested in 
companies in the Cluster compared to £154m 
and £133m in 2004 and 2003 respectively”.149 
However, the Cambridge Cluster continues to 
be a well-established centre of innovation, 
accounting for 12 per cent of venture 
capital investment in the UK in 2005, and 
approximately five per cent of overall European 
venture capital investment.150 
The area has no shortage of human and 
financial resources, formal and informal 
networks, or experienced business people. 
Various leaders in the University, research 
institutes, innovation centres and firms have 
criticised the lack of infrastructure support 
from local and central government. They 
want the Cambridge Cluster to meet global 
competition by evolving into a ‘Supercluster’, 
comprising Cambridge, Oxford, Reading, and 
London.151 
5. Analysis: drivers and enablers of 
technological innovation in Cambridge
5.1 Driver: Bottom-up pressure from 
enterprises 
In the late sixties and early seventies, there 
was a significant population and economic 
movement from London to Cambridge. There 
was also a significant indigenous growth of 
new small and medium-sized enterprises in 
the area. These developments put pressure 
on the local authorities to improve the local 
infrastructure and create more affordable 
housing. 
The growth of new businesses also encouraged 
other entrepreneurs to create high-tech 
enterprises and drive technological innovation. 
These small businesses have shown themselves 
to be more likely to take risks to innovate, 
collaborate with other businesses and use 
external business advice. One reason cited 
for this is the higher degree of trust between 
businesses in the Cambridge area.152 
5.2 Driver: Bottom-up pressure from the 
University of Cambridge
The University of Cambridge has played 
an enormous role in driving technological 
innovation, drawing on its international 
reputation for academic excellence, scientific 
discovery and invention. Liberal intellectual 
property rights at the University were an 
important factor in the creation and diffusion 
of most original innovation in Cambridge. 
Staff and students could take risks in using 
knowledge learned and created at the 
University and exploit it in new businesses. As 
a result, “the University of Cambridge people 
and technology have been at the heart of over 
300 new high-tech ventures in the past ten 
years, many of which now lead their industry 
sectors”.153 
The University continues to be a fundamental 
incubator for innovation. Institutional support 
for technological innovation has been 
through the increase in science parks and 
innovation centres, which have been primarily 
established by the Cambridge Colleges. 
The recent establishment of the Cambridge 
Entrepreneurship Centre demonstrates the 
dedicated role of the University in driving the 
relationship between high-tech activity and 
business. 
5.3 Driver: Leadership
The consensus that economic prosperity relies 
on infrastructural and network support for new 
enterprises has been driven by leaders from the 
University of Cambridge, innovation centres, as 
well as business and local political leaders. The 
‘constructive chaos’ of the Cambridge Cluster 
evolved from the need for spatial distribution 
of high-tech activity. This led to the formation 
of groups like the Greater Cambridge 
Partnership and Cambridge Network. Their 
policy and strategy continue to reflect liberal 
approaches to business and infrastructural 
maintenance, and their credibility is illustrated 
by their ability to organise and lobby the 
government. 
5.4 Enabler: Human and financial resources
The availability of human and financial 
resources has enabled the growth and 
sustainability of technological innovation in the 
Cambridge area. 
Cambridge has had significant human resources 
from the local universities. Many students wish 
to stay and start their own businesses or work 
for an already established firm. The University 
of Cambridge and innovation centres like St 
John’s Innovation Centre provide staff and 
students with entrepreneurial skills that enable 
them to succeed in the cluster. 
Thirty years ago, when the cluster first started, 
there were insufficient finances to fund 
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potential start-ups. Barclays Bank was one of 
the first to fill this gap by supplying financial 
backing. Since then, the area has rarely had 
a shortage of venture capitalists and angel 
funds and central government has provided tax 
incentives to businesses and research grants to 
research councils and university departments. 
5.5 Enabler: Networks and informal 
relationships
Social networking and open labour markets, 
where individuals can pursue their ideas and 
collaborate with others, have encouraged 
technological innovation. The sense of 
community created by the concentration 
of like-minded individuals has meant that 
different actors are more willing to collaborate 
by helping others and sharing knowledge. The 
Cambridge Cluster has developed networking 
and information institutions such as the 
Cambridge Network and Cambridge High-
tech Association of Small Enterprises (CHASE) 
and various forums for considering the future 
of the area including the Greater Cambridge 
Partnership.
6. Summary and conclusions
The high-tech clustering and technological 
innovation in the Cambridge area has been 
driven by a combination of factors. In 
the sixties, the recognition by university, 
local authority and business leaders that 
economic growth depended on the growth of 
science-based enterprises contributed to the 
establishment of science parks. It also spawned 
new formal and informal networks. The need 
for this development was re-enforced by the 
population increase from the London region 
and the emergence of new enterprises by 
University of Cambridge staff and students, 
which put employment and housing pressures 
on the area. 
The strategy to support the clustering of 
high-tech activity was a process modelled on 
the success of other high-tech clusters like 
Silicon Valley. The process involved nurturing 
the development of enterprises in the area 
by creating an environment conducive to 
knowledge diffusion with science parks and 
innovation centres, while also supplying 
improved transportation and housing. Human 
resources, especially with the University, and 
financial resources provided by banks, venture 
capitalists and government grants, enabled the 
Cambridge Cluster to sustain its growth. 
Although interviews and recent reports 
voice concern over the area’s stalled growth, 
Cambridge has no shortage of resources, 
networks, and experienced leaders. The factors 
which helped make the Cambridge Cluster 
one of the most important high-tech bases in 
the world over the last 30 years continue to 
support the area’s growth and innovation. 
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Case study 10: An experiment in using Social Network Analysis as a tool for 
understanding social innovation
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a method for mapping networks of influence and trust 
within and across organisations, partnerships and communities. It helps to identify the key 
relationships, including the individuals who make collaboration work in practice, as well as 
the key blockages. SNA has the potential to reveal some of the dynamics of innovation, 
and why otherwise similar areas perform very differently in response to threats and 
opportunities. An experimental case study was therefore conducted in a local authority area 
in the UK that is known for innovation in education. 
The purpose was twofold: to explore the effectiveness of SNA as a diagnostic tool in 
illuminating (or contradicting) the broader findings of this study; and to explore how this 
technique could be used by agencies to help understand the circumstances fuelling or 
frustrating innovation and to support them to develop strategies to tackle any identified 
problems. 
The case study confirmed that the method offers a different and important perspective 
on the relationships and networks that underpin innovation. It exposed relationships and 
networks that are unlikely to have been revealed by traditional research methods. The 
exercise confirmed what would be expected in the area given its stage of innovation, but 
pointed to possible weaknesses in future sustainability. It found that:
the locality has a high level of networking around innovation compared to other areas;•	
there are strong networks for seeking new ideas, and many individuals act as hubs, •	
pulsetakers and gatekeepers. The strength of the networks is high given the early stage in 
the social innovation lifecycle. A significant contributing factor may be the high perceived 
level of risk involved as services go through a major transformation;
the local authority and a number of schools are central to innovation networks and •	
are leading the innovation process. The same core group of individuals, including 
local authority officers and head teachers, were consistently identified across all seven 
networks. This is a strength but could also indicate the existence of a dominant and 
exclusive clique; and
the voluntary and community sector, student council and residents appear to be outside •	
the core networks of influence. This could be either because they are weak or because 
they are being excluded. This may not pose a problem for implementation at present but 
could undermine future sustainability, if the current core group leave their current posts. 
1. Background
Different models of network analysis have been 
used in the United States since the 1970s154 
and even earlier in community studies in 
England in the 1950s.155 
Early pioneers of the field156 focused on 
identifying the important connectors in a 
network and assessing their value to the 
network in terms of mathematical prediction157 
or social capital.158 However, these approaches 
did not take into account the impact of 
different types of networks.
The SNA model used in this experimental case 
study has been developed by an American 
anthropologist DrKaren Stephenson, who has 
worked widely with the public and private 
sectors in the US. Working with Jeremy 
Hawkins, she has also collaborated with the UK 
Government – the Home Office, Cabinet Office 
and Communities and Local Government (CLG) 
– and the method has been used in 13 localities 
in five regions in the UK, primarily to explore 
relationships within multi-agency teams and 
Local Strategic Partnerships. It has not however 
been used to identify innovation in multi-
agency partnerships until this experimental case 
study.159 A parallel study has been completed 
by the Young Foundation and Jeremy Hawkins 
applying the method to relationships in a local 
community (in north Norfolk).
2. What is SNA?
SNA is designed to map how networks 
of influence flow through and between 
individuals, organisations, partnerships and 
communities and whether or not they are 
aligned with the ‘will’ of the agency (or 
partnership, or community). This analytical 
process maps the informal connections among 
key stakeholders and identifies individuals – 
‘key connectors’ – who hold pivotal positions 
within these networks. 
SNA (coupled with structured and semi-
structured interviews for validation) is a 
recognised academic approach for diagnosing 
what is informally unfolding ‘on the ground’.160 
One senior human resources executive 
at Merrill Lynch & Company during the 
late 1990s, who commissioned Professor 
Stephenson for a study of the company’s 
human resources function described social 
network analysis as “a high-level MRI of the 
organization”.161 
2.1 The relationship between networks and 
hierarchies
SNA concentrates on analysis of the networks – 
both overt and covert – within organisations or 
partnerships that exist in parallel with traditional 
hierarchical structures. The thesis of much of the 
work in this field is that hierarchies and networks 
influence each other and evolve in tandem.162 
Figure C2 shows, on the left, a typical 
organogram or hierarchical chart for an 
organisation. This traditionally enables 
employees and external observers to assess 
status and career achievement and through 
this understand how the agency works. Each 
rectangular box represents a person or team 
of people and the lines drawn between them 
represent the accepted formal lines of authority 
through which requests and/or orders are given 
and information in response to those requests 
and orders is passed. The box at the top is the 
‘leader’. 
The image to the right in the figure is a network 
representing the informal ways in which people 
get their jobs done but which often are unseen 
at senior levels. The black boxes or ‘nodes’ 
represent individuals and the lines connecting 
them are their responses to a survey asking them 
who they work with on a daily, trusted basis. 
If such networks are not recognised they will be 
invisible, unrecognised and undervalued, with 
the potential to derail strategic plans. Mapping 
these networks can add value: if individuals 
within networks are recognised and rewarded 
then a complementary shadow system can be 
created that is aligned with the overall direction 
of the enterprise – single or multi-agency 
– enabling greater efficiencies and overall 
effectiveness. 
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2.2 The SNA process
The SNA process is web-based. A sample 
of informants is selected, and all are asked 
to complete an online survey. SNA maps 
and charts are generated from this data, 
and findings are analysed working closely 
with individuals involved in the survey to 
contextualise the results.
Each individual that responds to the survey 
produces what is called an ‘egocentric’ network 
– the unique connections emanating from their 
particular ‘node’. NetForm® then aggregates 
each unique individual egocentric network 
into one large (partnership, community or 
organisational) network. What any one person 
imagines as ‘their network’ may appear very 
differently when viewed at a strategic level. 
Individuals can then be shown to play different 
roles:163 
Hubs•	  are people who have many direct ties 
with people; they know everyone. They are 
shown as yellow nodes.
Gatekeepers•	  are connected to few people, 
but a ‘strategic few’. They know the ‘right’ 
people. They are the green nodes.
Pulsetakers•	  are connected to many people 
but not through direct links, like the Hub, 
but through indirect links. They know the 
people who know the right people. They are 
the red nodes. 
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Step1
Select Sample
Sample must include
all people involved in
the innovation in
different agencies and
on different levels
The list is circulated 
to ensure all relevant
people are included
Step2
Online Questionnaire
Sample completes
online survey about
who they interact with
for decision-making,
expert advice, seeking 
new idea, keeping up 
to date etc.
Step3
Generation of SNA
maps and charts
Survey results are used
to generate maps
showing interaction,
analyse social capital
and identify the
different roles 
individuals may take 
within the networks
Step4
Analysis of findings
Analysis of data by
consultants using
insight and support
from individuals
involved in the 
survey who can 
provide context to 
the findings
Pulsetaker
Pulsetaker
GatekeeperHub
Figure C3: Flow chart of a typical SNA process
Figure C4: The network key connector model
Source: NetForm®
Networks are analysed using the NetForm® 
software, and key connectors emerge and are 
identified. Although everyone surveyed will 
have some connections, individuals in any 
workplace or structure will be connected very 
differently. The top five per cent of these are 
shown as coloured nodes in the analysis. 
2.3 The ‘seven pillars’ of knowledge 
The particular brand of SNA used by Netform® 
Social Network Analysis164 is based on a 
hierarchy of knowledge and the way key 
networks of knowledge align in practice. For 
example, when innovation is not aligned with 
expertise, this produces a healthy tension. On 
the other hand, when strategy is not aligned 
with decision-making this produces a lack 
of confidence in leaders, which can lead to 
malaise and disengagement. These and other 
correlations are the basis of the predictive 
algorithms from which seven types of networks 
have been derived. Each network generates the 
questions which are core to each SNA survey, 
albeit adapted to different circumstances and 
needs. The excerpt below explains in more 
detail how the networks function.165 
The Work Network: with whom do •	
you exchange information as part of 
your daily work routines? The everyday 
contacts of routinised operations represent 
the habitual, mundane ‘resting pulse’ of a 
culture. “The functions and dysfunctions; 
the favors and flaws always become evident 
here,” says Professor Stephenson.
The Social Network: with whom do you •	
‘check in’, inside and outside the office, 
to find out what is going on? This is 
important, primarily as an indicator of trust 
within a culture. Healthy organisations are 
those whose numbers fall within a normative 
range, with enough social ‘tensile strength’ 
to withstand stress and uncertainty, but not 
so much that they are overdemanding of 
people’s personal time and invested social 
capital.
The Innovation Network: with whom •	
do you collaborate or kick around new 
ideas? There is a guilelessness and childlike 
wonderment to conversations conducted in 
this network, as people talk openly about 
their perceptions, ideas, and experiments. 
For instance, “Why do we use four separate 
assembly lines where three would do?” Or, 
“Hey, let’s try it and see what happens!” Key 
people in this network take a dim view of 
tradition and may clash with the keepers of 
corporate lore and expertise, dismissing them 
as relics. 
The Expert Knowledge Network: to •	
whom do you turn for expertise or 
advice? Organisations have core networks 
whose key members hold the critical and 
established, yet tacit, knowledge of the 
enterprise. Like the Coca-Cola formula, 
this kind of knowledge is frequently kept 
secret. Key people in this network are often 
threatened by innovation; they’re likely to 
clash with innovators and think of them as 
“undisciplined”.
The Career Guidance or Strategic •	
Network: to whom do you go for advice 
about the future? If people tend to rely on 
others in the same company for mentoring 
and career guidance, then that in itself 
indicates a high level of trust. This network 
often directly influences corporate strategy; 
decisions about careers and strategic moves, 
after all, are both focused on the future. 
The Learning Network: whom do you •	
work with to improve existing processes 
or methods? Key people in this network 
may end up as bridges between hubs in the 
expert and innovation networks, translating 
between the old guard and the new. Since 
most people are afraid of genuine change, 
this network tends to lie dormant until the 
change awakens a renewed sense of trust. “It 
takes a tough kind of love”, says Professor 
Stephenson, “to entrust people to tell you 
what they know about your established 
habits, rules and practices”.
2.4 Generating ‘social capital’ reports
In this context, ‘social capital’ will be held by 
a relatively small number of key connectors 
who transmit their knowledge through their 
trusted relationships. As this information is tacit 
and not explicit, there is rarely any record or 
documentation of its existence. It can however 
be captured by tracking the traces of informal 
communication using a technique such as SNA 
which looks beyond people’s perceptions and 
understandings of what is known.
Analysis of the networks is combined with 
findings on the key connectors to produce a 
series of social capital reports. These identify 
key individuals, who are categorised as:
Kleiner, A. (2002) Karen 164. 
Stephenson’s Quantum 
Theory of Trust. ‘Strategy 
+ Business.’ Issue 29, Q4, 
3:14; and K. Stephenson 
(2007) The Community 
Network Solution. 
‘Strategy+Business.’ Issue 
49, Q4, 32:7.
Kleiner, A. (2002) Karen 165. 
Stephenson’s Quantum 
Theory of Trust. ‘Strategy 
+ Business.’ Issue 29, Q4, 
3:14.
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leaders•	  – both potential and recognised 
leaders; 
mentors and mentees•	  – who provide or 
seek expert advice, professional development 
or coaching;
problem solvers•	  – including innovators or 
implementers; and
rising stars•	  – individuals who have great 
potential to be outstanding in their fields. 
The contention is that identifying these 
individuals will help inform and direct 
organisational development; improve 
organisational, team and individual 
performance through improved planning and 
decision-making; and result in considerable 
time and resource savings. 
An important dimension of networks that 
must be borne in mind is their density. 
There needs to be enough connection to be 
sustainable, however high levels of connection 
can suggest the existence of a clique or cartel 
which can block or kill innovation. The 400 
case database established by NetForm® over 
30 years has determined normative ranges 
(which are constantly updated with each 
analysis performed). When network densities 
fall outside the normative ranges, a software 
flag is raised prompting further investigation to 
explore whether there is some form of conflict 
or collusion.
3. SNA and local social innovation
3.1 Informal and formal networks are critical 
to local social innovation 
The experimental case study exercise began 
with the hypothesis that SNA in general and 
NetForm® network analysis in particular can be 
a useful tool in understanding and accelerating 
innovation. In particular, in how it could be 
used to explore the intricacies and subtleties of 
communication networks and the relationships 
and interactions that may be driving forward 
social innovation in an area. 
The case study findings as well as literature 
reviews have highlighted the need for both 
internal and external networks to exist 
at a variety of levels in order to sustain 
collaboration. The other case studies 
carried out through this research exposed 
different patterns of networks underpinning 
innovation: in Pittsburgh, for example, strong 
networks between foundations and third 
sector organisations were key in stimulating 
innovation. In Lille, strong networks connected 
to the Métropole legitimised and strengthened 
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(individuals, service users, 
neighbourhoods) 
Figure C5: Visualising a local innovation system
Source: The Young Foundation/NESTA (2007)
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Available at: http://www.
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[Accessed January 2008].
by political leadership were critical in 
sustaining innovation. In South Tyneside, the 
strengthening of networks amongst frontline 
staff to initiate and share ideas was very 
important in their service transformation.
Analysis of the case studies highlighted the 
importance of networks, of collaboration, 
communication and consultation, to create 
the processes and synergies that are needed 
for innovation to flow, as illustrated in Figure 
C5. The hope was that SNA would enable a 
fuller exploration of the relationships that may 
facilitate or obstruct social innovation. 
3.2 Frequent two-way communication 
is critical for creating an innovative 
organisational culture
The broader literature also stresses the 
importance of communication. For example, 
insight into communication networks can 
also indicate the state of cultural health of 
a local area, agency or organisation.166 Also, 
an innovative organisational culture will tend 
to include influential boundary spanners or 
gatekeepers to enable the free flow of ideas 
between departments and organisations – see 
Figure C6 below. 
3.3 A NetForm® SNA of an economic region 
in the US
A previous NetForm® SNA of community effort 
in the US illustrates how the SNA process 
was used to build sustainable innovation and 
leadership networks in the Philadelphia region, 
an area that is home to approximately five 
million US citizens.168 
Philadelphia was the first capital of the US, 
the place where Benjamin Franklin led 13 
independent colonies in unity against colonial 
rule. This legacy of rising to the challenge in 
difficult circumstances has become tarnished 
in recent history, which has seen rising crime, 
graft and serial corruption charges against a 
long line of elected officials. 
SNA was used to scan the economic region 
for its hidden connectors. Two newspapers – 
previously more known for competition than 
collaboration – worked together and asked 
their readers to nominate their ‘hidden leaders’ 
through a SNA survey. Leading community 
organisations helped broadcast the message 
to their constituencies. Five thousand names 
were suggested and of the five thousand, two 
hundred names emerged as the top nominees. 
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Figure C6: Chesbrough’s model of open innovation showing boundary spanners167
Further analysis of the data established a 
‘working population’ of 101 individuals. This 
phase of the project corresponds to Step 1 in 
Figure C3 – determining the population size. 
Once the 101 were contacted, they were then 
extensively interviewed as well as asked to 
complete a second survey, a NetForm® SNA 
questionnaire consisting of four questions 
modified from the initial seven questions. 
Figure C7 contains a sampling of the maps 
obtained from this second survey. The 101 
‘hidden leaders’ naturally divided into four 
categories: the not-for-profit sector (the largest 
sector), the for-profit, private or corporate 
sector (the next to largest sector), government 
and academia (the smallest sector) – see 
Section A.
Section B shows collaboration across the 
boundaries of each sector. Noticeable in 
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Figure C7: Networks and connectors in Philadelphia
Section A
Section B
Section C
Section A (top): the template; section B (middle): the inter- and intra-expertise network; 
Section C (bottom): the intra-innovation network among the different sectors of not-for 
profit, private, government and academia.
Section B is the lack of connection between 
government and academia. This prompted a 
further analysis showing how the connections 
within each sector work, shown in Section 
C. Also shown are the locations of the key 
connectors (shown in yellow, green and 
red circles, indicating respectively hubs, 
gatekeepers and pulsetakers). 
Section C illustrates strong connections within 
and between the not-for-profit and private 
sectors. Further investigation established that 
the paucity of communication among the two 
smallest sectors – government and academia – 
is not explained by the smaller numbers but by 
the impact of competition for limited resources. 
However academics did play a significant role 
in forging the early networks among the not-
for-profit and private sectors, the majority of 
whom were educated in the region and who 
later returned to Philadelphia with aspirations 
to ‘make a difference’. 
Although it was not established definitively, 
it was suggested that there was something 
in the way people were connected early in 
their college and post-graduate schooling 
that stayed with them and brought them 
back to Philadelphia. It emerged that the 
majority of the connectors were not native to 
the area, which was an unexpected insight. In 
the majority of US cities the core connectors 
linking the most significant networks are native 
to the city – and tend to exert a paternalistic 
influence over who is influential in civic affairs. 
This was not the case in Philadelphia.
It is still unclear what the impact of this 
exercise is in the medium to long term, or what 
happens when key connectors are identified 
and provided with additional opportunity 
to be connected. A few early examples have 
emerged of positive impact; whether these are 
sustainable or not remains to be seen:
Chris Satullo, the Philadelphia Inquirer •	
columnist, now runs workshops with key 
connectors on city improvement.
Groups of key connectors have •	
spontaneously collaborated on a number of 
city projects.
Leadership Philadelphia (a long-standing •	
organisation set up to mobilise private sector 
involvement in civic activities) has develop 
a new leadership competency model for 
use in continuing adult education in civic 
leadership.
The model has been adapted to teach high •	
school students across the Philadelphia 
region before they enter college and 
graduate school about the advantages of 
‘connecting’ as leaders, a competency that is 
currently not taught in traditional leadership 
courses in public policy and business schools.
4. SNA of one UK socially innovative 
locality
4.1 The case study
An SNA of a UK local authority which is known 
for innovation in education was conducted as 
an experimental pilot. The survey of individuals 
involved in education was carried out in 
Autumn 2007. Ninety-two respondents from 
the private, statutory, voluntary and community 
sectors completed the survey, including 
representatives from other local authorities 
with an interest in the new developments, 
cross-sector partnerships and some individual 
residents. This was a 67 per cent response rate.
In this experimental case study, SNA was used 
to explore the relationships between different 
stakeholders involved in the change agenda, 
to identify how informal and formal networks 
operate, the strength of these networks and 
the role they play in supporting local social 
innovation. The questions focused on the seven 
different networks that are important to the 
NetForm® approach.
The results have been anonymised so that 
they may be generalised for broader use. 
This area is at a relatively early stage in the 
innovation cycle, however already large 
amounts of investment have been committed 
to implementation. It would therefore be 
expected that networks supporting innovation 
may show some instability because of their 
relative newness, and that there may be some 
anxiety amongst key individuals because of the 
high exposure to risk.
4.2 The findings
Figure C8 is divided into two sections, A 
and B. Section A is the generic template 
showing the layout location of the various 
stakeholders (local authority in upper left, 
schools and colleges in upper right; voluntary 
and community sector, student council and 
residents are the groups below). Section 
B displays the two-way ties of innovation 
identified through answers to the question 
“whom do you seek out regarding new ideas 
and novel approaches?”
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4.3 Emerging messages
4.3.1 The locality has a high level of 
networking around innovation compared to 
other areas
The locality exhibited a high level of 
networking – compared to other authorities 
analysed in the UK. Compared to other surveys, 
a high proportion of people are actively 
seeking ideas and innovative solutions. This 
is illustrated by the relatively high density of 
connection between the local authority and 
schools and colleges in Figure C9. Figure C10 is 
taken from another local authority where there 
is a paucity of innovation. 
The presence of good innovative ideas does 
not necessarily guarantee good networking, 
but here there is evidence that in this area 
innovation is well rooted in relationships and 
networks. However, the existence of good 
networking does not by itself directly lead 
to or guarantee an innovative programme or 
initiative, or the successful implementation of 
the innovation. 
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Figure C8: Networks and connections in the cas  study
Section A
Section B
Section A is the template showing key connectors (yellow, green and red circles denoting 
respectively hubs, gatekeepers and pulsetakers). Section B shows the inter- and intra-
innovation network across all sectors.
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Figure C9: Networks connected to innovation in the locality
4.3.2 The local authority has strong internal 
networks for seeking new ideas, and 
includes many individuals acting as hubs, 
pulsetakers and gatekeepers 
Figure C11 shows the internal networks within 
the local authority. The map indicates that 
this network is not nascent but consists of 
significant and mature networking abilities, 
particularly regarding innovation and new 
ideas. This is shown in two ways: by the 
existence of connections (blue lines) between 
different individuals within the local authority 
and more importantly by the existence of 
a significant number of hubs, pulsetakers 
and gatekeepers identified within the local 
authority. This included both senior and 
frontline staff.
The number of hubs, pulsetakers and 
gatekeepers is critical within this. If an 
individual is identified as one of the five 
per cent of key connectors it requires that 
they are not only directly connected with 
many individuals but also ‘strategically’ 
connected (either directly or indirectly) to 
other key connected individuals. This form of 
direct and indirect connection is impossible 
to ‘manipulate’ by any one person (largely 
because people tend to only see their direct 
connections, not their indirect connections) but 
arises out of a collective sense of who to trust, 
or who can be depended on to carry a good 
idea and make it happen. 
The strength of this network is high given the 
early stage in the social innovation lifecycle 
(see Figure 1 of the main report). A significant 
contributing factor to this is likely to be the 
scale of the changes happening to services.
4.3.3 The local authority and a number of 
schools are central to innovation networks 
and are leading the innovation process
The local authority and the schools and 
colleges form the ‘real’ network for innovation 
in the locality. The local authority appears to 
have strong connections between internal 
decision-makers and frontline staff which have 
assisted in and helped to drive innovation.
A consistent pattern across all seven identified 
networks shown in Figure C12 demonstrates 
the existence of a core group of individuals 
including local authority officers as well as a 
number of head teachers – these are the key 
figures in all seven networks. In the context 
of this case study, both the scale of service 
transformation and the need to manage 
the risk of a high profile capital programme 
are likely to be important in explaining the 
strength of the core group.
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Figure C11: Networks within the local authority for seeking new ideas
Figure C12: A consistent pattern across all seven networks
These individuals are crucial to the locality’s 
innovation networks, in terms of seeking 
and promoting new ideas, making decisions 
and communicating about day-to-day work. 
Much of the locality’s social capital or tacit 
knowledge around innovation is concentrated 
in this core group of individuals. 
In the case study, the strength of networks 
within the local authority itself was less 
surprising – although many comparable local 
authorities and other large organisations 
struggle with their internal relationships. 
The strong relationships with many schools, 
however, indicate high levels of social capital. 
The danger of this is if these individuals 
dominate thinking and relationships and come 
to act as a clique or cartel, controlling the 
implementation of ideas and making it difficult 
for people outside this network to put forward 
suggestions. It also raises questions about 
the schools that are not part of the networks 
driving innovation – do they feel excluded by 
the strength of the core group or is it simply 
that they are less interested or involved in the 
development of new thinking? Further detailed 
analysis with survey participants is needed to 
answer this question.
4.3.4 The voluntary and community sector, 
student council and residents appear to be 
outside the core networks of influence in 
the locality
Network analysis shows both the flow of 
information and ideas within the centre of 
any agency or partnership, and also indicates 
how ideas are allowed to flow in from 
external agencies or individuals. Any core 
group of individuals must be receptive to 
external information and ideas but here some 
vulnerabilities were identified in the case study.
The maps show that voluntary and community 
sector organisations are not included in 
identified networks. This suggests that the 
influence and decision-making power of this 
sector is limited and that these organisations 
are not assuming an active role in influencing, 
sharing and participating in innovation. They 
were also found to be failing to network well 
with each other. This could be either because 
the sector’s capacity is weak – because it is 
being excluded from conversations – or a 
combination of the two.
In this locality, the two lowest levels of the 
system (the public and grassroots levels) 
are also poorly connected to the higher 
levels. For example, views were sought from 
members of the Student Council but none 
completed the survey. This finding is consistent 
with comparable SNAs of other areas and 
is probably linked to the weakness of the 
voluntary and third sector within networks. It 
is often found in the UK that local authorities 
‘dominate’ the innovation process, and tend 
to isolate the voluntary and community sector, 
the sector which is most likely to connect 
innovation to residents and consumer voice.
The implications of this finding could suggest 
that the local authority and schools are not 
exploiting the potential of others to input ideas 
and suggestions into innovation; that they 
are missing opportunities to involve the user 
perspective; and that their ideas are failing to 
influence all the agencies they should (which 
could lead to failure to understand the need for 
change or at worst active blocking of new ideas 
and initiatives). However it could be that at this 
stage of innovation they do not actually need 
to involve service users in order to progress. 
The finding could become more significant in 
the future: if some of the current core group 
leave their current jobs and support for the 
innovation is not widely embedded in the area, 
the innovation may come to lack champions 
and its sustainability may be threatened. It also 
limits the sources for the new ideas which will 
be needed to refresh innovation in the future.
It also raises the question of whether there is 
sufficient ‘connected difference’ to stimulate 
fresh thinking in the future.
4.4 Conclusions: the value of the 
experimental SNA 
The SNA of this locality has generated a fuller 
understanding of the networks and interactions 
which have driven and facilitated innovation. 
It has also revealed where there are significant 
gaps in relationships and networks that need to 
be overcome to ensure that the input of all the 
different stakeholders is maximised and that 
the best prospects are created for the future 
sustainability of new ideas. It has raised critical 
questions which can only be answered with the 
help of the local stakeholders who participated 
in the survey. This exercise revealed a different 
level of detail compared with more traditional 
research and evaluation exercises.
Although the analysis identified a relatively 
high number of individuals who were actively 
involved in innovation, and who were using 
networks to seek new solutions to problems 
that they faced, this active network was not 
enabling knowledge and ideas to flow to all 
members of the locality.
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The local authority, as well as a number of 
schools and colleges, appears to dominate 
the innovation process. With risky innovation 
comes the need for strong strategic control, 
but this approach may limit the extent to 
which ideas emerge from the frontline and 
how communities will adapt locally to the new 
innovations.
Additionally, turnover of elected members and 
officers may mean that the sustainability of 
the innovation network over time is fragile. 
Sustainability would be boosted by spreading 
innovation out into the broader community of 
practice, actively involving the voluntary and 
community sector and the student councils in 
gathering new ideas as well as disseminating 
new ideas to the frontline. Unless there is an 
intervention to change the relationship with 
other constituencies, innovation will be isolated 
at the local authority level.
More detailed discussion with agencies in 
the case study locality will help interpret and 
understand the implications of the results. 
The potential of SNA in furthering the 
understanding of local social innovation, as 
well as in maximising and building sustainable 
innovation by strengthening communication 
networks is largely untapped. Further 
research is required to compare SNAs of 
other innovative localities, exploring, for 
example, the various stages of innovation. 
How are ideas developed, winnowed down 
and matured for the different phases of 
innovation? Can interventions be designed that 
take advantage of existing network structures 
and accelerate the adoption of ideas? A key 
question is whether comparative studies of 
local authorities can be developed into a 
standardised approach that can be scaled up 
across the UK and compared with the growing 
body of international experience.
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Appendix D: In-depth literature review
1. What is social innovation?
The term ‘social innovation’ refers to new 
ideas, institutions or ways of working that aim 
to meet social needs or tackle social problems. 
This might include, for example, new ways of 
working to reduce poverty or discrimination, 
or new services and organisations to care for 
those suffering from illness. Other examples 
of social innovation include the NHS (a radical 
new way to deliver health care at the time of 
its inception), the use of cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) to treat certain mental health 
conditions or The Big Issue organisation 
that produces magazines sold by homeless 
people.169 
Social innovations can take the form of a new 
service, initiative or an organisation, or a radical 
new approach to the organisation and delivery 
of services. Both approaches have the potential 
to spread throughout a profession or sector, 
like education or health care, or geographically 
from one place to another. 
2. Why do some places innovate?
Some geographical locations appear to exhibit 
a flurry of socially innovative practices and 
behaviour, while others seem much less adept 
at finding creative and imaginative ways to 
address the same social goals and needs. 
Every region, city or neighbourhood possesses 
a different range of actors and stakeholders 
who can drive innovation. There may be 
strong individual leaders who are motivated 
to achieve social change (such as politicians, 
business leaders, entrepreneurs). There may 
also be strong or weak networks of third sector 
organisations, vocal or organised activists 
or pressure groups, or strong connections 
between central and local government.
This pattern has also been recognised in the 
field of technological and business innovation. 
Studies such as Canepa and Stoneman’s 
investigation of technological innovation 
in Germany showed that certain locations 
foster much greater innovation than others.170 
Synergies can be created among these 
stakeholders and supported by the combined 
effect of other factors, such as investment, 
human capacity and ambition, to produce an 
environment where innovation can flourish. 
Regional and territorial innovation theory tries 
to explore the reasons why some locations, 
such as Silicon Valley in California or Bangalore 
in India, produce large amounts of innovation 
compared to others. Silicon Valley and 
Bangalore are both acknowledged worldwide 
for their success in sectoral innovation and 
seem to possess a distinctive environment that 
is able to cultivate high levels of innovation 
and creativity.171 
This geographical locus for innovation has 
fascinated many researchers who have 
attempted to distil their behaviour to 
create models and theories that connect 
environmental factors to the innovation levels 
an area exhibits. There has been a great deal of 
recent research on the characteristics that make 
local economies innovative and the connection 
between innovation and place. This work dates 
back to Alfred Marshall’s 19th century study 
of industrial districts. More recently, it includes 
the work of Michael Piore and Charles Sabel 
in the eighties, Michael Porter in the nineties, 
Peter Hall on creative cities and milieux, and 
the more recent suggestions of figures like 
Mulgan, G. (2006) ‘Social 169. 
Innovation: what it is, 
why it matters, how it can 
be accelerated.’ London: 
Basingstoke Press.
Canepa, A. and 170. 
Stoneman, P. (2004) 
‘Financial Constraints to 
Innovation in Europe: 
Policy and Evidence.’ 
EIFC - Technology and 
Finance Working Papers 
36. United Nations 
University: Institute for 
New Technologies.
Moulaert, F. and Sekia, 171. 
F. (2003)  Territorial 
Innovation Models: A 
Critical Survey.  ‘Regional 
Studies.’ 37(3), pp. 
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Richard Florida. Their work has identified a 
host of interesting features of dynamic and 
creative economies – including the roles of 
intermediary bodies, incubators, universities, 
finance, creative industries and migrant 
workers, in encouraging and supporting the 
emergence of geographical innovation. Other 
research about innovation and place has 
identified clustering and proximity as important 
factors in the concentration and transfer of 
knowledge in specific locations, such as those 
found in Silicon Valley, as well as their impact 
on creating deep pools of specialised labour.
Innovation in a geographical area appears 
to occur due to a number of individual 
factors that combine to create an innovative 
environment. 
2.1 Creative cities and innovation
Creative is an adjective that can only be truly 
applied to a few cities across the world. The 
concept of the ‘creative city’ emerged in 
the eighties from a vacuum caused by the 
death of industry in many Western cities. 
Creativity had to be embedded through ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ infrastructure, such as the built 
environment and transport but also education 
and atmosphere. Landry argues that a new 
approach to the development of urban space 
is crucial to the creation of cities in which 
innovative solutions to problems can be found 
and where human culture can thrive.172 He 
outlines the following principles for good city-
making:
Every city should seek not to compete with •	
those around it but should aim to be the best 
for the world, meaning that this development 
must have an ethical and moral foundation.
Cities should reflect local cultures but also be •	
open to new ideas from outside.
Users should be involved in the decision-•	
making process (ordinary people can make 
the extraordinary happen).
Professionals should learn from other •	
examples but not copy slavishly.
Projects that make economic sense but also •	
reinforce ethical values, therefore balancing 
individual and collective needs and desires, 
should be encouraged.
There is a need to create an environment •	
where thinking and imagination are present 
and where tenacity and courage can lead to 
positive change, i.e. to foster ‘civic creativity’ 
or imaginative solutions to public-good 
objectives.
Landry identifies the characteristics creative 
cities need to nurture and sustain talent, many 
of which can be applied to thinking about how 
places can develop a culture of innovation. He 
argues that the city must identify, nurture and 
sustain its talent and must take measured risks. 
It must have widespread leadership, a sense of 
destination, determination and the strength to 
go beyond the political cycle.173 
The idea of a creative centre has been adopted 
to some extent by some British cities, such 
as Liverpool, Sheffield, Manchester and 
Birmingham, which have attempted to place 
cultural industries at the centre of their 
physical redevelopments. Florida identified the 
need to draw in people from a global skilled 
class to drive these new industries; he rated 
cities on a ‘gay index’ of how cosmopolitan and 
attractive cities were to gay and lesbian people. 
Hall claims that all cities that have enjoyed 
a ‘golden age’ have had some things in 
common. They have all had access to resources 
in the form of a tax or revenue collection 
system that has allowed some money to be 
directed towards the arts. They have also 
had a dominant social class that has acted as 
patrons. However, these conditions have not 
inevitably led to innovation. Hall believes that 
more important than resources is a spark that 
arises almost through serendipity – creative 
people having chance conversations and ideas 
following from that.174 This is also an important 
consideration in thinking about the factors that 
need to align in order for local social innovation 
to occur. It is not sufficient for a place to 
have resources and capacity. Places also need 
triggers in the form of individuals and events 
that provide inspiration or vision.
3. Public sector innovation: drivers and 
enablers
While some of these concepts can be 
transferred to an investigation of local social 
innovation, very little work has been conducted 
specifically about the characteristics of 
geographical social or public sector innovation. 
This body of work demonstrates the growing 
interest in social innovation within the public 
sector. A 2007 study of local government 
innovation in England by the Audit Commission 
indicates that 43 per cent of local authorities 
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claim to be engaged in a great deal of social 
innovation practices, whilst an additional 52 
per cent claimed to be engaged in ‘some’ 
innovation.175 These findings illustrate an 
increasing awareness of social innovation in 
local authorities as a means to meet social 
needs.
There is an emerging body of research about 
public service innovation, including recent work 
by the National Audit Office and the Audit 
Commission about local government innovation 
in England, and several academic studies 
exploring the impact of best practice networks 
in spreading learning about innovation. 
Pressure for innovation in the public sector 
primarily comes from changing needs in 
society, not competition as in the private 
sector. The Audit Commission data indicates 
that poor performance is an important driver 
of innovation. English local authorities have 
a statutory duty to undertake continuous 
improvement and are much more likely to do 
so in areas where their provision is poor. This 
claim is supported by Boyne et al., who identify 
that poor performance can spur authorities on 
to adopt ‘best practice’,176 and Hämäläinen and 
Heiskala’s study of social innovation, which 
suggests that the best performing local areas 
are not necessarily the most innovative.177 
Aydalot identifies three kinds of innovation: 
in-house corporate restructuring; the re-
energising of old industries by the application 
of new technologies; and the production of 
knowledge and its application. Much public 
sector innovation appears to fall into the latter 
category.
A number of studies appear to suggest that 
public or third sector innovation is focused, 
rather than being a general organisational 
strategy. Studies found that local authorities 
innovating in one field were not necessarily 
innovating in others. This makes sense in that 
it reduces overall exposure to risk and focuses 
resources on the most pressing needs. 
This finding is reinforced by evidence from 
studies of innovation in other sectors. 
Perroux’s work identifies that innovation 
does not happen everywhere at once but 
fits the pattern he called the ‘growth pole’, 
a point in historic time and space when 
entrepreneurial forces vigorously stimulate 
economic growth (either an individual firm or 
an industry). Barton and Kleiner’s study of 55 
innovative communities found that only a tiny 
proportion of neighbourhoods in this group 
were comprehensively innovative, despite the 
projects in question being initiated and led by 
organisations from different sectors – 69 per 
cent initiated by the voluntary/community 
sector, 22 per cent by the public sector and 
nine per cent by the private.178 
Hartley et al. identify that innovation processes 
in the public sector are unlike those in the 
private sector, with innovation coming from 
different sources and through different 
processes, described as:
Policy-driven – ‘top-down’ from central •	
government.
Organisation-driven – ‘bottom-up’ meeting •	
needs and expectations of users.
Professional-driven – ‘sideways-in’ •	
comparison with other organisations.
User-driven – groups of users developing and •	
advocating their own innovation.
A wide range of studies by bodies such as the 
Audit Commission and NAO refer to the factors 
required to generate innovation in the public 
sector. These can be summarised as: 
Political crisis or change in leadership.•	
Symbolic triggers such as statements of •	
intent, charters, or strategy documents.
Ambition at the executive level which •	
must then percolate through the whole 
organisation. Strong leadership is vital to this 
process.
Joined-up working which allows staff to •	
share information and understand in more 
depth the way in which the organisation 
functions.
Supporting staff to be inventive and allowing •	
space for creative thinking.
Strong relationships with councillors, other •	
partner organisations and external agencies.
Local activists or campaign groups, some •	
likely to be mavericks.
Good links to users and residents to engage •	
their experiences and opinions.
A strong awareness of ongoing policy •	
debates in the public sector.
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Hartley et al. describe a specific role for 
politicians in catalysing public sector 
innovation. This is reinforced by the Audit 
Commission 2007 report investigating 
innovation in public services in which many 
local authorities described internal pressure 
from politicians and demands from staff 
as more influential than external pressures 
for improvement from central government 
or regulatory bodies. However, this type of 
external pressure should not be discounted. It 
appears to often act as an underlying trigger 
for innovation and change, which requires 
internal pressure to act as a catalyst to initiate 
change. 
Other forms of external pressure, such as 
competition between peers or between local 
authorities, are also important underlying 
drivers of innovation. This pressure takes the 
form of best practice or awards for innovation, 
which encourage improvement and adoption of 
ideas from other authorities. 
4. Leadership
There is a significant body of evidence about 
the catalysing effect that strong leadership 
and charismatic individuals have on initiating 
innovation and change. This is reflected in the 
limited evidence about social and public sector 
innovation.
Much existing academic literature that 
addresses the effect of leadership on 
social innovation looks at the role of social 
entrepreneurs who act as pioneers of socially 
innovative ideas. An example of this is the 
recent Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad 
Yunus, who established the Grameen Bank, 
which uses the model of micro finance to 
alleviate deprivation in the developing world. 
In this case, much of Grameen’s success relied 
on Muhammed Yunus’s vision, dedication and 
the strong relationships he has developed with 
business leaders, government officials, donors, 
academics and poor villagers. 
Strong leadership from individuals pioneering 
social innovations often features the building 
of bridges across different sets of stakeholders, 
facilitating and sustaining the innovation. 
Leadership that drives innovation is not 
restricted to single individuals but can also 
refer to top management’s commitment 
to innovation. An innovative organisation 
may feature a collective of individuals who 
prioritise innovation and hence are receptive 
to ideas, willing to take on risk and embrace 
change. Such leadership is often able to 
cross organisational boundaries and stimulate 
innovation in other such organisations through 
partnerships and alliances. 
A study by the Audit Commission into 
innovation in local government found that 
ambition was a key component in driving 
forward and encouraging innovation.179 
Unfortunately, it is often inefficient change 
management, poor implementation or 
inefficient risk management that stifles 
innovation in an area and creates inertia within 
an organisation. 
There is conflicting evidence about the impact 
of political stability on a local authority’s 
willingness to take risks. Wejnert suggests that 
politically unstable authorities may be more 
risk adverse, whereas a large majority may give 
a significant mandate for change. However, 
Walker suggests that long-standing majorities 
may make authorities complacent.180 
5. Organisational culture
Innovation is not a straightforward process 
and is often associated with significant risk. 
Establishing an innovative culture is crucial 
in encouraging and fostering innovation 
and an organisation’s structure can affect 
innovation, by either encouraging or inhibiting 
the generation and spread of good ideas, 
as illustrated in the research undertaken by 
Burns and Stalker in the 1950s who classified 
organisations as epitomising either mechanistic 
or organic structures.181 
The factors that create an innovative 
organisational culture depend on a delicate 
balance and blend of components. It is possible 
to identify a number of characteristics that are 
common to innovative organisations across the 
public and private sectors.
In recent years, many private and public sector 
organisations have moved away from rigid, 
hierarchical, mechanistic structures with clear 
boundaries between departments to adopt 
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looser, more integrated, decentralised, organic 
formations. Organic structures are recognised 
as facilitating innovation due to their greater 
flexibility and stronger communication. 
Combined with a culture that is receptive 
to new ideas, this style of working can be a 
powerful enabler of innovation. This is further 
supported by Rothwell and Dodgson’s research 
on innovation and firm size, which recognised 
smaller firms as being much more innovative 
than their larger counterparts due to their 
organic nature, which supports a more creative 
climate for staff to operate in.182 
A common characteristic of innovative 
organisations is an ‘open’ working culture 
where staff are supported and allowed to 
experiment, and where management does not 
universally impose decisions and choices on 
staff. A degree of risk-taking is an inevitable 
conclusion to this as developing new ideas will 
lead to failure in some cases. 
Creative staff can be a hugely significant source 
of ideas and must be provided with the space 
for creative thinking. Without support from 
executive level members, good ideas can often 
‘run into the organisational sand’.183 
A recent study into innovation in central 
government found only limited innovation in 
many departments. The cause was identified 
as the hierarchical nature of the civil service, 
which discouraged staff from experimentation, 
because of fears that failure could affect their 
careers. Recommendations to improve this 
situation included supporting staff to be more 
creative and the civil service becoming more 
open to risk-taking.184 
Chesbrough’s model of ‘open innovation’ 
shows innovation excels when ideas are free to 
flow between departments and organisations. 
This has also been shown in much research 
undertaken about firms that adopt a project-
based approach to joined-up working and 
cross-cutting structures that allow greater 
flows of information and staff to see a bigger 
picture, facilitating innovation. 
An open approach allows for promising 
ideas, that might otherwise have been 
abandoned, to be picked up by others, 
investigated, and possibly to come to fruition. 
In Chesbrough’s model, communication with 
external stakeholders is also fundamental in 
encouraging innovation, as often knowledge 
gained from external agencies such as 
competitors, academia and allies is important 
and hence links with them must be built and 
maintained.185 Open innovation also allows 
intellectual property rights to be used not 
just to defend ideas but also to make ideas 
tradable to outside organisations willing to 
take them further, with a role for intermediaries 
to provide information, access and finance 
during this transfer of ideas and products. 
This model has largely been developed from 
experience in American hi-tech industries. It 
is questionable how relevant these ideas are 
to other types of industries, however, the idea 
of open innovation is transferable to public 
sector innovation because of the emphasis on 
co-production of ideas and learning through 
best practice.
6. Learning and best practice
An organisation must acknowledge the 
importance of learning if it is to prevent 
innovation from becoming an isolated rare 
event and if it wants to establish a culture of 
innovative behaviour. Innovation involves both 
failures and successes due to the large amounts 
of risk and thus it is crucial to ensure lessons 
from past practice are captured and not lost as 
a new innovation cycle begins. 
Innovative organisations are characterised by 
strong communication and effective evaluation 
of projects, in order to learn from experience 
and consolidate what has been accomplished. 
This is not restricted to learning from within an 
organisation. Much can be learnt from other 
organisations and collective learning can also 
greatly impact social innovation. Regional 
innovation system theory describes how 
learning in a cumulative activity occurs through 
interaction. 
There are a variety of studies that explore 
how ‘best practice’ is used and adopted in 
the public sector. Brannan et al. identify ‘best 
practice’ and innovation as conceptually two 
different things, but ‘best practice’ is often a 
tool to disseminate innovative ideas and helps 
prevent local government from ‘reinventing 
the wheel’. Using ‘best practice’ implies the 
involvement of a central body to determine 
relevant examples and coordinate the system. 
In the UK local government context, the 
Improvement and Development Agency for 
Local Government and the Local Government 
Association play a key role.
Brannan surveyed local authorities about their 
adoption of ‘best practice’ in two policy areas, 
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regeneration and community safety. Innovation 
was most likely in policy areas that had been 
identified as a priority area for some time. 
There was also a link to the level of available 
funding in both highly competent authorities 
and those with poor records, demonstrating 
that both a culture of excellence and the 
‘burning platform’ of lack of success can act as 
drivers for innovation.
The study identified a number of problems with 
the use of ‘best practice’ to inform innovation 
(from most to least problematic):186 
Assessing the appropriateness of the •	
example of ‘best practice’.
Judging whether it really was ‘best practice’.•	
Identifying what ‘best practice’ is.•	
Evaluating it once implanted; knowing where •	
to find ‘best practice’.
Implementing and convincing the local •	
authority to adopt or accept ‘best practice’. 
In England, central government has instituted 
the ‘Beacon Scheme’ (conceived of by 
Hartley and Benington), which recognises 
and awards excellence and innovation in local 
authorities’ service delivery, and which aims 
to encourage the spread of best practice. 
Experience is shared through National Beacon 
conferences, open days in each Beacon, 
learning opportunities such as mentoring 
and shadowing as well as web materials. An 
evaluation of the outcomes of this scheme 
found significant improvements in service 
delivery and partnership working.187 
The major finding from the research was that 
adaptation rather than adoption, or ‘graft 
and grow’ rather than ‘cut and paste’, was 
central to the success of best practice and 
that key to this was reciprocal knowledge 
transfer, customisation of ideas, trust and 
collaboration with respect for diversity, and 
face-to-face contact between staff of different 
organisations.
Two significant boundaries to knowledge 
sharing are:
Organisational – individuals may hoard •	
knowledge in competitive situations, and also 
government policy may inhibit knowledge 
sharing.
Professional – professionals tend to interact •	
in silos, and also struggle to share knowledge 
that is tacit in nature.
7. Networks and people
Collaboration and working with outsiders 
can be beneficial in generating innovation 
because it allows greater access to knowledge, 
capabilities and resources. These benefits are 
greatest when there is a degree of ‘cognitive 
distance’ between the organisations, that is, 
some level of difference in the way that the 
two organisations view the situation, as this 
can provide novel insights.188 
But such collaboration can also be risky. 
Where the distance is too great between 
partners, there can be a complete lack of 
mutual understanding. The risks associated 
with collaboration are situations where 
partners can absorb knowledge and use this 
to gain an advantage, a process known as 
‘spill-over’. However, this is less of a risk in 
the context of public sector innovation. Trust 
between organisations is important in building 
meaningful partnerships, but at its most 
extreme can lead to dependence and blindness 
towards other organisations or ideas. 
For many industries, organisations and 
companies have tended to cluster in a 
particular geographical area, most famously 
the IT industry in Silicon Valley. Historically 
this was seen as a way to reduce the costs of 
transferring raw materials and finished products 
throughout the production process, which is of 
course more relevant for industrial production 
than modern ‘knowledge’ industries. The 
presence of large companies often encouraged 
smaller firms that specialised in part of a 
process or in producing one component to 
spring up around them and act as satellites.
Investigation into the benefits that clustering 
can provide to an industry as a whole revealed 
that in some cases, such as the chemicals 
industry, it was vital, but that in others it 
did not provide such significant advantages. 
Benefits were thought to come from ‘spill-
over’: co-operation – particularly between 
buyers and suppliers; the availability of a skilled 
local work force – and in some cases a local 
specialised education infrastructure and an 
‘innovative milieu’; and a positive ‘buzz’ in the 
local population and among policymakers.189 
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Partnership working, collaboration and joined-
up working can greatly spur and facilitate local 
innovation. The IDeA has reported a trend 
towards partnership working within the public 
sector, both on the regional and local level in 
order to increase effectiveness and efficiency. 
Greater engagement with the voluntary and 
community sector has also enabled local 
government to gain a better understanding 
of local need and use the voluntary sectors’ 
experience and expertise to meet them. This 
has also been seen in the growing trend of 
Councils commissioning certain services to the 
voluntary and community sector.
Network organisational structure was 
introduced into parts of the NHS as an 
alternative to market, or hierarchical systems, 
because it was thought that they would 
improve capacity for knowledge transfer. 
The move was welcomed by many staff 
because it reflected how many people had been 
working informally. However, once formally 
introduced, the networks grew in a way that 
was managed and not organic. Research into 
the success of these changes in the case of 
cancer treatment found that networks did 
provide some new opportunities for knowledge 
transfer. However, the existence of targets and 
the move towards greater centralisation (and 
competition to become centres of excellence) 
resulted in knowledge management being 
marginal to other considerations. Networks 
failed to develop a shared epistemology as 
knowledge management theory suggested they 
would. Government spending on knowledge 
sharing is much lower than that for inspection 
and auditing (£10 million compared to 
£90 million for local government in 2002). 
Inspection implies that best practice is known 
and agreed, but knowledge sharing allows 
for diversity, innovation and learning through 
failure. 
Government has acknowledged the importance 
of learning through electronic knowledge 
transfer and visits, but has not expressed 
a theory of knowledge management, its 
strengths and weakness or how networks 
should be formed and sustained. Currently 
there is too much dissemination and the ‘copy 
and paste’ approach. More needs to be done to 
‘graft and grow’.190 
Examples of the introduction of networks in 
the public sphere are:
E-government, or electronic government, •	
refers to the use of information technology 
to exchange information with its citizens and 
the private sector in order to improve internal 
efficiency, the delivery of services, and 
democratic participation.
T-government, or transformational •	
government, is an initiative propagated by 
the UK Government with the publication of 
Transformational	Government:	Enabled	by	
Technology in November 2005.191 This report 
outlines ways to transform public service 
deliveries and to improve the efficiency 
of government structures with the use of 
information technology designed around the 
citizen.
Innovation Forum between central and local •	
government.
Beacon Award schemes for health, schools, •	
local government, central government, 
police, transport, national parks and waste 
management.
NHS collaborations.•	 192
8. Resources
Successful innovation requires an organisation 
to be able to invest resources to bring about 
necessary change. Innovation is often a 
time-consuming, labour- intensive and 
expensive process associated with high levels 
of associated risk. Private sector organisations 
with constrained resources are often unable to 
justify such expenditures and investment when 
positive returns and improvement cannot be 
guaranteed. This can create a sense of inertia 
that prevents innovation.
Much research regarding technological 
innovation demonstrates there is a direct 
correlation between the availability of financial 
resources and the amount of innovation within 
an establishment. Rothwell and Dodgson’s 
research regarding innovation and firm size 
cites availability of financial investment as a 
key advantage to innovation in larger firms.193 
Both Walker and Rogers argue that those 
with greater resources in terms of finance, 
personnel, facilities and skills have more 
potential for economies of scale and greater 
experience in policy areas that are most 
responsive to innovation. Research into social 
innovation has also shown that organisations 
facing financial constraints are less likely 
to experiment or adopt new ideas and 
technologies.
134
However, a recent study by the Audit 
Commission suggests that the availability 
of funding and finance to innovate is not as 
crucial as widely believed in the context of 
innovation in the public sector. This research 
has shown that many English local authorities 
are innovating in response to problems 
associated with deprivation, where there is 
a lack of financial resources but great social 
need. 
In these situations, other resources are 
enabling innovation such as the availability of 
skilled staff, or access to local partnerships. 
Innovation is fundamentally about people and 
hence an organisation’s capacity to innovate is 
limited by the type and quality of staff within 
the organisation. An important constraint 
on innovation is the lack of staff that are 
consciously invested into the innovation 
process; in practical terms, given the time 
and space to think creatively. Research by 
Saxenian, Porter and Enright has identified 
clustering and proximity as important factors 
in the concentration and transfer of knowledge 
in specific locations, such as those found 
in Silicon Valley, as well as their impact on 
creating deep pools of specialised labour.194 
Frank Moulaert has researched territorial 
innovation in both a private and now more 
social setting, in order to unravel the reasons 
behind, and ways in which geographical areas 
innovate.
Partnerships and alliances are an essential 
way to overcome capacity restraints. Through 
working together, organisations can pool 
resources and dissipate risk. This is of particular 
importance in the case of social innovation 
where resources are limited. 
However, the availability of financial or human 
resources does not automatically lead to 
innovation. Evidence suggests that constrained 
resources can act as a spur for organisations to 
think creatively, and much social innovation has 
been demonstrated by areas and organisations 
with limited funding and capacity. 
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